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LABOR LAW
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
*Tackling Organized Labor: Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. ]
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized a non-
statutory exemption from the Sherman Antitrust Act for certain labor
practices.' The Court created this nonstatutory exemption because the
statutory exemption from federal antitrust laws only protects unions
from judicial scrutiny regarding their formation and specific types of
union activities such as strikes and boycotts. 3
 The foundation for this
nonstatutory exemption lies in the strong labor policy favoring the
association of employees to eliminate competition over working con-
ditions and wages. 4 In creating the nonstatutory labor exemption for
certain union-employer agreements, the Court sought to balance the
congressional policy favoring collective bargaining under the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") with the congressional policy favoring
free competition in business markets.' Without this exemption, anti-
trust laws would prohibit certain concerted actions like collective bar-
gaining, which federal labor laws explicitly recognize.' Moreover, un-
* By Daniel H. Weintraub, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 50 F.3d 1041, 148 L.R.R.M, 2769 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 593 (1995).
2 Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U,S. 616, 622-23,
89 L.R.R.M. 2401, 2403-04 (1975). The sources of organized labor's statutory exemption from
the federal antitrust laws are: (i) sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 17
(1994) and 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1994), respectively); and (ii) sections 4, 5 and 13 of the Norris-La
Guardia Act (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 104-05, 113 (1994), respectively). These statutes do not
consider labor unions to be combinations or conspiracies in the restraint of trade. Connell, 421
U.S. at 621 -22, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2403. These statutes only exempt specified union activities—such
as secondary picketing and boycotts—from the operation of antitrust laws. Id.
3 See Connell, 421 U.S. at 622, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2403. The statutory exemption does not provide
protection for concerted action or agreements like collective bargaining between unions and
nonlabor parties. See id.; see also United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 662, 59
L.R.R.M. 2369, 2370-71 (1965).
4 Connell, 421 U.S. at 622, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2403.
5 Brown, 50 F.3d at 1048, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2772-73 (citing Connell, 421 U.S. at 622). The
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-99 (1994), and the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-
44 (1994), establish a federal policy encouraging the use of collective bargaining. Kieran M.
Corcoran, When Does the. Buzzer Sound?: The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in Professional Sports,
94 Cows'. L. REV. 1045, 1051 (1994). Although Congress encouraged collective bargaining with
the passage of these acts, the use of collective bargaining could conflict with the federal antitrust
laws because the collective bargaining agreements often have provisions Eike hour and wage
restrictions that would restrain trade. Id. at 1050.
6 Corcoran, supra note 5, at 1050. In particular, collective bargaining not only involves
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like the statutory exemption, the nonstatutory exemption is available
to both unions and employers.'
In 1965, the United States Supreme Court in Local No. 189, Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co. held that a union provision estab-
lishing working hours in a collective bargaining agreement with a
multiemployer bargaining unit fell within the protection of the federal
labor laws and thus was exempt from the Sherman Antitrust Act.' The
Court applied the exemption to protect an agreement between a union
and a multiemployer bargaining unit to close meat departments in
food stores at six p.m. 9
 By closing the meat departments at this time,
the union aimed to prevent self-service markets or unskilled laborers
from replacing union butchers at night.'° The Court noted that if the
employee-imposed restraints on the hours were subject to attack under
the antitrust statutes, it would undermine the NLRA's policy of encour-
aging collective bargaining." The Court further recognized that al-
though the effect of the agreement on competition was "apparent and
real," the concern of union members was also immediate and rea1. 12
In weighing the interests of the union workers against the impact on
the product market, the Court concluded that the labor policy ex-
pressed in the NLRA places union-employer agreements on working
hours beyond the reach of the Sherman Antitrust Act." The Court
further stated that it would also exempt from antitrust scrutiny the
union's unilateral demand that other employers in the industry use
the same contract. 14 Thus, in Jewel Tea, the Court for the first time
delineated the nonstatutory exemption by holding a working hour
provision in a multiunion and multiemployer collective bargaining
agreement exempt from the Sherman Antitrust Act.''
concerted action between unions and management, but also concerted action among members
of the same party. See Kevin Acquit & Richard Wolfram, Antitrust Law: A Recent Circuit Court
Decision May Impair Labor's Ability to Sue Multi -Employer Bargaining Units Pursuant to Sherman
Act, NAT'L 14., June 5, 1995, at B5. The conflict with federal antitrust laws arises especially where
there are multiemployers (e.g„ the individual teams of the National Football League) because
the employers' concerted action in agreeing to pay a fixed wage may constitute an illegal
conspiracy to restrain trade. Id.
7
 Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 847 n.14 (3d Cir. 1974).
8 381 U.S. 676, 691, 710, 59 L.FIRM. 2376, 2381, 2390 (1965).
9 Id.
'° Id. at 680-82, 59 L.R.R.M. at 2376-78.
" Id. at 691, 59 LRAM. at 2381.
12 Id.
"Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 691, 59 L.R.R.M. at 2381.
" Id.; see Corcoran, supra note 5, at 1051.
15Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 691, 710, 59 L.R.R.M. at 2381, 2390.
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In 1974, the United States Supreme Court in Connell Construction
Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100 held that the non-
statutory exemption did not apply to a union and multiemployer
agreement that imposed direct restraints on competition among non-
union subcontractors.' 6 The union in that case forced a general con-
tractor to sign an agreement requiring the general contractor to sub-
contract work only to firms that had collective bargaining agreements
with the union.'? The Court reasoned that although the nonstatutory
exemption permits unions to impose some restraints on competition
by acting unilaterally, it does not offer protection when a union and a
nonlabor party (i.e., an employer) agree to restrain competition in the
business market.'$ Thus, the Court concluded in Connell that the non-
statutory exemption did not apply where the terms of a collective bar-
gaining agreement imposed direct restraints on competition among
parties that were not involved in the collective bargaining agreement."
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether
the nonstatutory exemption applies to restraints contained in an ex-
pired collective bargaining agreement, two circuit courts have addressed
this issue.2° In 1976, in Mackey v. National Football League, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a player
restraint provision (the "Rozelle Rule") in a collective bargaining agree-
ment was not exempt from antitrust scrutiny. 21 Under the Rozelle Rule,
after the player's contract expired, the player (now a free agent) could
sign with another club. 22 Nevertheless, if the player did sign with a dif-
ferent club, the commissioner of the National Football League ("NFL")
had the discretion to award the free agent's former club one or more
players from the free agent's new club to compensate the former club."
The Eighth Circuit, reasoning from the Supreme Court's Connell and
Jewel Tea line of cases, devised a three-part test to determine whether
the antitrust exemption applies to a collective bargaining agreement:
(1) the restraint on trade primarily affects only the parties to the
collective bargaining relationship; (2) the agreement concerns a man-
datory subject of collective bargaining; and (3) the agreement is the
16 421 U.S. 616,623-26,89 L.R.R.M. 2401,2403-05 (1975).
12 Id. at 619-21,89 L.R.R.M. at 2402-03.
1 /3 Id. at 622-23,89 L.R.R.M. at 2403-04.
12 Id. at 623-26,89 L.R.R.M. at 2404-05.
20 See Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293,1304,132 L.R.R.M. 2866,2873 (8th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606,
609-10 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
21 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 623.
22 /d. at 610-11.
"Id. at 609,610-11.
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product of bona fide arm's length bargaining. 24 The Mackey court
found that although the Rozelle Rule satisfied the first two elements
of the test, it nevertheless was subject to antitrust scrutiny because it
failed to satisfy the third element." Thus the Mackey court held that
the nonstatutory labor exemption did not apply to a player restraint
provision in a collective bargaining agreement where the provision was
not the product of an arm's length negotiation."
In 1989, in Powell v. National Football League, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the nonstatutory
labor exemption extended beyond a bargaining impasse and contin-
ued as long as the relationship between the parties continued. 27 In that
case, the players challenged the "right of first refusal/compensation"
provision that restricted the players' ability to sign with other teams. 28
The players and the NFL had reached an impasse over the provision,
which had been contained in the previously expired collective bargain-
ing agreement. 29 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that not extending the
exemption to the point of impasse would be inconsistent with the
federal labor policy set out in the NLRA and would give the players an
unfair bargaining position." Thus, the Eighth Circuit held that the
nonstatutory labor exemption applied as long as there remains a col-
lective bargaining relationship between the parties. 3 '
Similarly, in 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in National Basketball Association v. Williams, held that
the nonstatutory labor exemption for certain employment terms con-
tinues until the collective bargaining relationship ends." In that case,
the National Basketball Association ("NBA"), a multiemployer bargain-
ing unit, sought a declaratory judgment exempting the disputed pro-
visions of an expired collective bargaining agreement from antitrust
scrutiny." The Second Circuit reasoned that subjecting the disputed
terms to antitrust scrutiny would subvert the collective bargaining
process because the NBA could neither maintain the status quo nor
24 Id. at 614.
25 Id. at 615-16.
26 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615-16.
27 930 F.2d 1293, 1303-04, 132 L.R.R.M. 2866, 2873 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1040 (1991).
28 Id. at 1295, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2867.
29 Id. at 1296, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2867.
" Id. at 1302-03, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2872-73.
31 Id. at 1303-04, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2873.
32 N ati o n al Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 693, 148 L.R.R.M. 2368, 2375-76 (2d
Cir. 1995), petition far cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3070 (Jul. 24, 1995) (No. 95-137).
" Id. at 686-87, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2370-71.
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implement new terms after impasse without fear of antitrust liability.'"
Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that the nonstatutory exemption
precluded an antitrust challenge to the continued imposition of terms
contained in the expired collective bargaining agreement, even after
the parties had reached an impasse in negotiations."
During the Survey year, in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the
nonstatutory labor exemption extended beyond a bargaining impasse
and remained for as long as the collective bargaining relationship
existed between the multiemployer unit and the union. 36 Furthermore,
the court held that the nonstatutory exemption applied even if the
prior collective bargaining agreement between the parties did not
contain the challenged term. 37 In Brown, the court had to determine
whether federal labor or antitrust laws controlled where—after bar-
gaining in good faith to a point of impasse—a multiemployer bargain-
ing unit imposed a fixed salary for a category of employees, which was
an otherwise lawful step in the collective bargaining process estab-
lished by the NLRA." The court's holding that the nonstatutory ex-
emption extended beyond impasse and remained for as long as the
relationship continued, extends the scope of the nonstatutory exemp-
tion because a court for the first time has applied the exemption to a
term not included in a previous collective bargaining agreement)''
In 1989, the twenty-eight teams that comprised the NFL engaged
in collective bargaining with the NFL Players Association ("NFLPA"). 4"
The collective bargaining agreement that had covered the terms and
conditions of employment for all the players in the league expired in
1987 and the NFL and the NFLPA had immediately begun negotiations
for a new agreement. 4 ' During the course of these negotiations, in early
1989, with the two sides making little progress toward an agreement,
the team owners amended the NFL constitution to change the rules
governing players on the clubs' injured reserve list and to establish
new developmental squads of practice and replacement players." The
34 Id. at 693, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2375-76.
" Id.
"Brown, 50 F.3d 1041, 1045, 148 L.R.R.M. 2769, 2770 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct.
593 (1995).
37 Id. at 1045-46, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2770.
38 Id. at 1045, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2770.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1046, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2771.
4 Brown, 50 F.3d at 1046, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2771. The NFL and NFLPA agreed to a new seven-
year collective bargaining agreement on January 6, 1993. Id. at 1047 n.3, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2772 n.3.
42 Id. at 1046, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2771. The developmental squad allows each NFL team to sign
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amendment, by anticipating a fixed salary for the developmental squad
players, departed from the customary NFL practice of setting players'
salaries through individual negotiations." The NFL proposed a salary
of $1000 per week for the developmental squad players, which the
NFLPA subsequently rejected on behalf of the players." The parties
negotiated to an impasse over the issue and then the NFL unilaterally
implemented the developmental squad program—with a fixed salary
of $1000 per week—by distributing uniform contracts for developmen-
tal squad players to all the teams. 45
In May of 1990, nine developmental squad players, on behalf of
all the developmental squad players, brought a class action suit against
all twenty-eight of the NFL clubs and the NFL itself, alleging that the
defendants had engaged in price fixing in violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act by setting a fixed salary for the developmental squad
players." In June of 1991, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, relying on three different rationales, did not
exempt the NFL and the NFL clubs from antitrust liability. 47 First, the
district court held that the nonstatutory exemption ended when the
parties' collective bargaining agreement expired in 1987." Second, the
district court held that even if the exemption survived the expiration
of the collective bargaining agreement, the exemption ended when
the parties reached an impasse over the issue of the players' salaries."
Third, the district court held that the exemption nevertheless did not
apply because it only protects restraints on competition contained in
collective bargaining agreements, and the fixed salary had not pre-
viously been included in any agreement between the NFL and the
NFLPA.5°
In reversing the district court's finding that the NFL and NFL
clubs did not qualify for the nonstatutory labor exemption, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected the players' argument
rookie and first-year free agents to service contracts for the season year. Brown v. Pro Football,
Inc., 782 F. Supp. 125, 127 (D.D.C. 1991), read, 50 F.3d 1041, 1046, 148 L.R.R.M. 2769, 2771
(D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 593 (1995). The developmental players' job requires them to
practice with the regular NFL players and to replace the regular players who become injured,
but they cannot otherwise play in NFL games. Brown, 50 F.3d at 1046, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2771.
43 Brown, 50 F.3d at 1046, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2771.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1046-47, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2771-72.
46 Id. at 1047, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2771-72.
41 See Brown, 782 F. Supp. at 130-39.
48 Id. at 130-34.
49 Id. at 134-37.
" Id. at 137-39.
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that the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Jewel Tea and
Connell establish that the exemption only applies where a union mani-
fested its consent to a restraint on trade by signing a collective bargain-
ing agreement.'' The court's reasoning rested on the principle that the
nonstatutory exemption must be broad enough in scope to shield the
entire collective bargaining process."
The Brown court reasoned that ending the exemption at the point
of a bargaining impasse would disrupt the balance of the collective
bargaining process." Permitting the union to sue at the point of im-
passe (and thereby invoking the threat of treble damages) would give
the unions "a powerful new weapon"—one which federal labor law did
not contemplate—and would give the unions an incentive to generate
impasses." The court further reasoned that federal labor policy favors
neither party in the collective bargaining process, but rather gives each
party roughly equal economic bargaining power." Consequently, the
court reasoned that the national labor policy expressed in the NLRA
and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 requires that the
nonstatutory exemption function as a shield for all lawful actions taken
by either unions or employers in the collective bargaining process."
The court concluded that injecting antitrust liability into the system
for resolving disputes between unions and employers would both sub-
vert national labor policy and exaggerate federal antitrust concerns."
Finally, the Brown court determined that the Sherman Antitrust
Act focuses primarily on the product market and not on the labor
market." The court reasoned that the strongest case for applying the
nonstatutory exemption involved situations where the restraint on
competition operated primarily in the labor market (i.e., the players'
services to the teams) and not the product market (i.e., football's
consumer entertainment value)." Consequently, the court concluded
that the nonstatutory exemption waived antitrust liability for restraints
on competition imposed through the collective bargaining process as
51 Brown, 50 F.3d at 1049-50, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2774.
52 /d. at 1051, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2775. The court also relied on Wood v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959, 124 L.R.R.M. 2446, 2451-52 (2c1 Cir. 1987) ("No one seriously contends
that the antitrust laws may be used to subvert fundamental principles of our federal policy as set
out in the [NLRA].").
55 Brown, 50 F.3d at 1052, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2776.
51 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
" Id. at 1056, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2779-80.
55 Bronm, 50 F.3d at 1054-55, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2778.
59 Id. at 1056-57 & n.8, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2779-80 & n.8.
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long as the restraints operated primarily on the labor market, as they
did in this case. 6°
The dissent, by judge Patricia Wald, argued that the nonstatutory
exemption should only apply where the previous collective bargaining
agreement included the challenged term. 6' It further argued that the
exemption should end at the impasse because at that time the em-
ployee no longer has an obligation to engage in collective bargaining
over the new terms that the employer unilaterally proposed in good
faith prior to the impasse.62 The dissent acknowledged that the major-
ity's solution provided a bright-line rule that would keep the federal
courts out of messy labor-management disputes.° Nevertheless, the
dissent argued that the rule would not serve the best interest of federal
labor law by promoting collective bargaining. 64
Rather, the dissent countered, the majority's rule would disrupt
the balance of countervailing power in favor of employers by giving
them new rights and incentives, which would harden the parties' bar-
gaining positions. 65 The dissent further argued that because employers
could now unilaterally impose labor market restraints, which had pre-
viously exposed them to antitrust liability, the employers now had an
incentive to raise the stakes during bargaining in hope of winning new
industry-wide labor restraints.66 The dissent also contended that the
majority's rule would encourage multiemployer bargaining units to
stick tough to their demands because at impasse they might have the
ability to impose unilaterally any bargaining proposals the employees
rejected without the consequence of antitrust sanctions. 67
The dissent also argued that the majority's rule, instead of encour-
aging collective bargaining, would force employees either to decertify
their unions or avoid forming them in order to receive protection from
the antitrust laws.66 The dissent asserted that rather than stimulating
6° Id. at 1056-57, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2779-80.
61 Id. at 1064, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2786 (Wald, J„ dissenting).
62 Brown, 50 F.3d at 1066-67, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2788-89 (Wald, J., dissenting); Arcittit &
Wolfram, supra note 6, at BB; see also Taft Broadcasting, 64 L.R.R.M. 1386, 1388 (1967) ("[Alfter
bargaining to impasse, that is, after good faith negotiations have exhausted the prospects of
concluding an agreement, an employer does not violate the Act by making unilateral changes
that are reasonably comprehended within his pre-impasse proposals."), affd sub nom. American
Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622, 67 L.R.R.M. 3032 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
63 Brcrum, 50 F.3d at 1064, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2786 (Wald, J., dissenting).
64 Id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
65 Id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
66 Id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 1064, 1065, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2786, 2787 (Wald, J., dissenting).
68 Brown, 50 F.3d at 1065, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2787 (Wald, J., dissenting). For example, the players
responded to the Powell decision by decertifying their union and then suing under the antitrust
laws. Id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
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collective bargaining, the majority's decision would have the effect of
immunizing unilaterally imposed terms, whether used as a bargaining
tactic or to break an impasse. 6° Finally, the dissent contended that the
majority opinion improperly disregarded the anticompetitive effects of
restraints on the input market, such as labor, and that the antitrust laws
apply to input markets no less than they apply to output rnarkets. 7°
The District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Brown restrains
organized labor's power because it curtails organized labor's ability to
use antitrust laws in the collective bargaining process.71 Although the
majority in Brown sought to maintain a level playing field in employer-
employee relations, its decision fails to follow the congressional man-
date of favoring the collective bargaining process as the primary means
of resolving employer-union disputes:72 By limiting organized labor's
use of antitrust laws in the collective bargaining process, the District of
Columbia Circuit's decision dramatically tilts the field in favor of em-
ployers." Indeed, William B. Gould IV, Chairman of the National
Labor Relations Board, observed that the Brown decision "eliminated
altogether" the role of antitrust laws in the collective bargaining process. 74
As a result of the Brown court's decision, multiemployer bargain-
ing units will have an incentive to raise the stakes in the bargaining
process because they can now attempt to unilaterally impose labor
market restraints after bargaining to impasse, restraints previously sub-
jected to antitrust scrutiny." Rather, employees lose an incentive to
engage in collective bargaining and may decertify their existing unions
in order to take advantage of the antitrust laws. For example, without
the benefit of a union, the NFL players could sue the NFL under the
antitrust laws. By entering into a collective bargaining agreement with
the NFLPA, the NFL received the benefit of antitrust exemption while
the NFLPA bargained away its antitrust remedies for the benefits of
collective bargaining. 76
 As some commentators recently noted, by ex-
tending the nonstatutory exemption beyond impasse to the point
6° Id. at 1067, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2788-89 (Wald, J., dissenting). Specifically, the dissent found
that the uniform salary cap was not designed as a tactical or economic weapon to bring the union
back to the bargaining table, but rather was an attempt to save money by the NFL. Id. at 1069,
148 L.R.R.M. at 2791 (Wald, J., dissenting).
7° Id. at 1059-62, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2782-85 (Wald, J., dissenting).
71 See id. at 1065, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2787 (Wald, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 1058, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2781 (Wald, J., dissenting).
73 See Brown, 50 F.3d at 1059, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2782 (Wald, J., dissenting).
74 Arquit & Wolfram, supra note 6, at 85 (quoting William B. Gould IV, The Curse of the
Bambino: Remarks Delivered at Hofstra University (April 27, 1995)).
75
 See Brown, 50 F.3d at 1064, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2786 (Wald, J., dissenting).
76 Arquit & Wolfram, supra note 6, at 88; see Brown, 50 F.3d at 1057, 1065-66, 148 L.R.R.M,
at 2780, 2787-88 (Wald, J., dissenting).
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where the NFL can unilaterally change the terms—the very terms for
which the NFLPA bargained away their antitrust remedies—the Brown
court gives management all the advantages of antitrust immunity with-
out giving labor any corresponding benefit."
Nevertheless, subsequent courts may limit the Brown decision to
its facts. In Brown, the parties agreed that the salary cap for the develop-
mental squad players had no anticompetitive impact on the product
market (i.e., the entertainment market). 78
 Accordingly, unions in the
future can try to avail themselves of the protection from antitrust
scrutiny in collective bargaining situations by demonstrating the effect
that any unilaterally imposed term would have on the relevant product
or output market. 79
In conclusion, Brown v. Professional Football, Inc. establishes that
the nonstatutory labor exemption extends beyond impasse in the col-
lective bargaining process and lasts as long as the collective bargaining
relationship exists between the union and the multiemployer unit.8°
Furthermore, the nonstatutory exemption applies even to a challenged
term not included in a prior collective bargaining agreement. 81 Con-
trary to federal labor policy, the District of Columbia Circuit's decision
greatly tips the balance in the collective bargaining process in favor of
multiemployer bargaining units." As a result, when bargaining with
multiemployer bargaining units, employees will either have to forgo
unionization or decertify their union in order to avail themselves of
antitrust remedies."
STRIKER REPLACEMENTS
*Burdens of Proof in Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations
Act: NLRB v, Oregon Steel Mills, Inc.'
Section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act ("the Act")
prohibits employers from discriminating against employees for mem-
bership in a labor organization or participation in concerted activities.'
77
 See Arquit & Wolfram, supra note 6, at B8.
78 See Brown, 50 F.3d at 1056-57 & n.8, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2780 & n.8.
79 See id. at 1056-57, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2780.
88 Id. at 1045, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2770.
81 /d. at 1045-46, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2770-71.
82 See id. at 1059, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2781-82 (Wald, J., dissenting).
83 See Brown, 50 F.3(1 at 1056-57, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2780.
* By Brian Patrick Carey, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 47 F.3d 1536, 148 L.R.R.M. 2657 (9th Cir. 1995).
2 See 29 U.S.C. 4 158(a) (3) (1994). Section 8(a) (3) provides in relevant part: "It shall be an
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Section 2(3) of the Act includes in the definition of employee "any
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connec-
tion with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor
practice." The United States Supreme Court has held that employees
engaged in an economic strike retain their employee status under the
Act.4 Determining the precise scope of an employer's duty with respect
to economic strikers has been the topic of considerable case law. 5
In 1938, in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., the United
States Supreme Court held that although employees who are not
working because of a labor 'dispute continue to be "employees" for
purposes of the Act, an employer is entitled to hire permanent em-
ployees to replace the strikers for the legitimate business purpose of
continuing operations.' In Mackay, union members engaged in an
economic strike, and the employer hired replacement workers. 7 When
the strikers offered to return to work unconditionally, the employer
rehired most of the strikers.' The employer, however, excluded from
reinstatement five employees who were active in the union. 9
 The union
brought unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Rela-
tions Board ("the Board") alleging that the employer had not rein-
stated these five employees because they had joined and assisted in the
strike.'" The Court stated that although it was not an unfair labor
practice to replace the striking employees, and the employer was not
bound to discharge the replacements after the strike, the employer's
refusal to reinstate the five employees solely because of their participa-
tion in the strike constituted discrimination on the basis of union
activity in violation of section 8(a) (3) of the Act." The Court reasoned
that because economic strikers remain employees under section 2(3),
an employer must reinstate an economic striker who offers uncondi-
tionally to return to an available position. 12 Thus, the Mackay Court
unfair labor practice for an employer .. . by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization." Id.
3 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994).
4
 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Cu., 304 U.S. 333, 345, 2 L.R.R.M. 610, 614 (1938).
5 See, e.g., NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 66 L.R.R.M. 2737 (1967); NLRB v.
Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 65 L.R.R.M. 2465 (1967); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373
U.S. 221, 53 L.R.R.M. 2121 (1963).
304 U.S. at 345-46, 2 L.R.R.M. at 614.
7 Id. at 337, 2 L.R.R.M. at 611.
8 Id.
" Id. at 339, 2 L.R.R.M. at 612.
1 ° Id.
11 Mackay, 304 U.S. at 346, 2 L.R.R.M. at 614.
12 See id. at 345-46, 2 L.R.R.M. at 614.
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concluded that the employer had committed an unfair labor practice
under section 8(a) (3) by refusing to reinstate the five employees based
on their participation in the strike.' 3
In 1963, in Labor Board v. Erie Resistor Corp., the United States
Supreme Court held that although section 8(a) (3) analysis normally
turns on whether the employer's discriminatory conduct is motivated
by an antiunion purpose, where the conduct is "inherently destructive"
of employee interests, the Board is not required to demonstrate anti-
union motive to establish a violation of the Act." Moreover, the Court
held that although an employer can usually defend a section 8(a) (3)
charge by showing that it acted for legitimate business purposes, such
a showing is not always a defense when the employer's conduct is
"inherently destructive" of employees' rights.' 5 In Erie Resistor, during
an economic strike, the employer offered twenty years of additional
seniority to all replacements and strikers who returned to work by a
certain date.' 6 The union charged that the offer of super-seniority to
employees during the strike discriminated against employees on the
basis of union activity)? The employer attempted to justify the offer of
super-seniority as a legitimate business practice necessary to continue
production during the strike.'s The Court distinguished the offer of
super-seniority from the hiring of permanent replacements in Mackay
and determined that the employer's conduct here was inherently de-
structive of employee rights.° The Court explained that the devastating
consequences that the offer of super-seniority had on the employees'
right to engage in concerted activities outweighed the interests of the
employer in operating its business. 20 The Court inferred an illicit mo-
tive behind the employer's conduct, holding the employer to have
intended the consequences that foreseeably and inescapably flowed
from the destructive conduct. 2 ' The Erie Resistor Court concluded,
therefore, that the employer's granting of super-seniority to replace-
ment employees during a strike was inherently destructive and that the
Board was not required to offer specific evidence of the employer's
IS See id.
14 373 U.S. 221, 227-29, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2121, 2124 (1963).
15 /d.
16 Id. at 223, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2122.
17 Id. at 224, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2123.
18 Id. at 225-26, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2123.
19 Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 232, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2126.
29 1d.
21 See id. at 228, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2124.
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discriminatory motive to prove an unfair labor practice under section
8(a) (3) . 22
Consistent with this reasoning, in 1967, in NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers, the United States Supreme Court held that once the Board
has proven that an employer has engaged in discriminatory conduct
that adversely affects employees' rights to some extent, the burden
shifts to the employer to establish that the conduct was motivated by
legitimate and substantial business reasons." Specifically, the Court
stated that in cases where an employer's discriminatory conduct is
"inherently destructive" of important employee rights, the Board can
establish an unfair labor practice without proof of antiunion motiva-
tion.24
 Additionally, the Court stated that when the resulting harm to
employee rights is not inherently destructive and the employer has
demonstrated a legitimate and substantial business reason, the Board
cannot establish an unfair labor practice merely by showing antiunion
motivation." In Great Dane, the union engaged in an economic strike
even though its collective bargaining agreement expired." During the
strike, the employer continued operations, using nonstrikers, replace-
ments, and strikers who had returned to work.27
 When the strikers
asked for their accrued vacation benefits pursuant to the terms of the
expired collective bargaining agreement, the employer rejected the
strikers' demand and claimed that the strike had terminated all con-
tractual obligations." The employer did announce, however, that it
would pay such benefits to striker replacements, returning strikers and
nonstrikers. 29
 The Court determined that the refusal to pay vacation
benefits to the strikers amounted to discrimination on the basis of
concerted activity in violation of section 8(a) (3). 3° The Court stated
that it was not required to determine the degree to which the chal-
lenged conduct affected employee rights because the employer had
not met its burden of proving a legitimate and substantial business
reason for its discriminatory conduct.'' The Court reasoned that the
employer bears the burden of demonstrating a legitimate and substan-
tial business reason because proof of motivation is most accessible to
22 Id. at 227, 231, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2124, 2125.
23 See 388 U.S. 26, 33-34, 65 L.R.R.M. 2465, 2468-69 (1967).
24 Id. at 34, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2469,
25 Id.
26 Id. at 29, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2467.
27 Id.
28 Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 29, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2467.
2° Id.
3° Id. at 32, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2468.
Si Id. at 34, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2469.
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the employer. 32 The Great Dane Court concluded, therefore, that with-
out a showing of legitimate and substantial business justification, with-
holding accrued vacation benefits was an unfair labor practice under
section 8(a) (3)."
Also in 1967, in NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., the United States
Supreme Court held that former strikers' right to reinstatement, does
not depend upon job availability when they first apply for reinstate-
ment, but continues until they have obtained other regular and sub-
stantially equivalent employmentm In Fleetwood, a union's economic
strike caused a sharp cutback in the employer's production, and when
the strikers applied for reinstatement after the strike, their positions
no longer existed." The employer, however, hired six new employees
for jobs that the strikers were qualified to perform. 36 Subsequently, the
union charged that hiring new employees over strikers was discrimina-
tory under section 8(a) (3). 37 Following the reasoning in Great Dane,
the Fleetwood Court stated that the Board did not need to show antiun-
ion motivation because the employer had not met its burden of prov-
ing a legitimate and substantial business reason for refusing to reinstate
the strikers." The Court determined that the curtailment of produc-
tion was not a legitimate and substantial business reason because the
undisputed evidence showed that the company's intention was to in-
crease production as soon as possible." The Fleetwood Court reasoned
that the basic right to employment cannot depend upon the mere
technicality of job availability at the moment when applications are
filed. 4" On the contrary, the Court explained, the right continues
until the former strikers have obtained other regular and substantially
equivalent employment." The Fleetwood Court concluded, therefore,
that the employer was required to reinstate former strikers to available
comparable positions. 42
In 1987, in NLRB v. Rockwood & Co., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the reasoning of Fleetwood and
Great Dane to hold that a former striker has a right to reinstatement
32 Id.
33 See Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 34-35, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2469.
54 389 U.S. 375, 381, 66 L.R.R.M. 2737, 2739 (1967).
35 Id. at 376, 66 L.R.R.M. at 2737.
36 Id. at 377, 66 L.R.R.M. at 2738.
37 Id.
" See id. at 380, 66 L.R.R.M. at 2738-39.
39 See Fleetwood, 389 U.S. at 376, 66 L.R.R.M. at 2737.
4° Id. at 381, 66 L.R.R.M. at 2739.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 380-81, 66 L.R.R.M. at 2739.
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to any substantially equivalent position for which he or she is qualified
unless the employer can demonstrate a legitimate and substantial busi-
ness reason for not reinstating the striker." In Rockwood, the union
engaged in an economic strike, and the employer took applications for
permanent replacement employees. 44
 At the end of the strike, the
employees unconditionally offered to return to work, but the employer
refused to reinstate them. 45
 The union brought an unfair labor practice
charge, alleging that the employer had hired four new, inexperienced
workers instead of former strikers and had terminated one striker after
offering him a position that was not substantially equivalent to his
previous position." The employer asserted that its refusal to reinstate
the strikers was due to the legitimate business reason that the strikers
were unqualified for the available positions. 47
 Noting that the strikers
were more experienced than the replacements, however, the court
determined that the employer had not produced sufficient evidence
to demonstrate that the strikers were unqualified." Citing Fleetwood,
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that an employee has the right to accept
or reject an offer to a non-substantially equivalent poststrike position
without affecting his or her right to reinstatement. 49 Consequently,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the employer had violated section
8(a) (3) by refusing to rehire the former strikers to substantially equiva-
lent positions after the strike. 50
During the Survey year, in NLRB v. Oregon Steel Mills, Inc., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an
employer bears the burden of proving that the decision to hire "tem-
porary" workers over former strikers was made for legitimate and
substantial business reasons. 51
 The court stated that unless an employer
can show a legitimate and substantial business reason for refusing to
reinstate the strikers, the employer is guilty of an unfair labor practice
under section 8(a) (3).52
 The Ninth Circuit applied this holding to
enforce the Board's order, which declared that Oregon Steel had
42 NLRB v. Rockwood & Co., 834 F.2d 837, 840-41, 127 L.R.R.M. 2070, 2072-73 (9th Cir.
1987),
44 Id, at 839, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2071.
45 1d.
46 Id. at 840, 845, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2072, 2073,
47 Id. at 840, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2072.
46 Rockwood, 834 F.2(1 at 840-41, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2072.
42 Id. at 842, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2073.
50 See id. at 841, 842, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2072, 2073.
51 47 F.3d 1536, 1539, 148 L.R.R.M. 2657, 2659 (9th Cir. 1995).
52 Id.
320	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 37:303
violated section 8(a) (3) by failing to reinstate former strikers and by
removing former strikers from the preferential reinstatement list."
The controversy in Oregon Steel Mills arose from an economic
strike by two locals of the United Steel Workers of America and the
418 employees of Oregon Stee1. 54 After the strike began, Oregon Steel
reduced the work force and instituted a hiring freeze. 55 The union
made an unconditional offer to end the strike, and the employer
placed the former strikers' names on a preferential reinstatement list
for future job openings.56 Subsequently, the employer hired approxi-
mately 112 strikers from the preferential reinstatement list. 57 The em-
ployer also contracted for services through a temporary employment
agency, however, even though former strikers remained on the prefer-
ential reinstatement list." The union filed an unfair labor practice
charge with the Board claiming that the employer had violated section
8(a) (3) by hiring temporary employees obtained through independent
employment agencies instead of rehiring qualified former strikers. 59
An Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") concluded that Oregon
Steel had violated section 8(a) (3) by: (1) using temporary service
agency employees to perform work when qualified strikers remained
on the preferential reinstatement list; (2) disqualifying eight employ-
ees for reinstatement because the employer incorrectly determined
that they had received comparable employment elsewhere; and (3)
striking the names of two employees from the preferential reinstate-
ment list because the employer determined that the strikers refused
an offer of substantially equivalent positions at Oregon Stee1. 6° The
Board affirmed the decision of the Aq and subsequently filed an
application for enforcement of its order. 61 Oregon Steel appealed to
the Ninth Circuit, challenging on three grounds the Board's decision
that it had violated section 8(a) (3) of the Act."
First, the Ninth Circuit rejected Oregon Steel's argument that the
employees hired through the temporary employment agency were not
considered new employees under the Act." The employer argued that
53 /d, at 1537, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2657.
54 Id. at 1541, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2661.
55 Id.
58 Oregon Steel Mills, 47 F.3d at 1538, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2658.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 1542, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2661. Employees of the temporary service agency represented
five to 10 percent of the work force at Oregon Steel. Id.
59 Id.
6° Oregon Steel Mills, 47 F.3d at 1542, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2661.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1537, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2657.
65 Id. at 1538, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2658.
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the Board had failed to show a prima facie violation of the Act because
an employer's obligation to hire former strikers from the preferential
reinstatement list applied only when it hired new employees on its
payroll." The court reasoned that the distinction between new employ-
ees hired and paid by Oregon Steel and temporary workers hired
through an independent employment agency under contract with Ore-
gon Steel was irrelevant under the Act. 66 In reaching this conclusion,
the court applied the reasoning of Fleetwood, that "the right [of a
former striker] to reinstatement does not depend upon technicali-
ties."66
 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Oregon Steel's
hiring of temporary employees to perform the same jobs held by the
former strikers before the employer exhausted the preferential reinstate-
ment list constituted an unfair labor practice under section 8(a) (3). 67
The Ninth Circuit next addressed Oregon Steel's argument that
the Board had misapplied the law by requiring an employer to dem-
onstrate that former strikers were not rehired for legitimate and sub-
stantial business reasons.68 The court stated that this argument was
precluded by both United States Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit
precedent.° Specifically, the court cited Fleetwood, in which the Su-
preme Court had explicitly held that the employer bears the burden
of proving that it did not rehire strikers for a legitimate and substantial
business reason, and Rockwood, in which the Ninth Circuit had held
that an employer bears the burden of proof for a refusal to reinstate
strikers to available positions." Thus, the Oregon Steel Mills court con-
cluded that the employer had the burden of producing a legitimate
and substantial business reason for hiring temporary workers over
former strikers. 71
Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that the employer did not meet its
burden of proving that the decision to hire temporary workers was
made for legitimate and substantial business reasons. 72 The court de-
termined that the assertion that it had hired temporary workers in
place of the former strikers because it was an effective cost-saving
measure was not enough to meet its burden of proof." The court stated
64 Id.
65 Oregon Steel Mills, 47 F.5d at 1538, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2658.
66 Id, (quoting Fleetwood, 389 U.S. at 381, 66 L.R.R.M. at 2737).
67 See id, at 1538-39, 148 L.R,R,M, at 2658-59.
68 14. at 1538, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2658.
60 Id.
70 Oregon Steel Mills, 47 F.3d at 1538, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2658 (citing Fleetwood, 389 U.S. at 381,
66 L.R.R.M. at 2737; Rockwood, 834 F.2d at 840-41, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2072).
71 See Oregon Steel Mills, 47 F.3d at 1539, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2659.
72 Id.
73 Id.
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that the employer had failed to offer a financial or accounting analysis
of its purported cost-saving measures or to show a nexus between its
use of contract labor and the company's economic health. 74
 The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that the broad question of whether an employer with
a preferential reinstatement list can ever contract with outside agencies
for labor was not at issue because the employer had failed to demon-
strate a legitimate and substantial business reason." The Ninth Circuit
concluded, therefore, that without empirical findings to demonstrate
a legitimate and substantial business reason for hiring temporary work-
ers over former strikers, Oregon Steel's assertion of cost saving was
insufficient to meet its burden of proof and avoid liability under the Act."
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit addressed Oregon Steel's chal-
lenge to the Board's finding that the employer had unlawfully removed
five employees from the preferential reinstatement list. 77
 The court
stated that an employer may remove a former striker from a preferen-
tial reinstatement list only if the striker either has found regular and
substantially equivalent employment elsewhere or has refused an em-
ployer's offer of substantially equivalent employment." Accordingly,
the court affirmed the Board's finding that the employer had unlaw-
fully removed three former strikers from the reinstatement list because
they had not found substantially equivalent employment elsewhere. 7g
The court also affirmed the Board's finding that the employer had
unlawfully removed two employees who had rejected new job offers
from the preferential reinstatement list because the new job offers were
not substantially equivalent to their prestrike positions." Thus, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the Board's finding that removal of these five
employees from the preferential reinstatement list violated section
8(a) (3) of the Act. 81
In a separate opinion, Judge Alacorn dissented from the court's
allocation of the burden of proof to the employer. 82 Judge Alacorn read
Great Dane and Fleetwood to stand collectively for the proposition that
in the ordinary situation where an employer's conduct is not inher-
ently destructive of employee rights, the Board must make a prima
74 Id.
75 Id.
78 See Oregon Steel Mills, 47 F.3d at 1539, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2659.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
8° Id.
81
 Oregon Steel Mills, 47 F.3d at 1539-40, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2659-60.
82 Id. at 1540, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2660 (Alacorn, J., dissenting).
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facie showing that an employer has committed an unfair labor practice
and that the conduct was motivated by an antiunion purpose." Judge
Alacorn stated that there was no evidence in the record that Oregon
Steel's conduct was inherently destructive and that the Board had
failed to demonstrate that the employer's decision to use temporary
service agency employees was motivated by antiunion bias." Therefore,
Judge Alacorn concluded that because the Board had failed to dem-
onstrate antiunion motivation, Oregon Steel had not violated section
8(a) (3) by hiring temporary employees over former strikers."
Moreover, Judge Alacorn stated that the majority opinion did not
address the initial dispositive question of whether the employer's con-
duct was inherently destructive of employees' rights. 86 Reasoning that
Oregon Steel's conduct did not create far-reaching effects that would
have hindered future bargaining or discriminated solely upon the basis
of participation in union activity, Judge Alacorn determined that Ore-
gon Steel's use of employees from the temporary employment agency
to perform duties previously executed by the strikers was not inher-
ently destructive of employee rights. 87 Judge Alacorn also noted that
the employer had reinstated 112  strikers after the strike ended." Judge
Alacorn concluded, therefore, that there was no evidence in the record
that the employer's conduct was inherently destructive of employee
rights."
Judge Alacorn determined that, in the absence of any evidence of
inherently destructive conduct, the employer had met its burden of
demonstrating a legitimate, and substantial business reason. 9° Judge
Alacorn contended that the majority's reliance on the ALJ's findings
was misplaced because the AU had failed to consider the testimony of
both Oregon Steel's Vice-President of Manufacturing regarding the
cost savings of using temporary workers and an industrial psychologist
regarding employee confidence. 91 Judge Alacorn reasoned that, unlike
in Fleetwood, where no evidence was put forth by the employer, in this
case the testimony was sufficient to demonstrate that Oregon Steel had
83 Id. at 1543, 148 1,..12,R.M. at 2662-63 (Alacorn, J., dissenting).
84 Id. at 1545, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2664 (Alacorn, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 1546, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2665 (Alacorn, J., dissenting).
88 Oregon Steel Mills, 47 F.3d at 1545, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2664 (Alacorn, J., dissenting).
87 Id. at 1544-45, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2664 (Alacorn, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 1545, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2664 (Alacorn, J., dissenting).
89 Id. (Alacorn, J., dissenting).
9° Id. (Alacorn, J., dissenting).
91 Oregon Steel Mills, 47 F.3d at 1545, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2664 (Alacorn, J., dissenting).
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contracted the temporary employees for a legitimate and substantial
business reason."
The Oregon Steel Mills court correctly affirmed that the burden of
proof is on the employer to demonstrate a legitimate and substantial
business reason for a refusal to reinstate strikers to available positions."
The United States Supreme Court consistently has held that an em-
ployer bears the burden because the employer has better access to
proof of motivation." The Ninth Circuit's placement of the burden of
proof on the employer safeguards the right of employees to engage in
concerted activities free of employer discrimination, while still provid-
ing an appropriate avenue to an employer who can demonstrate a
legitimate and substantial business reason for hiring temporary work-
ers." Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit was correct in not analyzing
whether the employer's conduct was inherently destructive of em-
ployee rights." A determination that the employer did not demon-
strate a legitimate and substantial business reason precluded an analy-
sis of whether the employer's conduct was inherently destructive of
employee rights." Therefore, the dissent's emphasis on the absence of
inherently destructive conduct was misplaced, and requiring the Board
to prove inherently discriminatory conduct would have incorrectly
raised the hurdle for establishing an unfair labor practice charge
under section 8(a) (3). 98
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's decision is consistent with an under-
lying policy of the Act encouraging the economic strike as a legitimate
means of resolving a labor dispute." The Act's declaration of policy
states in relevant part that "experience has proven that protection by
law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively
safeguards ... and promotes the flow of commerce."'" Additionally,
the United States Supreme Court has made clear that there are limits
to the weapons that employers may use during a strike, precisely be-
92
	(Alacorn, J., dissenting).
93 See id. at 1538, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2658.
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34, 65 L.R.R.M. 2465, 2469 (1967).
95
 See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 234-35, 53 L.R.R.M. 2121, 2127 (1963).
96 See Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 34-35, 65 L.R.R.M. at '2469 (establishing that where employer
has noi come forward with legitimate and substantial business reason for discriminatory conduct
it is not necessary to decide degree to which challenged conduct might have affected employee
rights).
97
 See id.
99
 See Oregon Steel Mills, 47 F.3d at 1544, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2664 (Alacorn, J., dissenting).
99
 29 U.S.G. § 151 (1994). it is declared the policy of the United States .
	 Ito protect] the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization ... for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of employment." Id.
199 Id.
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cause particular tactics would have a devastating impact on the parties'
bargaining relationship at the strike's conclusion."' Furthermore, in
light of the ongoing debate in Congress regarding the right of employ-
ers to hire striker replacements, this decision, unlike the dissent's
reasoning, sustains the strike as a potent economic weapon that sup-
ports the principles of the collective bargaining system.'" For these
reasons the Ninth Circuit's decision correctly supports the public pol-
icy underlying the Act and maintains the economic strike as an essen-
tial, legitimate feature of our collective bargaining system. 105
Although the Ninth Circuit's invalidation of Oregon Steel's at-
tempt to replace former strikers with temporary workers represents a
step forward for employee rights, the decision may not adequately
resolve all issues surrounding the use of poststrike temporary work-
ers."4 The Oregon Steel Mills court declined to address the broader issue
of whether an employer with a preferential reinstatement list can ever
contract with outside temporary employment agencies. 105 As a result,
in the case where the employer has satisfied the burden of proving a
legitimate and substantial business reason, Oregon Steel Mills does not
discuss whether the employer should maintain operations by means
less restrictive than hiring temporary workers over former strikers.
Similarly, the decision does not address the more difficult issue of what
strikers must show to satisfy their burden of proving that an employer's
conduct was inherently destructive of employee rights.
In sum, the Ninth Circuit in Oregon Steel Mills held conclusively
that temporary workers are equivalent to new employees for purposes
of the Act. 106 This decision followed naturally from the United States
Supreme Court's rulings in Great Dane and Fleetwood, holding that
former strikers are entitled to reinstatement to available positions
unless the employer refuses to reinstate them for a legitimate and
substantial business reason.'" Oregon Steel Mills does not answer all
questions regarding the scope of an employer's right to hire replace-
101 Samuel Estreicher, Strikers and Replacements, 3 LAB. LAIN. 897, 898 (1987).
1°2 David Masci, Senate Rejects Striker Bill; More Action Unlikely, CONG. Q., July 16, 1994, at
1936. During the 103d Congress, the House of Representatives passed the Workplace Fairness
Act, HR 5, by a vote of 239-190. Id. The measure would have overturned the Mackay decision by
prohibiting employers from permanently replacing workers who go on strike seeking economic
benefits. Id. The companion bill 5.55 was defeated in the Senate by a vote of 53-47 on July 12,
1994. Id. The legislation has not yet been considered before the 104th Congress. See id,
1 °3 See 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1994).
104 See Oregon Steel Mills, 47 F.3d at 1539, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2659.
1 "5 See id.
1°6 Id. at 1538, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2658,
1 °7 See id. at 1539, 148 L.R.R.M. at 2659; see also Fleetwood 389 U.S. 380-81, 66 L.R.R.M. at
2739; Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 35, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2469.
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ment workers, however, and practitioners can expect the courts and
Congress to continue to grapple with this contentious issue. ] °$
th8 Exec. Order No. 12,954, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,023 (1995). President Clinton issued Executive
Order 12,954 on March 8, 1995, which authorizes the Secretary of Labor to terminate the
contracts of government contractors that permanently replace lawfully striking workers, if doing
so will promote economy and efficiency in government procurement. Id.
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EMPLOYMENT LAW
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
*Sexual Harassment—Clearer Standards for Employers at the
Expense of Victims' Rights: Gary v. Long'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") makes it
unlawful for employers to discriminate against an individual based on
his or her gender.' Title VII thus prohibits sexual harassment of an
employee. 3 Courts have recognized two forms of sexual harassment
that violate Title VII's provisions: (1) quid pro quo; and (2) hostile
work environment.4 Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when an
employer conditions a tangible job benefit or privilege on the em-
ployee's submission to sexual demands and adverse consequences fol-
low from the employee's refusal. 5 The second theory, hostile work
environment sexual harassment, arises when the harassment is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the employee's working conditions and
create an abusive working environment (' The courts have not yet es-
tablished a clearly defined standard, however, to determine the extent
of an employer's liability for a hostile work environment claim.?
In 1986, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the United States
Supreme Court held that hostile environment sexual harassment con-
stitutes a form of sex discrimination actionable under Title VII. 8 In
Meritor, a female bank employee claimed that her supervisor made
* By Nicole Rosenkrantz, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIE,'W.
59 F.3d 1391, 1396, 68 Fair Empl, Prac. Gas. (BNA) 581, 583-84 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 569, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1760 (1995).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (I) (1988). Title VII states in relevant part that it is "an unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 1822, 1825
(1986).
4 See id. at 65-66, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1826.
5 See Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas, (BNA)
596, 603 (2d Cir. 1989).
6 See Meritor, 977 U.S. at 66-67, 90 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1827; Gamer°, 890 F.2d at
577, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 602.
7 See Meriior, 477 U.S. at 72, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1829; see also Bunton v. BMW
of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 110, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 53, 58 (3d Cir. 1994); Hicks v.
Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1418, 45 Fair Emil'. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 608, 617 (10th Cir. 1987),
aff'd on reh'g, 928 F.2d 966, 973, 59 Fair Empl. Prat. Cas. (BNA) 1787, 1793 (10th Cir. 1991).
8 477 U.S. at 66, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1827.
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repeated demands for sexual favors, fondled her in public and forcibly
raped her on several occasions. 9
 The employee sought injunctive relief,
compensatory damages and punitive damages against both her super-
visor and the bank for violations of Title VII. 1° In addressing the
employee's claim, the Supreme Court noted that Title VII's language
does not limit its application to "economic" or "tangible" discrimina-
tion." Additionally, the Court observed that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") Guidelines fully supported the
view that sexual harassment leading to noneconomic injury can violate
Title VII. 12
 The Court also reasoned that, although the existence of a
grievance procedure does not per se insulate an employer from Title
VII liability, a grievance procedure that effectively addresses sexual
harassment might shield an employer from liability. 13 Thus, the Meritor
Court held that employers do not automatically incur liability for the
acts of their supervisors that violate Title V11. 14
 Moreover, the Supreme
Court held that a Tide VII hostile work environment sexual harassment
claim is sufficient even absent economic injury. 15
In another 1986 decision, Highlander v. KEG. National Manage-
ment Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that an employer was not liable for a quid pro quo sexual harassment
claim because the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that the
plaintiff suffered a tangible job detriment upon rejecting her supervi-
sor's sexual advances.' 6 In Highlander, an employee invited her super-
visor to go out for a drink to discuss the employee's promotion possi-
bilities." The supervisor responded that if the employee wanted to
become a co-manager, "there is a motel across the street."" When
the employer terminated the employee four months later, she sub-
sequently brought this action.' 9
 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the
plaintiff's suggestion that she and her supervisor meet in a bar induced
the alleged harassment that followed. 20 Moreover, the court observed
9 Id. at 60, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1824.
I° Id.
11 Id. at
 64, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1826.
12 Id. at 65, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1826.
19 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1829. The Court determined
that the employer's grievance procedure inadequate because it failed to address sexual harass-
ment in particular, and because it required the employee to complain to her supervisor. Id. at
72-73, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1829.
14 Id. at 72, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1829.
15 Id. at 64-65, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1826.
16 See 805 F.2d 644, 649, 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 654, 657-58 (6th Cir. 1986).
17 Id. at 646, 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 655.
18 Id.
19 See id. at 647, 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 656.
29 Id. at 649, 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 657.
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that statements made by the plaintiff and her husband subsequent to
the alleged sexually offensive comment revealed that the plaintiff did
not take her supervisor's conduct seriously. 2 ' Most importantly, the
court noted that the supervisor did not participate in the decision to
terminate the plaintiff and the reasons for her termination were unre-
lated to the alleged sexual harassment. 22 Thus, the Sixth Circuit held
that a plaintiff could not recover for quid pro quo sexual harassment
because she did not suffer a tangible job detriment as a result of her
refusal to submit to sexual blackmail."
In 1987, in Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that to establish a valid quid pro
quo sexual harassment claim, the plaintiffs rejection of her supervi-
sor's sexual advances, rather than another factor such as poor job
performance, must be the cause of the plaintiff's job detriment," In
Hicks, a female security guard claimed that two of her supervisors
sexually harassed her on several occasions." During the incidents, her
supervisors allegedly touched her breasts, buttocks and thighs and
made harassing comments. 26 The Tenth Circuit first considered the
plaintiffs claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment. 21 The court deter-
mined that the record failed to show any suggestion that either of the
supervisors conditioned the plaintiffs employment on granting sexual
favors. 2B Additionally, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the employer
discharged the plaintiff because of her poor work performance and
not because she refused to submit to her supervisor's sexual advances."
Thus, the Tenth Circuit held that an employer had no liability for quid
pro quo sexual harassment in the absence of a nexus between the
employee's refusal to submit to her supervisor's sexual advances and
her subsequent termination."
21 Highlander, 805 F.2d at 649, 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 657.
22 1d. The employer terminated the plaintiff for her repeated failures to attend work, advise
her supervisor of her absences and provide medical verifications to support her frequent ab-
sences. Id.
23 See id.
24 833 F.2d 1406, 1414, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 608, 614 (10th Cir. 1987), affd on
reh'g, 928 F.2d 966, 973, 59 Fair Empl. I'rac. Cas. (BNA) 1787, 1793 (10th Cir. 1991). The court
also ruled on the plaintiffs claims of racial harassment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, holding that the employer did not maintain a racially
hostile work environment. See id. at 1408, 1412-13, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 609, 612-13.
25 Id. at 1410, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 610-11,
26 Id. at 1409-10, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 610-11.
27 Id. at 1413, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 613,
28 Id. at 1414, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 614.
29 Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1414, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 614.
s() See id. The court also addressed a hostile work environment claim. Id. The court relied on
agency principles in concluding that, on remand, the employer might be liable under Title VII
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In 1989, in Carrero v. New York City Housing Authority, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an employee
established quid pro quo sexual harassment where her refusal to sub-
mit to her supervisor's sexual advances resulted in a tangible job
detriments' In Carrero, the plaintiff's supervisor made sexual advances
toward her on several occasions despite her resistance and protests."
As a result of her repeated refusals and complaints, the plaintiff's
supervisor criticized her in public and gave her an unsatisfactory rating
on her probationary report." Subsequently, the supervisor reassigned
the plaintiff to a lesser position.s4
 The Second Circuit reasoned that
the plaintiff established a quid pro quo claim because the plaintiff
suffered adverse consequences as a result of her refusal to submit to
her supervisor's sexual advances." Additionally, the court reasoned
that the harassing employee acted as and for the company when
inducing the harassed employee to submit to sexual blackmail in re-
turn for a job benefit or privilege.36
 Accordingly, the court concluded
that an employer became strictly liable in a quid pro quo sexual
harassment case for its employee's violation of Title VII." Thus, the
Second Circuit held that the essence of a quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment claim requires that the employer or supervisor condition a tan-
gible job benefit or privilege on an employee's submission to sexual
advances and, as a result of the employee's refusal, the employee
suffers a tangible job detriment."
In 1994, in Bouton v. BMW of North America, Inc., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that an employer was not
liable for hostile work environment sexual harassment by a supervisory
for hostile work environment sexual harassment. Id. at 1418, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
617; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1957). On appeal of the subsequent lower
court decision, however, the court never reached the issue of whether the employer was liable
under agency principles because the court held that the plaintiff failed to prove her sexual
harassment claim. See Hicks, 928 F.2d at 973, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1793.
31
 890 F.2d 569, 579, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 596, 603 (2d Cir. 1989), The court also
held that the defendant's conduct created a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII.
Id. at 578, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 602-03. The court declined to address the issue of
the employer's liability for a hostile work environment because the district court predicated the
employer's liability on the quid pro quo violation. Id. at 578, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
603.
52 Id. at 573, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 598.
53 See id. at 573-74, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 598-99.
31 See id. at 574, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 599.
35
 Id. at 579, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 603.
Carrero, 890 F.2d at 579, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 603.
57 ,rd.
58 1d.
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employee because (i) the supervisor lacked actual authority and (ii)
the employer responded promptly and effectively to the plaintiff's
report of sexual harassment.V In I3outon, an executive secretary claimed
that the Vice President of Service at BMW, for whom she worked,
sexually harassed her." The plaintiff also argued that the court should
hold BMW liable for her supervisor's Title VII violation because her
supervisor had acted within the scope of his employment. 4' The Third
Circuit reasoned that, in light of BMW's grievance procedure for sexual
harassment complaints, the plaintiff could not have believed that acts
of harassment constituted BMW policy and that BMW authorized her
supervisor's acts of sexual harassment. 42 Moreover, the court deter-
mined that the employer's grievance procedure worked effectively
because BMW took prompt remedial action upon receiving the plain-
tiff's complaint." The Third Circuit reasoned that, under negligence
principles, prompt and effective action by an employer will relieve that
employer from liability." Thus, the Third Circuit held that a supervi-
sor's lack of apparent authority and an employer's swift response to a
plaintiffs complaint shielded an employer from Title VII liability for
hostile work environment sexual harassment."
During the Survey year, in Gary v. Long, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a supervisor's
failure to carry out threats of adverse job consequences, along with
the absence of actual or apparent authority to execute those threats,
shielded an employer from liability for quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment." In addition, the Gary court held that an employer was not liable
for hostile work environment sexual harassment where the employer
had adopted policies and implemented measures so that the plaintiff
either knew or should have known that the employer did not tolerate
sexual harassment. 47
 Considering the plaintiffs claim of quid pro quo
sexual harassment, the court reasoned that a supervisor must act as
the employer's agent when sexually harassing a plaintiff before it will
39 See 29 F.3d 103, 109-10, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 53, 57-58 (3d Cir. 1994).
4° Id. at 105, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 53-54.
41 Id. at 106, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 55.
42
 See id. at 108-09, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 56-57.
43 .See id, at 109-10, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 57-58.
44 &Mon, 29 F.3d at 107, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 55; see. EEOC v, Hacienda Hotel,
881 F.2d 1504, 1516, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 877, 886 (9th Cir. 1989); Lipsett v. University
of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 903, 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 230, 247 (1st Cir. 1988).
43 Bauton, 29 F.3d at 110, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 58.
46 See 59 F.3d 1391, 1396, 68 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas, (BNA) 581, 583-84 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 569, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1760 (1995).
47 Id, at 1398, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 585.
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impose liability on the employer under Title VII." Because the plaintiffs
supervisor did not carry out his alleged employment-related threats,
the court concluded that the employee did not suffer the tangible job
detriment necessary to establish quid pro quo sexual harassment."
Considering the plaintiffs hostile work environment claim, the court
reasoned that an employer had no liability for hostile work environ-
ment sexual harassment where the plaintiff could not have believed
that a supervisor was acting with the color of authority when the sexual
harassment occurred. 5° Consequently, the court concluded that an
employer was not liable for a supervisor's hostile work environment
sexual harassment when an employer adopted a policy against it and
implemented an effective grievance procedure for harassed employ-
ees.51 Thus, the District of Columbia Circuit held that given the exist-
ence of an effective grievance procedure and the absence of a tangible
job detriment following a supervisor's sexual advances, an employer
faces neither quid pro quo nor hostile work environment liability
under Title VII."
In Gary, the plaintiffs supervisor at the Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority ("WMATA"), James Edward Long ("Long"),
allegedly threatened adverse consequences if the plaintiff did not ac-
quiesce to his demands for sexual relations." The plaintiff alleged that
Long told her he would make her job easier if she would have sexual
relations with him. 54
 The defendant allegedly then threatened to ter-
minate the plaintiff and to impose other adverse job consequences if
she did not grant his requests. 55 Additionally, Long allegedly made
inappropriate references to the plaintiffs body and indicated that he
would have her discharged if she told anybody of these incidents." In
particular, the plaintiff contended that on one occasion Long drove
her to a secluded storage facility under the pretext of conducting a
construction site inspection and, while driving, fondled her breasts and
rubbed her thighs. 57 Upon arriving at the storage facility, the plaintiff
48 Id. at 1396, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 584.
46 See id.
5° Id. at 1397-98, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 585.
m Gary, 59 F.3d at 1398, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 585. Specifically, the court held
that a policy against sexual harassment will shield the employer from liability if it notifies the
victimized employee that reporting the conduct to the employer will not result in adverse
consequences and that the employer does not tolerate sexual harassment. See id.
52 See id. at 1396, 1398, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 584, 585.
55 Id. at 1393-94, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 582.
54 Id. at 1393, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 582.
55 Id. at 1393-94, 68 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 582.
56 Gary, 59 F.3d at 1594, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 582.
57 Id.
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alleged that Long raped her and threatened adverse consequences if
she reported the incident to anyone." Throughout all of these inci-
dents, the plaintiff insisted that she repeatedly resisted Long's over-
tures and indicated that they were unwelcome."
On February 14, 1990, the plaintiff reported the alleged sexual
harassment by her supervisor to a WMATA counselor and filed a
formal grievance." Upon receipt of the plaintiffs complaint, WMATA
conducted a detailed investigation and found no corroborating evidence
to support the plaintiffs charges.6 ' WMATA reassigned the plaintiff to
another facility so that she would no longer have contact with Long."
The plaintiff filed a sexual harassment charge with the EEOC three
months later." With permission from the EEOC, the plaintiff filed this
action against Long and WMATA in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia. 64
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs Title VII claim against
WMATA.65 In reaching its conclusion, the district court reasoned that
because WMATA took certain action it had therefore protected itself
from hostile work environment liability. 66 The district court concluded
that an employer has no liability for a hostile work environment cre-
ated by a supervisor when: (I) the employer has done nothing to
indicate that it sanctions the harassing conduct committed by the
supervisor; (2) the employer has a strong policy against sexual harass-
ment and a grievance procedure for complaints about sexually harass-
ing conduct; and (3) the employer takes prompt remedial measures as
soon as it becomes aware of the situation."
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the plaintiff's Title VII claims." The District of
Columbia Circuit looked to Meritor in deciding to use the common law
principles of agency to address employer liability under Title VII."
Although the court applied agency principles to both the plaintiffs
88 Id.
59 Id.
6° Id.
61 Gary, 59 F.3d at 1394, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 582.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Gary, 59 F.3d at 1394, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 582.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1393, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 581.
69 Id. at 1395, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 583; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 219(2) (1957).
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quid pro quo claim and her hostile work environment claim, the court
addressed the claims separately in its opinion."
First, the court addressed the plaintiffs claim of quid pro quo
sexual harassment." The defendant had argued that the quid pro
quo claim was groundless because the plaintiff's supervisor lacked the
authority to fire or suspend the plaintiff. 72
 The court did not address
this argument, however, because it ultimately held that the supervisor's
failure to execute threats of adverse job consequences was dispositive. 73
In reaching its holding, the court relied on the Carrera position that
the essence of a quid pro quo claim involves the conditioning of a
tangible job benefit on an employee's submission to sexual blackmail
in conjunction with the requirement that the employee suffer adverse
consequences for refusing her supervisor's advances. 74
 The court noted
that the supervisor must use his authority to subject the plaintiff to a
job detriment." It is fair to hold the employer liable in that situation,
the court reasoned, because inflicting a tangible job detriment on the
plaintiff serves as evidence that the supervisor acted as the employer's
agent." Thus, the court held that the WMATA was not liable for quid
pro quo sexual harassment under Title VII because the plaintiff did
not suffer adverse job consequences."
Turning to the plaintiff's claim of hostile work environment sexual
harassment, the court determined that the supervisor's alleged con-
duct created a hostile work environment." Nevertheless, the District of
Columbia Circuit agreed with the district court and held that the
employer was not liable for the employee's exposure to that hostile
work environment." In reaching its holding of no employer liability in
this case, the court used the requirements established by the district
court along with common law principles of agency. 8° The court cited
the general rule that a master has no liability for the torts of its servants
acting outside the scope of their employment.8] The court noted,
however, that an exception to this rule provides that a master may incur
7°
 Gary, 59 F.3d at 1395-96, 68 Fair Em pl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 583-84.
71 Id. at 1395, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 583.
72 Id. at 1396, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 583.
75 Id. at 1396, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 584.
74
 Id. at 1395, 68 Fair Empl. Prac, Gas. (BNA) at 583.
75 Gary, 59 F.3d at 1396, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 584.
76
 Id.
77 1d.
78 Id. at 1397, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 584.
79 Id. at 1398, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 585.
8° See Gary, 59 F.3d at 1394, 1397-98, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 582, 585-86.
AI Id. at 1397, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 584.
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liability for such acts if the existence of the agency relationship aided
the servant in accomplishing the tort."
The Gary court reasoned that the agency relationship always aids
supervisors in accomplishing torts because their responsibilities at work
afford them regular contact with the victims." For this reason, the
court observed that a better interpretation of the common law excep-
tion would predicate liability on whether the agent's position facilitates
the sexual harassment because the agent appears to be acting in the
ordinary course of business. 84
 The court reasoned that the plaintiff in
Gary could not have believed that Long acted within the scope of his
authority when he sexually harassed her." The plaintiff admitted that
she knew WMATA had an active policy against sexual harassment and
an adequate grievance procedure for filing complaints." Accordingly,
the court concluded that the plaintiff should have known that her
employer did not tolerate sexual harassment by any of its employees. 87
Based on this reasoning, the court further concluded that agency
principles could not serve as a premise for WMATA's liability. 88 Thus,
the Gary court held that an employer has no liability for a supervisor's
hostile work environment sexual harassment when the employer has
adopted a policy against it and implemented effective grievance pro-
cedures so that the employee either knew or should have known that
the employer did not tolerate sexual harassment. 89
The court's holdings in Gary make two significant contributions
to sexual harassment law. First, the Gary court further clarifies the
standard for employer liability for quid pro quo sexual harassment. 9"
Second, the Gary court leans away from protecting victims' rights and
instead sides with employers by allowing employers to insulate them-
selves from hostile work environment liability by instituting an effective
sexual harassment policy and grievance procedures. 91
82 Id. at 1397, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 584-85.
93 Id. at 1397, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 585.
" See id.
t Gary, 59 F.3d at 1397-98, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 585.
86 Id. at 1398, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 585, The court noted that. WMATA's
grievance procedure was thorough, immediate and effective, so that it encouraged sexual harass-
ment victims to come forward. See id. at 1398-99, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 586; see also
Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73, 40 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) 1822, 1829 (1986),
°See Gary, 59 F.3d at 1397-98, 68 Fair limp]. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 585.
88 See, id,
81 Id. at 1398, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 585.
9° See id at 1396, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 583-84.
81 Id. at 1398, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 585.
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The court's quid pro quo holding intensifies an already existing
obstacle for sexual harassment victims. 92
 In many cases, plaintiffs will
have difficulty showing that they suffered a tangible job detriment for
rebuffing an employer or supervisor's sexual advances absent eco-
nomic injury." Additionally, in some instances employees never suffer
a job detriment simply because they feared the supervisors' threats to
such an extent that they gave in to their sexual blackmail.
Nevertheless, although Gary's quid pro quo holding is displeasing
for sexual harassment victims, employers will appreciate the consistent
and clear standard Gary establishes for quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment.94
 The District of Columbia Circuit, by adopting the quid pro quo
standard found in the Second, Sixth and Tenth Circuits, will increase
fairness through greater consistency in sexual harassment verdicts where
the plaintiff brings a quid pro quo claim. Furthermore, holding an
employer liable only when the employee has suffered a tangible job
detriment is inherently fair because, under those circumstances, the
harassing employee acted as the employer's agent. 95
In the realm of the hostile work environment claim, the District
of Columbia Circuit took another step toward protecting employers'
rights by holding that an employer shielded itself from liability when
it instituted an active policy against sexual harassment.98
 Although the
Supreme Court in Meritor held that the existence of a grievance pro-
cedure does not per se insulate an employer from Title VII liability,
the Court's holding remained ambiguous by implying that the exist-
ence of a more effective grievance procedure might have such an effect.°
The Gary decision follows a judicial trend endorsing the notion that
effective grievance procedures insulate employers from liability. 98
Although the Gary decision emphasizes the existence of the em-
ployer's harassment policy, it minimizes the importance of the em-
ployer's specific response to the victim's complaint. 99 The sparse discus-
92 See Gary, 59 F.3d at 1396, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 583-84.
93
 Id. at 1396, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 584.
94 Compare id. at 1396, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 583-84 (basing finding of quid pro
quo sexual harassment on a clear standard) with Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 805 F.2d
644, 649, 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cos. (BNA) 654, 657 (6th Cir. 1986) (basing finding of quid pro
quo sexual harassment on specific facts).
95 See Gary, 59 F.3d at 1396, 68 Fair Empl, Prac, Gas. (BNA) at 584.
96 See id. at 1398, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 585.
97
 Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72-73, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1822, 1829
(1986).
98
 See Gary, 59 F.3d at 1398, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 585; Bouton v. BMW of N.
Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 3, 7-9, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 53, 55-56 (3d Cir. 1994).
99 See Gary, 59 F.Sd at 1398, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 585.
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sion of the effectiveness of the grievance procedure in Gary diminishes
the importance of this feature and suggests that the law is moving away
from victims' rights.m° The Gary court's failure to engage in an analysis
of the effectiveness of the employer's response to the plaintiffs com-
plaint suggests that the mere institution of a sexual harassment policy
and grievance procedures will now insulate an employer from hostile
work environment liability.'"' For example, the Gary court does not
consider the timeliness of WMATA's response to the employee's griev-
ance when deciding on the employer's legal liability. 1 ° 2
 As a result, the
Gary court moves toward leaving sexual harassment victims without an
avenue of relief from their employer—either in the workplace or in
the courtroom.
In summary, the District of Columbia Circuit in Gary held that an
employer's liability for quid pro quo sexual harassment depends on
the employee suffering a tangible job detrimentiO 3 The court also held
that an employer shielded itself from liability for hostile work environ-
ment sexual harassment if it formally discouraged sexual harassment
in the workplace and implemented measures to deal with sexual har-
assment if it does occur.'" Gary establishes clear standards for employer
liability for quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harass-
ment in violation of Title VII,' 05
 These standards, however, are created
at victims' expense, making it increasingly difficult for employees to
recover from their employers for sexual harassment. 106
*Fourth Circuit Adopts an Objective Standard for Determining
Constructive Discharge in Sexual Harassment Cases: Martin v. Cavalier
Hotel Corp)
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") prohibits
employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.' Sexual harassment constitutes
discrimination on the basis of sex and is therefore a violation of Title
I'm See id. at 1398-99, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 585-86. But see Bunton, 29 F.3d at
107-09, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 54-56.
101 See Gary, 59 F.3d at 1398, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 585.
102 Gf Bouton, 29 F.3d at 108 (noting that prompt remediation by employer will absolve it
from liability).
ins
	 59 F.3d at 1396, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas, (BNA) at 584.
114 Id. at 1398, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas, (BNA) at 585-86.
105 See id.
'6 See id.
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1 48 F.Sd 1343, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas, (BNA) 300 (4th Cir. 1995).
2 42	 § 2000e-2 (1988). Title VII states, in part:
338	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 37:303
VII. 3
 Plaintiffs may demonstrate an actionable violation of Title VII if
their employer has constructively discharged them by requiring them
to work in an environment in which they are sexually harassed. 4 The
federal courts of appeals are divided as to what a plaintiff must show
in order to establish constructive discharge. 5 The majority of the cir-
cuits rely on an objective standard of whether a "reasonable person"
in the employee's position would have felt compelled to resign." The
minority view requires that a plaintiff also establish that "the actions
complained of were intended by the employer as an effort to force the
employee to quit."7
In 1972, in J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that an employer who had delib-
erately made an employee's working conditions intolerable, thus forc-
ing the employee to resign, had constructively discharged the em-
ployee in violation of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). 8 In
Stevens, the plaintiff-employee, who was a union supporter, complained
that her employer's new system of compensation, based on quantity of
goods produced rather than hours worked, made it impossible for her
to earn the minimum wage, much less her previous hourly wage.° The
Fourth Circuit stated that when an employer deliberately makes an
employee's working conditions intolerable and thereby forces the em-
ployee to resign, the employer has constructively discharged the em-
ployee. 10
 The Fourth Circuit noted that although the compensation
system enabled other employees to make in excess of the plaintiff's
hourly wage, the plaintiff's job was unique." Because the system all
fected only the plaintiff, the court reasoned that the employer was
It shall he an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin .
Id. § 2000e-2(a) (1).
3 See Marlin, 48 F.3d at 1348, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 301.
4 See id.
5 Id, at 1354, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 307; Sheila Finnegan, Comment, Constructive
Discharge Under Title VII and the ADEA, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 561, 561-63 (1986).
Martin, 48 F.3d at 1354, 67 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 307.
7 Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 114, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) 306, 318 (4th
Cir. 1989) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted), vacated and remanded en bane,
900 F.2d 27, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 845 (4th Cir. 1990) (adopting dissenting opinion).
8
 461 F.2d 490, 494, 80 L.R.R.M. 2609, 2612 (4th Cir. 1972).
9 Id, at 494, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2611-12.
1 ° Id. at 494, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2612.
11 See id. at 494-95, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2612.
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targeting the plaintiff with the intent of forcing her out of her job
because of her union support." The Fourth Circuit held, therefore,
that because the employee was forced to switch to a much lower
compensation schedule the employee had been constructively dis-
charged in violation of the NLRA.' 3
In 1981, in Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that because an employer's treat-
ment of an employee did not differ from its treatment of other em-
ployees the employer had not constructively discharged the employee
in violation of Title WU' In Johnson, two employees charged that their
employer had discriminated against them on the basis of their color
by subjecting them to a strict work environment that caused their
constructive discharge.' 5 The Eighth Circuit stated that constructive
discharge arises when an employer creates an intolerable work envi-
ronment, thereby forcing the employee out of the job.'" Furthermore,
the court noted that the employee must show that his employer's
actions were taken with the intent of forcing the employee to quit."
The court observed that an employee may not be unreasonably sensi-
tive to his or her working environment's The Eighth Circuit rea-
soned that because the defendant company treated all of its employees
strictly, the company could not have been handling the plaintiffs with
the intention of forcing them to resign; such treatment, the court
reasoned, would have resulted in the conclusion that the company had
been handling all of its employees with the intention of forcing them
to resign." The Eighth Circuit thus held that the employer had not
constructively discharged the plaintiffs where the plaintiffs were treated
no differently than other employees.'"
In 1985, in Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that an employee whose only
reasons for resigning were everyday problems and tensions encoun-
tered on the job was not constructively discharged in violation of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 2 ' In Bristow, a su-
12 Id.
16 Stevens, 461 F.2d at 494, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2612.
14 646 F.2d 1250, 1256, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1326, 1331 (8th Cir. 1981).
15 Id. at 1252, 1254-56, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1327, 1329-31.
16 Id. at 1256, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1331.
17 /d.
13 Id.
Johnson, 646 F.24 at 1256, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1331.
2" Id.
21 770 F.2d 1251, 1254, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (RNA) 1145, 1147 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1082, 40 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) 608 (1986).
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pervisor of newspaper carriers resigned after encountering difficulties
managing his assigned area. 22
 The Fourth Circuit, citing the Stevens
and Johnson decisions, stated that in order to prove constructive dis-
charge, an employee must demonstrate two elements: deliberateness
of the employer's actions and intolerability of the working conditions. 23
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that deliberateness exists only if the
employer intentionally acts to force the employee to quit. 24
 In order to
demonstrate such intent, the Fourth Circuit noted that the plaintiff
may point to circumstantial evidence of employer's wrongful intent. 25
The Fourth Circuit stated that intolerability is evaluated by the objec-
tive standard of whether a "reasonable person" in the employee's
position would feel compelled to resign. 26
 The Fourth Circuit held that
because there was no deliberate behavior on the part of the plaintiff's
superiors and there was nothing done to the plaintiff that would lead
a reasonable person to quit, the plaintiff had not been constructively
discharged. 27
In 1989, in Paroline v. Unisys Corp., an en banc panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that because an
employer had disciplined a supervisor accused of sexual harassment
as the plaintiff requested, asked the plaintiff not to quit, gave the
plaintiff time off to recuperate and offered counseling to the plaintiff,
the employee had not been constructively discharged. 28 In Paroline, the
plaintiff alleged that her supervisor made unwelcome sexual advances
toward her. 29 The specific disciplinary action implemented by the em-
ployer at the request of the plaintiff had the net result of increasing
the workplace interaction between the plaintiff and the offending
supervisor.30
 The plaintiff claimed that this increased interaction caused
an intolerable work environment and thus led to her constructive
discharge. 3 ' Noting that there may be circumstances in which an cm-
22 M. at 1253-54, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1145-46.
23 Id. at 1255, 38 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 1147.
24 Id.
25 1d.
2t'
	 770 F.2d at 1255, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1147.
27 Id, at 1256, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1148.
28
 900 F.2d 27, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 845 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (adopting
dissenting opinion of Judge Wilkinson in Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 113-15, 50 Fair
Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) 306, 318-19 (4th Cir. 1989)). The defendant had been granted an en
bane panel hearing after which the panel adopted Judge Wilkinson's dissenting opinion as
reported in Paroline, 879 F.2d at 113-15, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 318-19.
29
 879 F.2d at 103, 50 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 309.
39 Id. at 114, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 318-19 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
31 Id. at 114, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 319 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
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ployer's actions create an inference that the employer is attempting to
force the employee to resign, the Fourth Circuit stated that this was
not such a situation." The court reasoned that the company's attempts
to ameliorate the situation evinced the company's desire to keep the
plaintiff on the job rather than a desire to force her to quit." Citing
the Bristow requirements of deliberateness and intolerability, the court
concluded that because the company's actions were taken at the direct
request of the plaintiff, the company had not demonstrated any intent
to force the plaintiff to leave.34 Thus, the court held that the company
failed to exhibit the deliberateness necessary for a constructive dis-
charge and had not discriminated against the employee."
In 1993, in Hukkanen v. International Union of Operating Engineers
Local No. 101, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that because an employee's resignation was a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of her supervisor's discriminatory actions,
her employer was liable for the supervisor's sexual harassment." In
Hukkanen, the plaintiff alleged that she resigned as a result of her
supervisor subjecting her to unwelcome and lewd advances as well as
a gun-enforced threat of rape. 37 The company contended that because
the supervisor wanted to keep the plaintiff on the job for his own
perverse pleasure, he did not consciously intend to force her to quit
as required by Johnson."
The Eighth Circuit rejected the defendant's contention, reasoning
that the plaintiff's resignation was a reasonably foreseeable conse-
quence of her supervisor's actions." The court reasoned, therefore,
that the supervisor's actions were necessarily taken with the intention
of forcing the plaintiff to resign.° The Eighth Circuit concluded, there-
fore, that the employee was constructively discharged because her
resignation was a reasonably foreseeable outcome of the supervisor's
actions. 4 '
62 /d. at 114, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 318 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Judge
Wilkinson noted that the employer's actions were premised on the request of the plaintiff and
that the plaintiff failed to give the remedies the opportunity to work. Id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 114-15, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 318-19 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
34
 Paroline, 879 F.2d at 115, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 318 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
"Id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
36 3 F.3d 281, 285, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1125, 1127 (8th Cir. 1993).
" Id. at 284, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 1126.
" Id. at 284, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1127. The Eighth Circuit labeled this
contention "bizarre." Id.
39 Id. at 284-85, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1127.
49 Id. at 285, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 1127.
41 Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 285, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1127-28.
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During the Survey year, in Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that an
employer had constructively discharged an employee because the em-
ployer had made the employee's working conditions intolerable and
the employee's resignation was a reasonably foreseeable consequence
of the intolerable conditions created by her employer's conduct: 1 '2 In
Martin, an employee alleged that she resigned after repeated sexual
harassment by her supervisor.43
 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the
plaintiff's resignation was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
supervisor's actions. 44 The Fourth Circuit held, therefore, that the
employee had been constructively discharged. 45
The plaintiff in Martin, Rosemary Martin, charged her employer
and its general manager, Daniel Batchelor, with sexual harassment and
constructive discharge in violation of Title VII. 46 As general manager,
Batchelor was Martin's direct supervisor and had the authority to
determine employee bonuses and to hire, fire, promote and discipline
hotel employees.° Martin testified that Batchelor had sexually harassed
her on numerous occasions:18
 In May 1992, Martin decided that she
could no longer continue in her job because of the sexual advances
and resigned. 49
Citing Bristow and Paroline, the Fourth Circuit observed that in
order to sustain a finding of constructive discharge a plaintiff must
show that the employer's actions created an intolerable work environ-
ment deliberately intended to force the employee to resign. 5° The
Fourth Circuit noted that the defendant did not dispute that working
conditions were intolerable. 51 Rather, the court stated that the defen-
42 48 F.3d 1343, 1354-55, 67 Fair Empl, Prac, Cas, (RNA) 300, 306-08 (4th Cir. 1995). In
Martin, the Fourth Circuit also ruled that under the circumstances, the defendant company was
responsible for its general manager's actions. Id. at 1353, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 306.
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that because the supervisor's assaults took place in the workplace,
during working hours and on an employee whom he had authority to hire, fire and discipline,
the supervisor was acting within the scope of his employment and the company was liable. Id. at
1352, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 305. The court further reasoned that even if the
supervisor were not acting within the scope of his employment, he was using the apparent
authority of his position to accomplish the wrongful acts. Id. Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that
the company was responsible for the supervisor's actions. Id. at 1353, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 306.
43 Id. at 1349, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 302-03.
44 Id. at 1355, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 308.
45 Id. at 1355-56, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 307-09.
46 Id. at 1348, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 301.
47 Martin, 48 F.3d at 1348, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 302.
48 Id. at 1349, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 302.
49 Id. at 1349, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 303.
$1) 1d. at 1353-54, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 306.
." Id. at 1354, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 307.
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dant contended that the supervisor did not intend to force the em-
ployee to resign and thus the plaintiff failed to meet the deliberateness
criterion.52 Citing the Hukkanen decision, the Fourth Circuit rejected
the defendant's contention and reasoned that constructive discharge
plaintiffs need not prove their employers consciously intended to force
them to quit." The Fourth Circuit held that in determining the delib-
erateness of an employer's actions, an employer is held to have in-
tended to force an employee to quit when such an outcome is the
reasonably foreseeable consequence of its actions.'" The Fourth Circuit
concluded that the plaintiff's resignation was a reasonably foreseeable
outcome of her supervisor's continual sexual harassment." The Fourth
Circuit held, therefore, that the employer had constructively discharged
the plaintiff."
Prior to Marlin, a clear distinction could be drawn between the
majority definition of constructive discharge requiring an objective
finding that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign
and the minority definition which also required that the employer
deliberately intend to force the employee out of his or her job." The
Fourth Circuit's adoption of a "reasonably foreseeable consequence"
standard is a move away from an examination of the subjective, con-
scious intent of the employer and towards an objective standard for
determining constructive discharge." Such a move blurs the distinc-
tion between the minority and majority criteria for establishing a con-
structive discharge and eases the burden on the plaintiff to show
constructive discharge.
In its first articulation of the elements of constructive discharge,
the Fourth Circuit stated that a plaintiff must show that the employer
deliberately made the plaintiff's working conditions intolerable." This
requires an examination of the subjective intent of a particular defen-
dant."° In Paroline and Bristow, the Fourth Circuit moved toward an
objective standard by stating that intent can be inferred through cir-
cumstantial evidence. 6 ' In Martin, the Fourth Circuit takes the next
52 Martin, 48 F.3d at 1354, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 307.
55 Id. at 1355, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 307-08.
54 Id. at 1355, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 307.
55 Id. at 1355, 67 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 308.
55 Id. at 1355-56, 67 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 308-09.
57 Martin, 48 F.3d at 1354, 67 Fair Einpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 307.
55 See id.
55 J.P. Stevens 8[ Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490, 494, 80 L.R.R.M. '2609, 2612 (4th Cir. 1972).
55 See id.
61 See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 114, 50 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 306, 318
(4th Cir. 1989) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting), vacated and remanded en bane, 900 F.2d 27, 52 Fair
Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 845 (4th Cir. 1990) (adopting dissenting opinion); Bristow v, Daily Press,
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step. Rather than look at the subjective intent of the defendant, the
court examines the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the defen-
dant's actions. 62 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that if the outcome was
reasonably foreseeable, it must have been the defendant's intent to
create that outcome.63 This standard is purely objective, relying as it
does on the outcome being "reasonably foreseeable." 64
Under the majority interpretation, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign.° Before
Martin, plaintiffs in the Fourth Circuit also had to prove, either directly
or through circumstantial evidence, that the defendant had the sub-
jective intent to force the employee to quit. 66 After Martin, the plaintiff
has only to show that the outcome of the defendant's actions is one
that the defendant should have reasonably foreseen. 67
 Such proof is
easier to establish than the subjective intent of a particular defendant
and brings the Fourth Circuit in line with the objective standard of the
majority of jurisdictions.
In summary, the Fourth Circuit in Martin held that where an
employee is sexually harassed by an employer, the employee need not
demonstrate conscious intent of the employer in order to establish
constructive discharge. 68 Rather, the plaintiff need merely show that
the results of the employer's actions were reasonably foreseeable. 69 This
is a lower threshold that moves the Fourth Circuit closer to the majority
view and renders constructive discharge easier to prove.
*Rejecting Preferential Treatment for Pregnant Women Under the PDA:
Armstrong v. Flowers Hospital, Inc. 1
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") prohibits
discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, sex, religion,
or national origin. 2 In 1978, Congress amended Title VII by enacting
Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) 1145, 1147 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1082, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 608 (1986).
62 Martin, 48 F.3d at 1356, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 309.
63 See id.
64 See id.
66 See id. at 1354, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 307.
66 See Bristow, 770 F.2d at 1255, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1147.
67 See Marlin, 48 F.3d at 1355-56, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 308-09.
66 See id. at 1355-56, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 307-09.
69 See id.
* By John B. Eagan, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
'Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1742 (11th
Cir. 1994).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e—e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The statute reads, in relevant part:
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the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA"), which brought discrimina-
tion based upon an employee's pregnancy or ability to get pregnant
within the scope of actionable offenses under Title VII. 5
 The PDA does
not create new substantive law; instead, it simply elevates the potential
for being pregnant to a status afforded protection under Title VII's
prohibition against sex discrimination. 4 In applying the PDA, the courts
have used the same analysis as that applied in other sex discrimination
cases.5
In 1987, in California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, the
United States Supreme Court held that Title VII, as amended by the
PDA, did not preempt a state statute that required employers to pro-
vide unpaid leave and reinstatement to pregnant employees. 6
 In Guerra,
a trade association of employers and an organization of state businesses
sought a declaration that a California statute requiring preferential
treatment for pregnant women was inconsistent with and preempted
by the PDA. 7
 The Court reasoned that Congress intended the PDA only
to remedy discrimination against pregnant women and did not address
the issue of preferential treatment in state statutes. 5 The Court stated
that the legislative record of the FDA was almost devoid of discussion
of preferential treatment for pregnant women. 9 Relying on this legis-
lative record, the Court determined that Congress did not intend to
preempt state statutes that provided preferential treatment for preg-
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988), Section 2000e(k) states:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of
benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar
in their ability or inability to work . . . .
Id.
4
 Armstrong, 33 F.3d at 1312, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1746.
5 See, e.g., Maddox v. Grandview Care Ctr., inc., 780 F.2d 987, 989, 39 Fair Etnpl. Prac. Cas,
(BNA) 1456, 1457-58 (11th Cir. 1986).
6
 479 U.S. 272, 292, 42 Fair Empt, Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1073, 1081 (1987).
7 1d. at 278 & n.8, 279, 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1076 & n.8.
6 Id. at 285-86, 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1079.
9 Id. at 286, 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1079,
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nant women unless the statutes were inconsistent with Title VII or
required or permitted actions that were unlawful under Title VII.I° The
Court, therefore, concluded that the preferential treatment provided
by the California statute, requiring employers to provide unpaid leave
and reinstatement to pregnant employees, was not inconsistent with
the purpose of the PDA and was not preempted by Title VII."
In 1987, in Carney v. Martin Luther Home, Inc., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that placing an employee
on mandatory leave for pregnancy-related conditions that do not in-
terfere with the employee's ability to do the job was actionable as sex
discrimination under Title VII and the PDA. 12 The plaintiff in Carney
was placed on mandatory pregnancy leave because her doctor recom-
mended that she not engage in heavy lifting.I 3 The court reasoned that
the inability to engage in heavy lifting was a pregnancy-related condi-
tion and, as such, the employer's treatment of the plaintiff regarding
this condition was included within the scope of the PDA.H The court
held, therefore, that an employer could not place a pregnant employee
on leave for a condition related to pregnancy unless the employer
could show that most women with the same condition would not be
able to safely perform the duties of their jobs.' 5
In 1991, in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., the
United States Supreme Court held that an employer could not exclude
a fertile female employee from certain jobs because of the employer's
concern for the health of the fetus the woman might conceive. 16 In
Johnson Controls, a class of male and female employees challenged as
sex discrimination an employer's fetal protection policy.' 7 This policy
prevented women from working in areas of battery manufacturing that
had high lead exposure unless the women could medically document
that they were infertile. 18
 The Court reasoned that the employer's
policy was facially discriminatory and could only be defended as a bona
10 Id. at 287-88, 290 n.29, 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1080, 1081 n.29.
i 1 479 U.S. 272, 292, 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1073, 1081 (1987).
17 824 F.2d 643, 648, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 683, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1987).
13 Id. at 644, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 684.
14 id, at 647, 648, 44 Fair Drip]. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 687, 688. The employer could have
defended its action if it had been able to establish a bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ")
that plaintiff was unable to meet during her pregnancy. Id. at 648, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 688. Defendant admitted, however, that plaintiff could have performed her job without difficulty
after she was placed on leave, so the defendant did not meet its burden in establishing this
defense. Id.
13 See id. at 649, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 688.
16 499 U.S. 187, 206, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 365, 374 (1991).
17 1d. at 191, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (RNA) at 368.
18 /d. at 191-92, 55 Fair Empl, Prac. Gas, (BNA) at 368.
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fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ").ig The Court then deter-
mined that fetal protection did not affect an employee's ability to
perform the job and, therefore, did not fall within the safety to third
persons exception to the BFOQ. 2° The Court, instead, stated that the
decision to work in a position entailing risk to a potential fetus must
be left to the woman.21
 The Johnson Controls Court concluded that a
company's exclusion of fertile females from jobs that may risk the
health of fetuses that the women might conceive deprived women of
the right to decide whether to work at jobs that they are capable of
performing, and, therefore, violates Title VII and the PDA. 22
In 1994, in Troupe v. May Department Stores Co., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the PDA does not
require an employer to allow a pregnant employee with morning
sickness to be tardy if the employer does not allow employees with
similar health problems to be tardy. 25 The defendant in Troupe dis-
missed the plaintiff one day before her maternity leave was to begin. 24
The defendant stated that the reason for dismissal was tardiness. 25 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment for the defendant, reasoning
that allowing pregnant women to be late because of morning sickness
while not extending the same rights to other employees amounted to
preferential treatment not required by the PDA.26
 The Seventh Circuit,
therefore, concluded that an employer is not required to ignore tardi-
ness related to pregnancy if the employer does not ignore tardiness for
nonpregnant employees. 27
During the Survey year, in Armstrong v. Flowers Hospital, Inc., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the
PDA does not require an employer to provide alternative work assign-
ments to pregnant women concerned about the health of their fetuses
if the employer does not allow similar exceptions for nonpregnant
employees. 28 The court determined that the PDA's requirement that a
woman be given the right to decide between her job and the health of
1° Id. at 199-200, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 371-72. The policy was facially discrimi-
natory because Johnson Controls allowed fertile men to choose whether they would risk the
health of possible future children while denying the same choice to women, See id. at 199, 55
Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 371.
2° Id. at 203, 209, 55 Fair Etnpl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 373.
21 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 206, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 579.
22 Id. at 187, 206-07, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 374.
23
 20 F.3d 734, 738, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 512, 515 (7th Cir. 1994),
"Id. at 735-36, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 513.
28
 See id. at 737, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at . 515.
26 Id. at 738-39, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 515-16.
27 Id.
28 33 F.3d 1308, 1317, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1742, 1749 (11th Cir. 1995).
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her fetus did not require an employer to ease the decision for the
woman by providing alternative, less risky, work assignments.29 The
court reasoned that such an interpretation of the PDA would provide
benefits to pregnant women that were arguably superior to benefits
provided to nonpregnant employees who were similarly situated in
their ability or inability to work." The court concluded, therefore, that
although the PDA did not prohibit such preferential treatment for
women, the PDA could not be read to require it, and thus the employer
had not wrongly discriminated against the plaintiff because of her
pregnancy."
The plaintiff, Pamela Armstrong, worked as a nurse for the Home
Care Service ("HCS") of Flowers Hospital." The hospital and HCS had
written policies stating that the refusal of an employee to care for an
assigned patient was grounds for immediate termination." On Decem-
ber 12, 1990, the plaintiff was assigned to an HIV positive patient. 34
The plaintiff was in the first trimester of pregnancy and was concerned
about the health risks to her fetus from virulent diseases that attack
the weakened immune systems of HIV positive patients." The plaintiff
requested that the patient be assigned to a different nurse." The request
was denied and the plaintiff refused to accept the patient assignment."
The plaintiff then chose to be terminated rather than resign."
The plaintiff filed suit against Flowers Hospital in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama alleging a
violation of Title VII, as amended by the PDA." The plaintiff claimed
29 Id. at 1316, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1748-49.
3° Id.
31 Id. at 1316, 1317, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1748-49, 1750; tf. California Fed. Says.
& Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 294, 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1073, 1082 (1991)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (not all preferential treatment for pregnant women is beyond the scope
of the PDA).
32 Armstrong, 33 F.3d at 1309, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1743.
33 Id. at 1310, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1744. HCS and Flowers Hospital used the
same policy statement, but HGS would modify the policies to meet the particular needs of its
operation. Id. at 1311, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1745. Flowers Hospital had certain
written exceptions to its policy regarding pregnant employees and their care of patients with
Hepatitis B or Herpes, and patients receiving radioactive Iodine treatments. Id. at 1312, 65 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1745. The hospital also had an unwritten policy of not assigning
pregnant women to care for isolation patients. Id. HCS had not adopted any of these policies.
See id.
54 Id. at 1310, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1743-44.
33 Id. 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1744.
36 Id. at 1311, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1744-45.
37 Armstrong, 33 F.3d at 1311, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1744-45.
" Id. at 1311, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1745.
3B
	 at 1309, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1743.
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sex discrimination by the hospital under both disparate treatment and
disparate impact discrimination theories. 4° The plaintiff's claim was
based upon Flowers Hospital's written policy of terminating nurses who
refused to accept a patient assignment. 4 ' The district court determined
that Armstrong did not state a prima facie case, and granted Flowers
Hospital's motion for partial summary judgment on the Title VII claims. 42
Armstrong then appealed the District Court's decision to the Eleventh
Circuit."
The Eleventh Circuit first stated that the analysis for a claim under
the PDA is the same as the analysis used in any other Title VII sex
discrimination claim.44
 The Eleventh Circuit noted that two types of
claims were available to persons alleging a Title VII sex discrimination
violation: disparate treatment and disparate impact. 45
 Disparate treat-
ment is intentional discrimination against a protected group, whereas
disparate impact discrimination is facially neutral but impacts one
group more than others and cannot be justified by business necessity."
The court first dealt with the plaintiffs disparate treatment claim.47
The Eleventh Circuit explained that disparate treatment can be either
facial discrimination or pretextual discrimination." The court rea-
soned that the HCS termination policy was not facially discriminatory
and, therefore, Armstrong's disparate treatment claim could only be
maintained as a pretext claim.49
The Eleventh Circuit noted the four elements necessary to estab-
lish a prima facie case of discrimination under the disparate treatment
analysis: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a group protected by Title WI;
(2) the plaintiff was qualified for the position; (3) the plaintiff suffered
an adverse affect on her employment; and (4) the plaintiff suffered
from differential application of work or disciplinary rules. 5° The court
then determined that the plaintiff had not met the fourth element. 51
Armstrong asserted that the accommodation of some pregnant em-
ployees in the hospital but not in the HCS amounted to differential
4° Id. at 1313, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1746,
41 Id.
42 See Armstrong, 33 F,3d at 1313, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1746.
43 Id. at 1312, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1746.
44 Id. at 1312-13, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1746.
45 Id. at 1313, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1746.
46 Id.
47 Armstrong, 33 F.3d at 1313, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1747.
45 Id. at 1313, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1746.
4° Id.
50 Id. at 1314, 65 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 1747.
51 Id.
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application of a work rule. 52 The court rejected the plaintiff's argu-
ment, reasoning that the hospital was not applying the same policy
differently, but rather, that the hospital had different work rules for
hospital and HCS employees because of differences between the two
jobs." Moreover, the court noted that the plaintiff failed to establish
that her medical condition was similar to any of the conditions in the
hospital that would lead to reassignment of nurses away from particular
patients.54 The Eleventh Circuit concluded, therefore, that the plaintiff
had failed to meet her prima facie burden of establishing differential
application of work rules. 55
Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit went on to hold that the plain-
tiff failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimi-
nation." The court stated that to establish a prima facie case for
disparate impact, a plaintiff must first identify the employment practice
that allegedly has the disparate impact. 57 Then, according to the court,
the plaintiff must establish causation by offering statistical evidence
sufficient to show that the practice has resulted in prohibited discrimi-
nation." The Eleventh Circuit noted that the plaintiff did not present
any statistical evidence, but rather argued that the disparate impact
upon her was the "difficult choice" that the hospital's rigid policy
forced her to make in choosing between her job and the health of her
fetus.59 In making the difficult choice argument, the plaintiff relied
upon the holding in Johnson Controls that an employer may not force
an employee to choose between her job and the health of her fetus. 6°
The Eleventh Circuit, rejecting the plaintiff's interpretation, stated that
Johnson Controls was relevant only in that the decision to become
pregnant or to work while pregnant was a decision for each woman to
make for herself. 6' The court reasoned that Armstrong's situation was
different from that described in Johnson Controls.62 The Eleventh Cir-
" Armstrong, 33 F.3d at 1314, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1747.
55 Id. Concurring in the judgment,Judge R. Lanier Anderson III concluded that the hospital
does make accommodations for pregnant women in some instances, but this cannot constitute
discrimination because the policies benefit pregnant women. Id. at 1318, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 1750 (Anderson, J., concurring).
54 Id. at 1314, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1747.
55 1d. at 1312, 1314, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1745, 1747.
56 Id. at 1315, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1748.
"Armstrong, 33 F.3d at 1314, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1747.
56 Id. at 1314, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1747.
59 See id. at 1315, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1748.
c'u Id.
61 Id.
62 Armstrong, 33 F.3d at 1315, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1748.
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cuit reasoned that requiring Flowers Hospital to remove the "difficult
choice" for Armstrong would subvert the purpose of the PDA by re-
moving the ultimate decision to work from the woman."
In rejecting the difficult choice argument, the Eleventh Circuit
accepted the reasoning of the defendant that the plaintiff's claim of
discrimination was actually an attempt to gain preferential treatment
for pregnant. women." According to the court, the PDA provided only
that pregnant women be treated the same as other employees, not
superior to them.° Examining the legislative history and the prior case
law, the court reasoned that the PDA, although not prohibiting pref-
erential treatment, did not require employers to provide pregnant women
with benefits that are not provided to other employees. 66 The Eleventh
Circuit concluded, therefore, that the "difficult choice" was not an
adverse consequence that would be recognized under the PDA and,
thus, held that the plaintiff had failed to state a prima facie case of
disparate impact; summary judgment by the district court, therefore,
had been proper."
The Eleventh Circuit's holding in Armstrong reinforces the deci-
sions of previous courts that the PDA does not require preferential
treatment for pregnant employees." Based upon the plain language of
the PDA and precedential case law, the Eleventh Circuit reached the
only reasonable decision given the facts in this case." If the Eleventh
Circuit had ruled in Armstrong's favor, the decision would have re-
quired employers to provide benefits to pregnant women regardless of
whether the employer provided similar benefits to all other similarly
situated employees." Instead, the Eleventh Circuit's decision strikes a
balance between the employer's right to limit the benefits it provides
to its employees and the employee's right to equal treatment as guar-
anteed by Title VII.
Armstrong's "difficult choice" argument contravened the very pur-
pose of the PDA. The PDA was enacted to ensure that pregnancy would
be included within the scope of discrimination based upon sex. 71 The
Act was intended to eliminate employer paternalism that attempted to
65 See id.
[4 See id. at 1316, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1749.
65 See id.
66 1d.
67 Arrnstmng, 33 F.3d at 1316, 1317, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1748-49, 1750.
66 See id. at 1317, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 1749.
69 See supra note 3 for the text of the PDA and supra notes 6-27 for discussion of the prior
case history.
7° See Armstrong, 33 F.3d at 1317, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1749-50.
71 Id. at 1312, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1746.
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dictate to pregnant women what was best for them and their potential
offspring. 72 The PDA replaced this paternalism with the right of each
individual to decide for herself in what situations she would work, and
how and when she would have children. 73 These private decisions of
the woman could no longer figure into employers' decisions about who
they would employ. 74
Armstrong advocated to have the court interpret the PDA so as to
require that employers make it easier for pregnant women to remain
in the workplace during pregnancy. 75 Armstrong argued that true equality
in the workplace requires an employer to make accommodations to
pregnant women that will eliminate the difficulties of working while
pregnant so that it would be as easy for a woman to work during
pregnancy as it is for a man to work when his spouse (or significant
other) is expecting a child. 76 This goal is laudable and has been ad-
vanced as the purpose of the PDA by many feminist scholars." Never-
theless, the legislative history of the PDA does not support such an
argument, and it is not the place of the courts to make such policy
decisions. 78 This necessary substantive right for pregnant women must
come from Congress and not from the courts. 79
In conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit held that the PDA did not
require an employer to provide alternative work assignments for preg-
nant employees. 80 Rather, the PDA guarantees to an employee only the
72 See Carney v. Martin Luther Home, Inc., 824 F.2d 643, 647, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
683, 686-87 (8th Cir. 1987).
73 See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 205-06, 55 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 368, 374 (1991).
74 Id.
75 Armstrong, 33 F.3d at 1316, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1748-49.
76 See id. at 1315-16, 1317, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1748-49.
77 See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommo-
dating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 CoLum. L. REV. 2154, 2158 (1994) (arguing that PDA
misconstrues difficulties faced by pregnant women and that the statute should be read to guarantee
equal opportunity rather than equal treatment for women); Reva B. Siegel, Employment Equality
Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 936 (1985) (arguing that courts
have interpreted the PDA more narrowly than Congress intended and that less than preferential
treatment under the statute leads to marginalization of female workers).
78 See Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 512,
515 (7th Cir. 1994).
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
present possible avenues for women to attempt to gain the accommodations that Armstrong was
advocating. See The Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-11 (1994); The Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. N 12101-02, 12111-17 (Supp. IV 1992). Until now, however, only
one circuit has recognized a cause of action for pregnancy under the ADA, and that was only in
extraordinary circumstances. See Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1397 (N.D. Ill.
1994) (holding that infertility treatment involves a major life activity, pregnancy, and therefore
is covered by the ADA).
Arnstrang, 33 F.3d at 1316, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1749.
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right to decide if she will remain in the work force while she is pregnant
or capable of bearing children.'" It does not provide any affirmative
duty on the part of an employer to provide benefits to the pregnant
employee that are superior to the benefits provided to other similarly
situated nonpregnant employees."
*Expanding the Public Employer's Duty to Accommodate Employees'
Religious Practices Under Title VII and the First Amendment:
Brown v. Polk County'
The number of religious discrimination suits filed nationwide is
on the rise.' Religious discrimination charges filed with state and fed-
eral agencies increased thirty-one percent between 1990 and 1994, with
2900 filed last year, according to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.' While religious discrimination litigation multiplied, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit may have sig-
naled a new pro-plaintiff attitude in religious employment discrimina-
tion cases in its recent decision in Brown v. Polk County.4 Finding for a
government employee under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, the court in Brown
stretched traditional Title VII analysis to protect employees' on-the-job
religious activities and announced a new free exercise test for public
employees."
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of an individual's religion." In
addition, section 701(j) of Title VII ("section 701(j)") specifies that the
81 Id.
82 See id. at 1316-17, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1749.
*By David M. McIntosh, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW RN:VIEW.
61 F.3d 650, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 648 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 64
U.S.L.W. 3439 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1996) (No. 95-964).
2 Margaret A. Jacobs, Courts Wrestle with Religion in Workplace, WALL Sr. J., Oct. 10, 1995, at Bl.
3 Id.
4 Compare Brown, 61 F.3d at 657, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 654 with Cook v. Chrysler
Corp., 981 F.2d 336, 338-39, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 644, 649 (8th Cir. 1992) (no Title
VII violation), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2963 and Johnson v. Angelica Uniform Croup, 762 F.2d 671,
674, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 1409, 1411 (8th Cir. 1985) (same) and Wren v. T.I.M.E.—
D.C., Inc., 595 F.2d 441, 445, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) 582, 587 (8th Cir. 1979) (same).
See generally infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
5 See Brown, 61 F.3d at 654-60, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 651-56; infra notes 80-90
and accompanying text.
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) ( I ) (1988). Title VII provides in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
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employer's obligation under Title VII includes an affirmative duty to
"reasonably accommodate" employees' religious beliefs.' In that sec-
tion, Congress stated that a reasonable accommodation is one that does
not impose an "undue hardship" on the employer. 8 Section 701(j),
however, did not provide any practical guidance for determining the
degree of accommodation required by an employer or what constitutes
an undue hardship.'
The First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause also protects public
employees from employment practices that burden the free exercise
of their religious beliefs. 10
 The First Amendment applies to all state and
local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment." In turn,
section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 ("section 1983") gives
plaintiffs suing under the First Amendment compensatory and equita-
ble remedies. 12
In 1977, in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, the United States
Supreme Court set the standard for employers' duty to reasonably
accommodate employees' religious beliefs under Title VII, holding
that section 701(j) does not require that employers bear more than a
de minimis cost to accommodate an employee's religious observances.' 3
In Hardison, the employee, a newly converted member of the World-
wide Church of God, sued his former employer, Trans World Airlines
("TWA"), under Title VII alleging that TWA fired him because his
religion forbade him from working on its Sabbath." TWA attempted
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(i) (1988). This section provides: "The term 'religion' includes all
aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's relig-
ious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."
Id.
8
 See id.
9 See id.; Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1697, 1701 (1977).
I° See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in part: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .
	 ." Id.
II jorm E. Now/ix & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10.2, at 332 (4th ed.
1991); see U,S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part: "No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
12
 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides, in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
13 432 U.S. 63, 84, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1697, 1705-06 (1977).
14 Id. at 67, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1699. The Worldwide Church of God defined
the Sabbath as occurring between sunset Friday and sunset Saturday. Id.
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to accommodate the employee by permitting his union to arrange a
shift swap, but the union was unwilling to violate the seniority system,
and the employee did not have enough seniority to bid for Saturdays
off. 15 In addition, TWA refused to allow the employee to work a four-
day week.'° The Court reasoned that Title VII did not require TWA to
implement either alternative because they involved either real eco-
nomic costs, in the form of lost efficiency or higher labor costs, or
significant noneconomic costs, by infringing coworkers' contractual
rights as secured by their collective bargaining agreement. 17 The Court
held that these costs were more than de minimis, and thus TWA
demonstrated that it was unable to reasonably accommodate the em-
ployee's religious observance without undue hardship.'s
In 1979, in Brown v. General Motors Corp., the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit elaborated on the Hardison analysis,
holding that to show undue hardship, an employer must present evi-
dence that the actual, present cost of a proposed accommodation is
more than de minimis, and not merely speculative.' 9 In Brown, the
employee, also a new inductee into the Worldwide Church of God,
sued his former employer, General Motors ("GM"), under Title VII,
alleging GM fired him because he refused to work on the Sabbath. 2°
The employee requested that he be allowed to leave his job every
Friday at sunset, but GM rejected his request, fearing that it would have
to make similar accommodations for other workers who claimed to
have similar beliefs. 2 ' The court reasoned that undue hardship must
be actual and present rather than speculative because otherwise, any
accommodation would rise to the level of an undue hardship once an
employer magnified it through predictions of the future behavior of
the employee's coworkers. 22
 Furthermore, the court noted that the
accommodation did not constitute an undue hardship simply because
it required giving the employee a privilege his nonreligious coworkers
lacked.23
 Thus, the court held that the employer breached its obligation
under Title VII to make a reasonable accommodation for the em-
15 Id. at 63, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1697.
16 Id.
17 1d. at 79, 84, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1703, 1705.
18 Hardison, 432 H.S. at 77, 84-85, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1702, 1705-06.
19 601 F.2d 956, 958-62, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 94, 96-98 (8th Cir. 1979).
20 Id. at 958, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 95.
21 Id. at 958, 961, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 95, 97.
22 Id. at 961-62, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 98 (quoting Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F.
Supp. 1172, 1182 (D.O.C. 1979)),
231d.
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ployee's religious beliefs, and therefore the employee was discharged
illegally. 24
In 1981, in Thomas v. Review Board, the United States Supreme
Court held that a state regulation that is neutral on its face violates the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment if it (1) substantially
burdens an individual's free exercise of religion and (2) is not the least
restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest. 25 In Thomas,
the plaintiff, a Jehovah's Witness, sought unemployment benefits after
he quit his job in a factory that built tank turrets because he objected
to the production of armaments. 26
 The state unemployment review
board denied him the benefit because he had not shown that his
termination was not based upon "good cause" as required by Indiana's
unemployment compensation statute. 27 The Court reasoned that the
review board essentially forced the plaintiff to choose between follow-
ing a course of conduct his religion mandated and forfeiting the un-
employment benefits on the one hand, and abandoning a religious
precept to accept work on the other.° This choice, the Court contin-
ued, put substantial pressure on the plaintiff to modify his behavior
and violate his beliefs, and thus it substantially burdened the free
exercise of his religion. 29
 The Court further concluded that the state
interest was not sufficiently compelling.m Thus, the Court held that the
plaintiff was entitled to receive unemployment benefits when he quit
his job due to his religious convictions.'l
In 1968, in Pickering v. Board of Education, the United States
Supreme Court held that a public employee has a First Amendment
right to speak on matters of public concern without fear of retribution
from his or her employer, so long as the speech does not interfere with
the effective functioning of the public employer's enterprise. 32 In Pick-
ering, the board of education in Will County, Illinois, fired a public
school teacher after he wrote a letter to the editor of his local newspa-
per criticizing the amount of money the board of education allocated
to athletics." The Court observed that although the letter undoubtedly
addressed a matter of public concern, the State's interest in regulating
24 See Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d at 961, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 98.
25
 See 450 U.S. 707, 717, 718, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 629, 633 (1981).
2° Id. at 710, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 630.
" Id. at 712, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 631.
28 See id. at 717-18, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 633.
29 Id.
30 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 719, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 634.
31
 Id. at 720, 25 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 634.
32 See 391 U.S. 563, 573-74, 575 (1968).
" Id. at 566.
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the speech of public employees differs significantly from its interest in
regulating the speech of private citizens." The Court reasoned that it
must find a balance between the interests of the employee, as a citizen,
in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interests of
the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of public serv-
ices.0 The Court further noted that the letter criticized the board of
education, rather than any of the teacher's direct supervisors or co-
workers and would not likely interfere with the general operation of
the school." Thus, the Court held that the teacher's First Amendment
right to speak on matters of public concern outweighed the board of
education's interest in promoting efficiency, and therefore his dismiss-
al was unconstitutional."
During the Survey year, in Brown v. Polk County, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc held that under
Tide VII, employers who prevent employees from engaging in religious
activities while on the job must show that the banned activities would
have imposed real costs on the employer, thus constituting an undue
hardship." Furthermore, the court held that such policies violate the
First Amendment if they are oppressive or vexatious to the employee
and are not narrowly tailored to a state interest. 39
In Brown, the Polk County Administrator fired Brown, a born-
again Christian, from his job as director of the county's information
services department after the administrator gave Brown two written
reprimands.4° The county administrator gave Brown his first reprimand
in mid-1990 for conducting religious activities on county time after an
internal investigation revealed (1) that Brown directed a secretary to
type Bible study notes for him, (2) that several subordinates prayed in
Brown's office before the beginning of some workdays, (3) that several
subordinates prayed in Brown's office during department meetings,
and (4) that in addressing one meeting of subordinates, Brown affir-
med his Christianity and referred to Bible passages related to slothful-
ness and work ethics. 4' The county administrator's reprimand directed
Brown to stop using county resources for religious activities and to
54 Id. at 568.
55 Id.
36 Id. at 572-73.
57 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574-75.
38 See Brown v. Polk County, 61 E3d 650, 657, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 648, 654 (8th
Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3439 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1996) (No. 95-964).
39 See Id. at 658-59, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 654-55.
4° Id. at 652-53, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 650.
4 ' Id. at 652, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 650.
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cease any activities that "could be considered" religious proselytizing,
witnessing or counseling." Later, the county administrator orally di-
rected Brown to remove all religious items from his office, including
a Bible in his desk.'"
The county administrator gave Brown his second reprimand in
late 1990 for poorly managing the department's budget." Two weeks
later, after an investigation into the personal use of county computers
by employees in Brown's department, the county administrator asked
Brown to resign." Brown refused, and the county administrator fired
him.46
 In late 1991, Brown sued the county, its board of supervisors
and the county administrator, alleging, under section 1983, that the
first reprimand and the order to remove all religious items from his
office violated constitutional guarantees of free exercise of religion and
free speech.47
 He also alleged, under Title VII, that the county fired
him because of his religion."
After a bench trial, the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Iowa found that religious animus played no part in
Brown's termination. 49 The court further held , (1) that the county
could not have reasonably accommodated Brown's beliefs under sec-
tion 701(j) because the county had a duty under the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment to maintain a religiously neutral work-
ing atmosphere, and breaching that duty would have thereby inflicted
more than a de minimis cost; 93
 and (2) that the First Amendment did
not protect Brown's religious activity because the Establishment Clause
mandated that the county keep its workplace free of religious speech. 5 '
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the district court's verdict with respect to the Title VII
claim, 52
 The court also agreed with the district court that Polk County
did not violate Brown's First Amendment free exercise rights by re-
42 Id. at 652-53, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 650.
43
 Brown, 61 F.3d at 653, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 650.
44 Id.
49 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Brown, 61 F.3d at 563, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 650.
49
 Brown v. Polk County, 832 F. Supp. 1305, 1313, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cass. (BNA) 1647, 1652
(S.D. Iowa 1993), affd, 37 F.3d 404, 411, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 47, 51 (8th Cir. 1994),
vacated, 61 F.3d 650, 660, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 648, 656 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
39 Id. at 1314, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1653.
31 Id. at 1315-16, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1654-55.
52
 Brown v. Polk County, 37 F.3d 404, 411, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 47, 51 (8th Cir.
1994), vacated, 61 F.3d 650, 660, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 648, 656 (8th Cir. 1995) (en
banc).
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stricting his religious conduct on the job.53 In addition, the Eighth
Circuit added that removal of religious items from Brown's office did
not constitute a substantial burden to Brown's religious beliefs and,
therefore, did not violate Brown's free exercise rights either."
When the Eighth Circuit revisited the case sitting en bane, how-
ever, the eleven-member panel reversed the court's earlier decision. 55
First addressing Brown's Title VII claim, the court noted that because
the county made no attempt to accommodate the employee's beliefs,
it had to show that allowing the plaintiff's religious activities to con-
tinue would have imposed an undue hardship, as defined in Hardison
and Brown v. General Motors Corp." The court then examined each of
Brown's religious activities. 57
 First, the court agreed with the district
and appellate courts that allowing the plaintiff to have a secretary type
his Bible study notes or to have prayer meetings in his office before
work imposed undue hardship on the employer because both would
have involved more than a de minimis cost." To type Bible study notes,
the court reasoned, the secretary must forego county work, which
would create more than a de minimis cost. 59 Similarly, the court rea-
soned that requiring the defendant to open its offices for prayer meet-
ings before the work day started imposed significant costs not contem-
plated by Title VII's reasonable accommodation requirement. 9°
The court reversed the district and appellate courts' rulings, how-
ever, with respect to Brown's spontaneous prayer in the office during
the work day, his references to Bible passages during a departmental
meeting and keeping religious items in his office, holding that such
activities did not impose an undue hardship on the county. 9 ' Relying
on Brown v. General Motors Corp., the court reasoned that the county's
fears that Brown's conduct might eventually polarize employees be-
cause the staff might think that Brown's religious beliefs would cause
him to favor fundamentalist Christians were speculative and conjec-
tural and thus imposed de minimis costs rather than real costs. 92
 Thus,
the court concluded that the county failed to reasonably accommodate
55 Id. at 409, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 50.
54
 Id. at 410, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 50.
55
 Brown y. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 660, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 648, 656 (8th Cir.
1995) (en franc).
56
 Id, at 655, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 652.
57 Id. at 655, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 652-53.
58 Id. at 665-66, 68 Fair Empl. Prac, Gas. (BNA) at 652-53.
59
 ht. at 656, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 653.
6t) Brown, 61 F.3d at 656, 68 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 653.
GI Id, at 657, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (RNA) at 654.
360	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 37;303
Brown's religious beliefs as required under Title VII, and therefore
found that the county illegally fired Brown on account of his religious
activities.°
The court then addressed Brown's First Amendment claim, hold-
ing that the county administrator violated Brown's right to freely exer-
cise his religion when he ordered Brown to cease all activities that
could be considered religious." The court reached this holding by
combining Free Exercise Clause analysis from Thomas and government
employer analysis from Pickering.'"
To reach its holding, the Eighth Circuit first had to find that the
county policy substantially burdened Brown's religious beliefs. 66 The
court relied on Brown's own testimony that his spiritual revival was a
life-changing experience and that prayer was a part of his being. 67 The
court concluded that Brown showed he was substantially burdened by
the county's employment practices because he found the county's
antireligious policies "oppressive and vexatious." 6B
The court then applied the balancing test described in Pickering
to Brown's religious discrimination case, but added an additional re-
quirement.° To pass the modified balancing test, the court said, the
county's policy must be narrowly tailored to its interest as an em-
ployer." Applying the test, the court first found that Brown's actions
caused "no diminution whatever" in the efficiency of the county's
governmental functions. 71 The court then reasoned that even though
the county had a legal right to ensure that its workplace was free from
68 Id. After making this finding, the court refused to remand the case to the district court
for findings on the question of whether the defendants would have fired the plaintiff even if they
had not considered his religious activities, as required by the "mixed motives" test enunciated in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-46, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 954, 960-61
(1989) (plurality opinion). See Brown, 61 F.3d at 657, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 654.
Instead, the court reversed the district and appellate court's judgment on the Title VII religious
discrimination claim, holding that no reasonable person could conclude from the evidence
presented that the defendants proved that they would have fired the plaintiff anyway. Id.
64 Brown, 61 F.3d at 658-59, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 655.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 658, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 654-55.
67 Id. at 658, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 655. The dissenting opinion lamented this
reliance on Brown's testimony, complaining that Brown failed to show any substantial harm to
his religious practice resulting from the county's actions. See id. at 660, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 657 (Fagg, J., dissenting). Thus, the dissent would not have reached the Pickering
analysis. Id. (Fagg, J., dissenting).
68 See id. at 658, 68 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 655.
69 Brown, 61 F.3d at 658, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 655.
7D Id. at 61 F.3d at 658-59, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 655; see also Pickering, 391 U.S.
at 568.
71 Brown, 61 F.3d at 659, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 655.
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religious activity that harasses or intimidates, its policies were uncon-
stitutional because the county did not narrowly tailor them to that
interest. 72
 In addition, the court found that the county's interest in
obeying the Establishment Clause did not allow it to prohibit employ-
ees' religious expression." Otherwise, the court reasoned, the Estab-
lishment Clause would eclipse the Free Exercise Clause for public
employees."
Brown may signal that the Eighth Circuit is more willing to decide
in favor of employees in religious discrimination suits than it has been
the past." Although Brown did not change the legal tests under Title
VII, it applied those tests to an employee's behavior at work rather than
an employee's refusal to work on certain days, which is the typical
reasonable accommodation claim under section 701(j). 76
 Thus, em-
ployers must tolerate employees' religious activities on the job to the
extent the activities do not disrupt the work environment and force
employers to sustain real, nonhypothetical costs." This new application
may significantly broaden the reach of section 701(j), which was en-
acted with the primary purpose of protecting employees whose relig-
ious practices forbade them from working on the Sabbath or certain
religious holidays." Thus, without changing any of the legal standards
under Title VII, Brown applied section 701(j) in a way that embraces
considerably more potential plaintiffs.
72 Id.
75 Id. at 659, 68 Fair Empl, Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 655-56.
74 Id. at 659, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 656.
75 Compare id. at 657, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 654 with Cook v. Chrysler Corp., 981
F.2d 336, 338-39, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) 645, 649 (8th Cir. 1992) (no Title VII violation
where accommodation would deprive other employees of their contractual rights and would
require employer to bear more than a de minimis cost), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2963 (1993) and
Johnson v. Angelica Uniform Group, 762 F.2d 671, 674, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1409,
1411 (8th Cir. 1985) (no violation of Title VII because collective bargaining agreement in effect
provided reasonable accommodation for plaintiffs needs) and Wren v. T.I.M.E.—D.C., Inc., 595
F.2d 441, 445, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 584, 587 (8th Cir. 1979) (no Tide VII violation
where accommodation would deprive other employees of their contractual rights and would
require employer to bear more than a de minimis cost).
76 Compare Brown, 61 F.3d at 655, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 652-53 with Trans World
Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 85, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1697, 1705 (1977) (employee
refused to work on Sabbath) and Brown v. General Motors, 601 F.2d 956, 959, 20 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 94, 95 (8th Cir. 1979) (same).
77 Brown, 61 F.3d at 655, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 652.
78 See 118 CONG. REC. 706 (1972) (statement of Sen. Jennings Randolf who introduced
section 701(j) as an amendment to Title VII, and who was himself a Sabbatarian whose religious
beliefs forbade him from working on Saturdays); see also Hardison, 432 U.S. at 89, 14 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1708 (Marshall, J., dissenting),
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Although Brown applied section 701 (j) of Title VII to an unusual
set of facts, it did little to illuminate the analysis of what constitutes a
de minimis cost. Brown's religious activities in the county office ranged
from keeping a Bible in his desk to asking a secretary to type Bible
notes." Instead of adding a new gloss to the analysis, however, the court
baldly drew a line without explaining its reasons. Essentially, the court
said that allowing employees to meet before work in the office to pray
imposed more than a de minimis cost, but that allowing "spontaneous"
prayers during department meetings did not impose more than a de
minimis cost. 8° Presumably, the court felt that the monetary cost of
turning on electricity in the building a half hour early was greater than
the loss of productivity while employees prayed, but it did not explain
why. In short, although plaintiffs with similar facts should be able to
use Brown to press successful claims under section 701(j), all litigants
will find that Brown provides little help in predicting whether conduct
imposes more than a de minimis cost.
In addition to expanding the scope of section 701(j) in Title
VII cases, Brown could be a bonanza for public employees bringing
First Amendment claims against government employers. In Brown, the
Eighth Circuit made it easier for plaintiffs to show that employment
policies substantially burdened their religious beliefs. 81
 Furthermore,
the court required that the employers' antireligious policies be nar-
rowly tailored to the employers' interests. 82
The Brown court significantly relaxed plaintiffs' substantial bur-
den standard for Free Exercise Clause cases." Before Brown, free ex-
ercise cases defined a substantial burden on a plaintiff's religious
freedom as denying the plaintiff a significant benefit because of con-
duct mandated by religious belief. 84 In Brown, however, the Eighth
Circuit held that prohibiting the employee from praying at work con-
stituted a substantial burden because the employee found the policy
oppressive and vexatious." The court never determined whether Brown's
religious beliefs mandated that he pray at work. Thus, under Brown,
employees need only show they were sufficiently annoyed by an em-
ployer's antireligious policies and need not demonstrate that the policy
forced them to forgo behavior that their religion mandates.
79 See Brown, 61 F.3d at 652-53, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 650.
8° See id. at 656, 68 Fair Empl. l'rac. Cas. (BNA) at 653-54.
81 See id. at 658, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 655.
82 See id.
85 See id.
84 See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 633.
85
 See Brown, 61 F.3d at 658, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 655.
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Once the Brown court found the county's policy imposed a sub-
stantial burden on Brown's religious freedom, the court employed a
modified Pickering analysis heavily weighted in Brown's favor." In Pick-
ering, the Supreme Court balanced the state's interest as an employer
in providing efficient services with the employee's First Amendment
right to speak on matters of public concern. 87
 In contrast, in Brown,
the Eighth Circuit asked whether the state's policy was narrowly tailored
to its interest as an employer in keeping its offices free from harassing
or intimidating religious behavior." Thus, short of religious behavior
that actually disrupts governmental efficiency or harasses or intimi-
dates coworkers, it is hard to imagine a religious activity that a govern-
ment employer could constitutionally ban."
In addition, the court further handicapped government defen-
dants when it rejected the county's contention that it had an interest,
for the purposes of the modified Pickering analysis, in avoiding a claim
that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment." As
the court noted, such a position would give dominance to the Estab-
lishment Clause and allow the state to ban all of its employee's religious
activities while at work. 9 ' With this formidable state "interest" out of
the way, government employers will find it extremely difficult to pass
the modified Pickering test. In sum, in Brown, the Eighth Circuit sig-
naled its willingness to interpret section 701(0 legal standards more
liberally and announced a more permissive standard for public em-
ployees' free exercise claims under the First Amendment.
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
* Tax Status of Damages Received Under the ADEA:
Commissioner v. Schleierl
Section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C." or "the
Code") provides that "gross income means all income from whatever
source derived" subject only to the exclusions specifically enumerated
elsewhere in the Code. 2 LR.C. § 104(a) (2) excludes from gross income
86
 See id. at 658-59, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 655.
87
 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 356, 368 (1968).
88 Brawn, 61 F.3d at 658-59, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 655,
89 See id.
99
 See id. at 659, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 655-56.
91
 See id. at 659, 68 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 656.
* By Taline Festekjian, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1
 115 S, Ct. 2159, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1745 (1995).
2 26 U.S.C, § 61(a) (1994).
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"the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement
. . .) on account of personal injuries or sickness."3 Regulations to the
Code interpret the term "damages received" as amounts received through
the prosecution or settlement of an action based "on tort or tort type
rights." Accordingly, courts determining the tax status of damages
received in actions brought under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act ("ADEA") 5 consider whether the ADEA creates a "tort-like"
cause of action and whether it provides recovery for damages received
on account of personal injuries.6
In 1986, in Threlkeld v. Commissioner, the United States Tax Court
held that § 104(a) (2) excluded from gross income the damages re-
ceived in settlement of a claim for malicious prosecution.? The tax-
payer in Threlkeld had recovered damages for injury to "professional
reputation" in settlement of a claim for malicious prosecution' The
taxpayer did not report the damages as part of his gross income in his
federal tax return. 9 As a result, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
("Commissioner") issued him a notice of deficiency.m The Tax Court
reasoned that in determining whether § 104(a) (2) allows for an exclu-
sion, the analysis should focus on whether the damages recovered were
pursuant to a claim for "personal injuries."" The court explained that
§ 104(a) (2) excluded from gross income all damages received on
account of an invasion of a legal right granted to the taxpayer by virtue
of being a person.' 2 Because the state where the plaintiffs brought the
action recognized malicious prosecution as a tort action allowing re-
covery for injury to reputation, the Threlkeld court classified the action
for malicious prosecution as an action arising from personal injuries.' 3
Thus, the court held that the taxpayer could exclude from gross in-
5 26 U.S.C. g 104(a) (2) (1994).
4 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) (1994).
5 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994). The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge any
individual between the ages of 40 and 70 because of such individual's age. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a) (1),
631(a). The remedies available under the ADEA are lost wages and an additional equal amount
of liquidated damages in cases of willful violations. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994).
6 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Schleier, 115 S. Ct... 2159, 2167, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1745, 1751 (1995); Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 658, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1389, 1391 (3d Cir. 1990).
7 87 T.C. 1294, 1308 (1986).
8 1d. at 1296.
9 Id. at 1297.
to Id.
" Id. at 1299.
Is 87 T.C. at 1308.
' 9 1d. at 1507.
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come the damages he received in settlement of a claim for malicious
prosecution."
Prior to 1992, courts following the Threlkeld reasoning held that
§ 104(a) (2) allows the exclusion of damages received under the ADEA) 5
In 1990, in Rickel v. Commissioner, for example, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that § 104(a) (2) excluded from
gross income damages received in settlement of an ADEA claim.' The
taxpayer in Rickel did not report damages he received for lost wages in
settlement of an ADEA action. 17 Focusing on the nature of the ADEA,
the court reasoned that an ADEA claim was analogous to a tort-type
claim for personal injury because age discrimination caused injury to
a person's individual rights? Thus, the court concluded that § 104(a) (2)
excluded damages received under the ADEA because they flowed from
a tort-like cause of action.°
In 1992, in United States v. Burke, the United States Supreme Court
altered the course of § 104(a) (2) analysis and held that back pay
awards received in settlement of Title VII claims could not be excluded
from gross income as damages received on account of personal injuries."
As part of the settlement of a sex discrimination claim under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the taxpayer in Burke received a back
pay award from which her employer withheld federal income taxes. 21
The taxpayer subsequently filed for a refund of the taxes withheld. 22
The Court reasoned that in determining whether a statute re-
dresses a tort-type personal injury for purposes of § 104(a) (2), the
analysis should focus on the nature of the claim underlying the dam-
ages award." The Court further explained that because the concept of
a tort is inextricably bound up with the nature of remedies, the remedial
scheme embodied in the statute is the critical factor for § 104(a) (2)
purposes.24
 Following this reasoning, the Court concluded that a claim
14 Id. at 1308.
15 See, e.g., Redfield v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 940 F.2d 542, 547, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1991); Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145, 148, 53 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1219, 1221 (6th Cir, 1990); Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 664, 52 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1389, 1395 (3d Cir. 1990).
16 Id. at 664, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1395.
"Id, at 657, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1390.
18 900 F.2d at 663, 52 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1395.
19 See id. at 663-64, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1395.
20 See 504 U.S. 229, 242, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1323, 1329 (1992).
21 id at 231, 58 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1325.
22 Id. at 232, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1325.
23 See id. at 237, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 1327.
24 Id. at 237 n.7, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 1327 n,7,
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under Title VII was not tort-like, because the remedies available under
Title VII did not compensate the plaintiff for any of the traditional
harms associated with personal injury, such as pain and suffering,
emotional distress, harm to reputation or other consequential dam-
ages." The Court noted that even though employment discrimination
may cause grave harm and injury, Title VII does not compensate
plaintiffs for anything beyond the wages properly owed to them, wages
that would have been fully taxable if paid in the ordinary course. 26
Thus, the Court held that § 104(a) (2) does not exclude from gross
income the back pay awards received in settlement of Title VII claims. 27
In 1994, in Hawkins v. United States, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that § 104(a) (2) does not exclude
from gross income punitive damages received for breach of the duty
of good faith and fair dealing. 28 The taxpayers in Hawkins had recov-
ered both compensatory and punitive damages in an action against an
insurance company for breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing. 28 The taxpayers initially reported the punitive damage award
as part of their gross income, but then filed an amended return
claiming that § 104(a) (2) excluded the punitive damages."
The Hawkins court developed a two-part test for determining
whether § 104(a) (2) excludes damages received in a lawsuit. 3 ' The
court stated that the taxpayer must show both that the underlying
cause of action was tort-like within the meaning of Burke and that the
damages received were on account of personal injury." In Hawkins,
the parties agreed that a lawsuit for breach of good faith- and fair
dealing was tort-like." Thus, the court focused on the second part of
the test and held that the damages received by taxpayers were not on
account of personal injtiry. 34 The court reasoned that punitive damages
were intended to punish the tortfeasor for intentional or malicious
action and to deter future wrongful conduct." Such punitive damage
25 See Burke, 504 U.S. at 239, 240, 58 Fair Empl. Prat. Cas. (RNA) at 1328, 1329.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 242, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1329.
28 30 F.3d 1077, 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 1994).
29 1d. at 1079.
30 Id. The taxpayer had excluded the compensatory damages from gross income. Id. The
Commissioner did not argue and the court did not address the excludability of the compensatory
damages. Id.
31 Id,
32 Id.
33 30 F.3d at 1079.
See id. at 1080.
35 Id. at 1083.
March 19961	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 367
awards, the court concluded, bear no relationship to the plaintiff's
actual injuries, and therefore § 104(a) (2) does not exclude them from
gross income as damages received on account of personal injury. 56
In 1994, in Schmitz v. Commissioner, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the Hawkins test to an ADEA
claim and held that § 104(a) (2) excludes from gross income liquidated
damages received under the ADEA. 37 The taxpayer in Schmitz received
both back pay and liquidated damages in settlement of a claim under
the ADEA. 38 The taxpayer claimed § 104(a) (2) excluded from gross
income both the back pay and the liquidated damages."
Applying the two-part test set forth in Hawkins, the Schmitz court
first concluded that the ADEA establishes a tort-like cause of action
within the meaning of Burke and § 104(a) (2). 4° The court reasoned
that the ADEA's provisions for liquidated damages and jury trials were
analogous to those available in tort cases and therefore rendered
ADEA claims tort-like. 41 Second, the Schmitz court held that the tax-
payer received the liquidated damages on account of his personal
injuries. 42 The court reasoned that courts traditionally awarded liqui-
dated damages to compensate victims for damages which were too
obscure and difficult to prove." Furthermore, the court reasoned that
unlike the punitive damages in Hawkins, which depended on defen-
dant's conduct and wealth and had no relation to the plaintiff's par-
ticular injury, the ADEA liquidated damages at issue here had a com-
pensatory purpose and did bear relation to plaintiffs particular injury. 44
Thus, the court held that § 104(a) (2) excluded the ADEA liquidated
damages.46
In contrast, in 1994, in Downey v. Commissioner, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that § 104(a) (2) did not
exclude from gross income settlement payments received under the
ADEA.46 The taxpayer in Downey had received both back pay and
36 Id. at 1084.
37
 34 F.3d 790, 792, 796, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1195, 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 1994),
38 Id. at 791, 65 Fair Empl. Pine. Gas. (BNA) at 1196.
su
40 Id. at 794, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1198.
41 See id. (noting that provisions for liquidated damages and jury trials distinguished AUEA
from Title VII, which Burke held not to he tort-like).
42 Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 796, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1200.
43 See id. at 794, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1198.
44 Id. at 795, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1199. Under the ADEA liquidated damages
must equal lost wages. Id. at 798. 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1201 (Trott, .f., concurring).
43 Id. at 796, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1200.
46 33 F.3d 836, 837, 840, 65 Fair Empl. l'rac. Cas. (BNA) 1192, 1192, 1195 (7th Cir. 1994).
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liquidated damages in settlement of a claim under the ADEA. 47 The
taxpayer claimed that § 104(a) (2) excluded both the liquidated dam-
ages and the back pay portion of the settlement payment. 48 The Downey
court interpreted Burke to stand for the proposition that a federal
antidiscrimination statute must provide compensatory damages for
intangible elements of personal injury (such as pain and suffering,
emotional distress or personal humiliation) to constitute a tort-type
cause of action and receive tax-exempt treatment under § 104(a) (2) . 49
The court noted the ADEA did not provide the broad range of com-
pensatory damages characteristic of tort-type personal injury statutes. 5°
The court reasoned that the liquidated damages available under the
ADEA were either punitive or contractual in nature, but did not com-
pensate the taxpayer for the traditional elements of a personal injury
claim." Thus, the court concluded that because an ADEA suit lacked
an essential element of a tort-like claim, the back pay and liquidated
damages received under the ADEA were taxable. 52
During the Survey year, in Commissioner v. Schleier, the United
States Supreme Court resolved the split in the circuits as to whether
§ 104(a) (2) excludes from gross income damages received in settle-
ment of a claim brought under the ADEA." The Court held that
§ 104(a) (2) excludes neither the back pay nor the liquidated damages
portion of an award received pursuant to the ADEA.54 Therefore,
under Schleier, a taxpayer must report such damages as gross income,
and such damages are subject to taxation. 55
The taxpayer in Schleierreceived $145,629 from United Airlines as
settlement of an ADEA claim." The settlement agreement apportioned
half of the payment as back pay and the other half as liquidated
damages.57 In his federal tax return, the taxpayer included the back
pay portion of the settlement as gross income, but excluded the por-
47 Id. at 837, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1192.
48 ,rd.
49 Id. at 839, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1194.
50 Id.
51 Downey, 33 F.3d at 840, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1195.
52 Id.
55 115 S. Ct 2159, 2163, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1745, 1747 (1995). Compare Schmitz,
33 F.3d at 796, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1200 (ADEA settlement is not taxable) with
Downey, 33 F.3d at 840, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1195 (ADEA settlement award is
taxable).
" Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2162, 2167, 67 Fair Etnp1. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1746, 1751.
55 See id. at 2167, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1751.
56 /d. at 2162, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1746.
57 Id.
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Lion attributed to liquidated damages." The Commissioner issued a
deficiency notice, asserting that the taxpayer should have reported the
liquidated damages as part of his gross income. 59 The taxpayer initiated
a proceeding in the Tax Court, claiming that he had properly excluded
the liquidated damages and that he was entitled to a refund for the
tax he had paid on the back pay portion.° The Tax Court found that
the entire settlement constituted "damages received .. on account of
personal injuries or sickness" and was therefore excludable from gross
incomes' The Commissioner appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the Tax Court's decision. 62
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
split among the circuits.° The Supreme Court reversed the decision
reached by the Fifth Circuit and held that ADEA damages are not
excludable from gross income. 64 The Court reached its decision by
focusing on the language of § 104(a) (2), the text of the IRS regulation
interpreting § 104(a) (2) and the Court's earlier decision in Burke. 65
First, the Court reasoned that § 104(a) (2) does not exclude back
wages or liquidated damages recovered under the ADEA because both
types of damages lacked the critical requirement of being "on account
of personal injury or sickness."99 The Court noted that although the
unlawful termination may have caused the taxpayer some psychologi-
cal or personal injury, it was the unlawful termination, not the personal
injury, that caused the employee to miss work and lose wages." The
Court distinguished back pay awarded to a victim who lost wages
because of age discrimination from back pay awarded to a victim who
lost wages because of personal injury caused by an automobile acci-
dent.° In the latter, the automobile accident caused the personal
injury, and the personal injury caused the loss of wages. 69 In the former,
the Court noted that the discrimination caused both the personal
injury and the loss of wages, but neither was linked to the other. 70 The
" Id.
69 Schleier, 115 S, Ct. at 2162, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 1746.
60 Id. at 2162, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 1747.
61 M
62 Id. at 2162-63, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1747.
66 Id. at 2163, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1747.
64 Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2163, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1747.
" Id. at 2163-67, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1747-51.
"Id. at 2164, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1748.
67 Id.
66 Id. at 2163-64, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1747-48.
66 Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2164, 67 Fair Empl. Frac. Cas. (BNA) at 1748.
70 1d.
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Court further explained that the personal injury suffered by the em-
ployee did not affect the amount of back wages he received:" Thus,
the Court concluded that the back wages received under the ADEA
were taxable because they were not "damages received on account of
any personal injury."72
 Furthermore, the Court held that liquidated
damages were punitive in nature, and, like back wages, were not re-
ceived on account of personal injury or sickness and should therefore
be included in gross income. 73
Second, the Court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the IRS
regulation interpreting § 104(a) (2) authorizes an exclusion of ADEA
damages from gross income. 74 The regulation defines excludable dam-
ages as those received through the prosecution or settlement of an
action based "on tort or tort type rights." 75 The taxpayer argued that
an action under the ADEA is "based upon tort or tort type rights" as
those terms are used in that regulation, and therefore ADEA damages
are excludable under the plain language of the regulation. 76 The Court
first explained that the respondent's ADEA recovery is not based upon
"tort or tort type rights" as defined in Burke." The Court dismissed the
taxpayer's argument that the ADEA's provisions for liquidated dam-
ages and a jury trial brought the ADEA within Burke 's conception of a
tort-type statute. 78
 The Court reasoned that although the availability of
these features distinguished the ADEA from the statute at issue in
Burke, the primary characteristic of an "action based upon . . . tort type
rights" is the availability of compensatory damages. 79
 The Court ex-
plained that like the pre-1991 version of Title VII, the ADEA provided
no compensation for any of the other traditional harms associated with
personal injury.80
 The Court noted that the only monetary remedies
available under the ADEA are back wages, which are clearly of eco-
nomic character, and liquidated damages, which serve no compensa-
tory function.$' ADEA recoveries therefore did not satisfy "one of the
71 Id.
72 Id.
"See id. at 2165, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1748-49.
Srhieier, 115 S. Ct. at 2166, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1749.
76 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) (1994).
76 &Meier, 115 S. Ct. at 2165-66, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1749.
" Id. at 2166, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1750.
78 Id.
79 Id.
8° Id. at 2167, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1750. Belbre the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Title VII limited available remedies to back pay, injunctions and other
equitable relief. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 237 n.8, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1323, 1327 n.8 (1992).
81 Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1750.
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hallmarks of traditional liability," the Court concluded, because they
did not provide for a broad range of damages that compensate the
plaintiff for injuries caused by the violation of legal rights."
Moreover, the Court observed that even if it accepted the tax-
payer's contention that his ADEA suit was tort-like, § 104(a) (2) only
excludes damages received under a tort-type action when the taxpayer
receives the damages on account of personal injury or sickness." The
Court emphasized that although the Burke Court had relied solely on
Title VII's failure to qualify as an action based upon tort-type rights, it
had not intended to eliminate the basic requirement found in both
the statute and the regulation that only amounts received on account
of personal injuries or sickness come within § 104(a) (2) 's exclusion. 84
In this case, the taxpayer did not receive the damages on account of
personal injury and therefore was not within § 104(a) (2)'s exclusion."
In sum, the Schleier Court held that a taxpayer must meet two
independent requirements before a recovery can be excludable under
§ 104(a) (2). 86 First, the taxpayer must demonstrate that the underlying
cause of action giving rise to the recovery was tort-like." Second, the
taxpayer must show that the damages he or she received were on
account of personal injuries or sickness." As the taxpayer in Schleier
failed to satisfy either requirement, the Court held that § 104(a) (2)
did not exclude his settlement."
In dissent, justice O'Connor argued that § 104(a) (2) does exclude
ADEA damages from gross income.90 Justice O'Connor reasoned that
if harms caused by discrimination constituted personal injury, then the
damages received for such discrimination are "on account of personal
injuries" and should be excludable under § 104(a) (2). 91 Justice O'Con-
nor criticized the majority's argument that acknowledging that dis-
crimination may cause intangible harms does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that damages received for such discrimination are not
on account of such injuries. 92 Justice O'Connor further argued that
ADEA claims are tort-type actions under the Burke analysis." Justice
82 See id. at 2166-67, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1750.
88 Id. at 2165-66, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1749.
84 Id. at 2167, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1750.
86 Id. at 2164, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1748.
es Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1751,
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
9° Id, at 2167, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1751 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
91 Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2170, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1753 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
92 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
99 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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O'Connor explained that unlike Title VII, the ADEA provides for a
jury trial and expressly provides for liquidated damages in addition to
back wages. 94 Justice O'Connor further argued that however the Court
characterizes liquidated damages, the ADEA's remedial scheme goes
beyond Title VII's limited focus on "legal injuries of an economic
character."95 These distinctions, according to the dissent, qualify the
ADEA as tort-like under Burke, and therefore, damages recovered under
the ADEA should be exempt from taxation under § 104(a) (2). 96
The Schleier Court correctly held that § 104(a) (2) does not ex-
clude from gross income damages received under the ADEA. The
Court's conclusion that ADEA claims are not tort-like follows logically
from the Court's decision in Burke. 97 Burke made it clear that courts
should focus on the nature of the remedies available under a particular
statute when determining whether a claim brought under the statute
is tort-like.g 8 A statutory claim is tort-like if the remedies available under
such statute provide compensation for traditional elements of personal
injury, such as emotional distress or pain and suffering. 99 The remedies
under the ADEA are limited to back wages, which are clearly of eco-
nomic character, and liquidated damages, which serve no compensa-
tory purpose.m Because the ADEA does not provide compensation for
any of the traditional harms associated with personal injury, such as
emotional distress or pain and suffering, the Schleier Court was correct
in concluding that a claim under the ADEA is not tort-like.m
The Schleier Court, however, diverged from its earlier decision in
Burke by holding that in addition to demonstrating that the underlying
cause of action was tort-like, a taxpayer must show that the damages
received were on account of personal injury.m For most courts, Burke
stood for the proposition that damages received under a tort-like claim
are damages received "on account of personal injuries" and are there-
fore excludable from gross income.m Relying on its own precedent,
the Court should have limited its holding to the fact that § 104(a) (2)
04 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
99 1d. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2170, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1753.
97 See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 233-37, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1323,
1326-27 (1992).
98 See id. at 235-37, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1326-27.
99 See id. at 237, 58 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1327.
100 Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1750.
Id.
102 See Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1751; Burke, 504 U.S. at
233-34, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1326.
10 See, e.g., Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3c1 836, 839, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
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did not exclude ADEA damages because they did not redress tort-type
personal injuries such as pain and suffering.
Although it is now clear that damages received under the ADEA
are taxable, the Court's new interpretation of § 104(a) (2) has implica-
tions that go beyond the ADEA. The Schleier Court has narrowed the
possibility of exclusion under § 104(a) (2) by holding that damages
received are on account of personal injury only when the injury in and
of itself justifies the damages. Given the strict requirements taxpayers
must meet to qualify for an exclusion under § 104(a) (2), age discrimi-
nation claims under state law will increase in importance because they
might provide certain compensatory remedies unavailable under the
ADEA. Additionally, in settling cases, taxpayers have a great incentive
to maximize the amounts assigned to nontaxable claims such as emo-
tional distress, pain and suffering. Such settlements, however, must be
reasonable because otherwise the IRS could challenge their validity.
Schleier has created uncertainty regarding the taxability of dam-
ages received under Tide VII and other antidiscrimination statutes.
Although it is clear that under Schleier § 104(a) (2) excludes compen-
satory damages such as damages for pain and suffering, the tax status
of back pay wages is unclear.' 04 In assessing the taxability of back wages
under Title VII, for example, the IRS could assert that although the
discrimination caused both injury and loss of wages, neither was linked
to the other, and therefore the back pay awards should be included in
taxable income. 105
 Under certain circumstances, however, a taxpayer
might still have a valid argument that § 104(a) (2) excludes the back
wages. In a situation where a taxpayer suffers personal injury due to
the employer's discriminatory conduct and as a result stops working,
the loss of wages would be the result of the personal injury caused by
the discrimination. The taxpayer would therefore be able to argue that
the back wages received were on account of personal injury as defined
under Schleier.m6
Schleier raises another question regarding the taxability of punitive
damages. The Court noted that liquidated damages are not received
on account of personal injury because they are punitive in nature.'° 7
Thus, under the Schleier reasoning, punitive damages may not be ex-
1192, 1194 (7th Cir. 1994); Rice v. United States, 834 F. Supp. 1241, 1244, 63 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1189, 1191 (E.D. Cal. 1993),
104
 See Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2163-64, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1747-48.
1 °5 See id. at 2164, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1748.
1D6 See id.
07 Id. at 2165, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1749-89.
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cludable in any circumstances because their purpose is always to pun-
ish the tortfeasor rather than compensate the victim.
In sum, the Schleier Court held that § 104(a) (2) does not exclude
from gross income damages received under the ADEA. 1 °8 Taxpayers
must meet two independent requirements before their recovery qualifies
for an exclusion under § 104(a) (2): the underlying cause of action
giving rise to the recovery must be "based upon tort or tort type rights,"
and the damages received must be "on account of personal injuries or
sickness." 105 Damages received under the ADEA failed to satisfy either
requirement."'" It is unclear, however, what Schleier would mean for
damages received under other discrimination statutes.
*No ADEA Liability for Employment Decisions Based on Nonpretextual
Factors Closely Correlated with Age: EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School'
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (the "ADEA"
or the "Act") makes it illegal for employers to discriminate against
individuals on the basis of age. 2 Congress relied heavily on Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in drafting the ADEA, and therefore, courts
have imported the "disparate impact" and "disparate treatment" theo-
ries of relief from Title VII jurisprudence to ADEA cases. 5 In proving
discrimination under disparate treatment theory, a plaintiff must prove
the employer's discriminatory intent. 4 Under disparate impact theory,
a plaintiff must show only that an employment practice falls more
harshly on the protected group than on other employees. 5 Although
it requires no proof of discriminatory intent, a disparate impact claim
will fail if the practice qualifies as a "business necessity." 6 Under the
ADEA, a plaintiff may endeavor to prove age discrimination using
disparate treatment theory, but the availability of disparate impact
theory under the Act remains unclear.' The question of whether the
1 °8 Id. at 2167, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1751.
mg Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1751.
t to id.
* By Jacob N. Lesser, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 41 F.3d 1073, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 85 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,115 S. Ct. 2577
(1995),
7 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994).
3 See Parker, 41 F.3d at 1076, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 86-87.
4 Id. at 1076, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 87.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1706, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 793, 795
(1993). The language of the ADEA makes it clear that the disparate treatment theory is available.
Id. The ADEA does not explicitly allow for the disparate impact theory, and the Supreme Court
has never decided whether it is available. Id. The ADEA also provides employers with a defense
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disparate impact theory is available is particularly important when a
plaintiff challenges an employment decision that is not based on age,
but on a factor closely correlated with age,'
In 1983, in Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that an employment
decision based on tenure status constituted age discrimination under
the ADEA.9
 The defendant in Leftwich did not rehire the plaintiff, a
forty-seven-year-old tenured professor, after the state college system
took over control of the college from the St. Louis Board of Educa-
tion.m The defendant's rehiring practice included reserving certain
positions for nontenured faculty." The Eighth Circuit found that the
close statistical correlation between age and tenure established that an
employment decision based on tenure status fell more harshly on older
employees and, therefore, violated the ADEA under disparate impact
theory.' 2
 In response to defendant's argument that it implemented the
practice pursuant to the business necessity of cutting costs, the Eighth
Circuit found that treating cost-cutting as a business necessity would
defeat the purposes of the Act.' 3
 The Eighth Circuit, therefore, con-
cluded that the ADEA forbids employers from basing employment
decisions on tenure status when tenure status closely correlates with age."
In 1987, in Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the ADEA prevented employers
from replacing older, higher-salaried employees with younger, lower-
paid workers in order to save salary costs.' 3 The plaintiff in Metz had
worked for a branch plant of defendant concrete company for twenty-
seven years when the defendant replaced him with a younger, lower-
salaried employee in order to save money. 16
 The Seventh Circuit found
when their employment decisions are based on "reasonable factors other than age." 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(1)(1) (1994). Some commentators have treated this defense as a codification of the business
necessity defense available under the disparate impact theory. E.g., Parker, 41 F.3d at 1080, 66
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 90 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Others have found that this defense
precludes disparate impact claims. E.g., Anderson v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 13 F.3r1 1120,
1125-26, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1016, 1020-21 (7th Cir. 1994).
"See Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1220, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1339,
1353-54 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J,, dissenting).
u Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 691, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
376, 380 (8th Cir. 1983).
lu M. at 689, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 377-78.
11 1d. at 690, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 379.
12 See id.
' 3 1d. at 691, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 380.
14 Leftwich, 702 F.2d at 691, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 380.
15
 Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1211, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1339, 1346
(7th Cir. 1987).
16 Id. at 1203, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1340. Plaintiff's replacement was 43 years
376	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 37:503
that, although the plaintiff had brought a disparate treatment case, the
disparate impact reasoning in Leftwich proved instructive." Due to the
high correlation between age and salary, the Seventh Circuit reasoned
that permitting cost-cutting as a nondiscriminatory justification for
replacing an older employee with a younger one would undermine the
goals of the ADEA.' 8 The Seventh Circuit found that the desire to cut
costs in this case did not constitute a reasonable factor other than age
and, therefore, was not a defense to ADEA requirements.' 9 Thus, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that replacing an older employee with a
younger one, out of a desire to cut costs, constituted age discrimination
under the ADEA. 20
In 1993, however, the United States Supreme Court, in Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, held that firing an employee because his pension
benefits were close to vesting did not constitute disparate treatment
under the ADEA. 2 ' The defendant fired the plaintiff just before he
completed the ten years of service required for his pension to vest. 22
The Court reasoned that the purpose of the ADEA is to prevent
employers from making decisions based upon inaccurate and stigma-
tizing stereotypes about older employees." When the employer bases
its decision on factors other than age, the Court observed, the problem
of stereotyping disappears, even if the factor correlates with age. 24 The
Court agreed that pension status typically correlates with age, but
determined that age and pension status are analytically distinct." Thus,
the United States Supreme Court held that an employer does not
violate the ADEA by interfering with an employee's pension status
when the vesting period is based upon years of service."
In 1994, in Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the ADEA does not
old, had worked for defendant for 17 years and earned $8.05/hour compared to plaintifrs
$15.75/hour. Id.
17
	 at 1207, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1343. judge Easterbrook's dissent argued
that the two theories should be kept separate, and stated that by combining the two, the majority
allowed plaintiff to get into court on the disparate treatment theory and prove his case using
disparate impact analysis. Id. at 1215, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1349. (Easterbrook, j.,
dissenting).
18 Id. at 1207, 44 Fair Empl, Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 1343.
19 Id. at 1208, 44 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1343-44.
20 Metz, 828 F.2d at 1211, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1346.
21 Hazen Paper Co, v, Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1707-08, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 793,
796-97 (1993).
" Id. at 1704, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 794,
23 Id. at 1706, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 795.
24 Id. at 1706, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 796.
25 Id. at 1706-07, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 796.
26 Hazen Paper, 113 S. Ct. at 1707-08, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 796-97.
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prevent employers from firing employees to reduce costs. 27 The plain-
tiff served as the highest-paid employee in one of defendant's facilities;
defendant fired him after several incidents that allegedly resulted from
the plaintiff's inattention. 28 Responding to plaintiff's argument that
defendant fired him to reduce its salary costs, the Seventh Circuit
followed Hazen Paper, stating that the problem of inaccurate stereotyp-
ing of older employees does not exist when an employer makes a
decision based on a desire to cut costs. 29 The Seventh Circuit reasoned
that though age and salary are typically correlated, they, like age and
pension status, are analytically distinct. 30 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit
concluded an employer does not violate the ADEA when it fires an
employee to save the cost of his or her salary. 8 t
During the Survey year, in FEOC
 v. Francis W Parker School, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that an
employer does not violate the ADEA by linking wages to experience,
unless a plaintiff shows that the practice results from a forbidden
stereotype about older workers. 32 Although the plaintiff based its ap-
peal only on disparate impact theory, the Seventh Circuit applied
Hazen Paper's disparate treatment conclusion that Congress enacted
the ADEA to prevent employers from basing decisions on inaccurate
and forbidden stereotypes. 33 In light of this purpose, the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that an employment practice that disproportionately affects
older workers will not result in liability under the ADEA unless a
plaintiff proves the practice constituted a pretext for a forbidden
stereotype about older workers. 84
Francis W. Parker School ("Parker"), a private school in Chicago,
calculated teachers' salaries based on a twenty-two step system linking
wages to years of experience." The school determined new teachers'
salaries by crediting them for years of teaching experience acquired
elsewhere." In 1988, a vacancy opened up in the drama department,
and Parker's principal asked Paul Druzinski, head of that department,
27 13 F.3d 1120, 1126, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1016, 1020-21 (7th Cir. 1994).
28 Id. at 1121, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1016.
29 Id. at 1125, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1020.
" Id. at 1126, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1020.
51 Id. at 1126, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1020-21.
52
 41 F.3d 1073, 1078, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 85, 88 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 2577 (1995).
" Id, at 1075, 1076, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 86, 87. Hazen Paper strictly involved
a disparate treatment claim; the Court never decided whether the disparate impact theory was
available under the ADEA. 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1706, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) 793, 795 (1995).
51 Parker, 41 F.3d at 1078, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 88.
35 Id. at 1075, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 86.
56 Id.
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to find a replacement. 37
 The principal informed Druzinski that, due to
budgetary concerns, the new position would pay no more than $28,000
per year."
In March 1989, Druzinski narrowed his list of candidates to three
finalists." After Druzinski had selected the finalists, another teacher
asked him if he would consider hiring Harold Johnson, a sixty-three-
year-old drama teacher with thirty years of experience.° One week
later, Druzinski told Johnson that the school would not hire him, giving
as one reason the fact that Johnson qualified for a higher salary than
the school could afford to pay. 4 ' On March 27, 1989, Parker hired
Nancy Bishop, a teacher with one year of experience, at a salary of
$22,000 per year. 42
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC")
filed suit on Johnson's behalf, claiming an ADEA violation under both
disparate treatment and disparate impact theories.° The trial court
denied Parker's motion for summary judgment on August 27, 1992. 44
After the United States Supreme Court decided Hazen Paper, however,
Parker asked the trial court to reconsider its ruling. 45 The trial court
then granted Parker summary judgment on both the disparate impact
and disparate treatment claims. 46
 The EEOC appealed only its dispa-
rate impact claim. 47
In response to the EEOC's argument that Parker's employment
practice excluded a disproportionate number of teachers over the age
of forty from consideration for the position, the Seventh Circuit began
with an analysis of the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in
Hazen Paper. 48 Although the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that Hazen
Paper involved a disparate treatment claim, it nonetheless applied the
reasoning of Hazen Paper to the EEOC's disparate impact claim. 49
 It
interpreted Hazen Paper to mean that the courts must interpret the
ADEA in light of its purpose of eliminating stereotyping of older
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Parker, 41 F.3d at 1075, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cm. (BNA) at 86.
4° Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Parker
 41
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 1076, 66 Fair Empl, Prac. Cm. (BNA) at 87.
4'° Parker, 41 F.3d at 1076, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 87.
F.3d at 1075, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 86.
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workers. 5° Following Hazen Paper's ruling that age and years of service
are analytically distinct, the Seventh Circuit found that Parker did not
base its decision to reject Johnson on a forbidden stereotype, and thus
Parker did not violate the ADEA. 5 '
The Seventh Circuit supported its conclusion by interpreting An-
derson as holding that practices that affect workers over forty more
adversely than younger employees are not unlawful as long as the
practice does not constitute a pretext for a forbidden stereotype about
age." The Seventh Circuit also found that subsection (f) of the Act,
which describes the "reasonable factors other than age" defense, sup-
ported this reading. 55
 This defense, the Seventh Circuit reasoned, sug-
gests that employment decisions made for reasons other than age, but
which rely on factors that correlate with age, do not violate the ADEA. 54
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court held
that a similar provision in the Equal Pay Act precludes disparate impact
claims."
In response to the dissent, the Seventh Circuit next determined
that the importation of Title VII jurisprudence, which would allow
disparate impact claims in the age discrimination context, proved
inappropriate on the facts of Parker.56 Comparing the ADEA and Title
VII, the court found significant the fact that subsection (2) of Title VII,
which gave rise to disparate impact claims in the Title VII context,
included the language "applicants for employment" where the mirror
provision in the AREA omitted this language. 57
 The Seventh Circuit
5° Id.
51 Id. at 1076-77, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 87.
52 Id. at 1077, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 87.
53 Id. at 1077, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 87-88. Subsection (I) states:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency or labor organiza-
tion—(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsections (a) ... of this
section where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal •operation of the particular business, or where the differentiation is
based on reasonable factors other than age ....
29 U.S.C. § 623(0 (1994).
"Parker, 41 F,3d at 1077, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 87.
55
 Id.; see County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170-71, 25 Fair Empl. Prat. Cas. (BNA)
1521, 1524 (1981).
56 Parker, 41 F.3d at 1077, 66 Fair Etnpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 88,
57 Id. The United States Supreme Court relied on subsection (2) of Title VII in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., in holding that Title VII permitted claims based on disparate impact theory. See 401
U.S. 424, 426, 429-30, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 175, 176, 177 (1971). The mirror provision
in the ADEA reads: "It shall be unlawful for an employer- ...(2) to limit, segregate or classify his
employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities . , . because of such individual's age . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994) (emphasis
added).
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noted that, aside from the omission, the ADEA and Title VII provisions
were almost identical. 58
Finally, the court reasoned that even under a disparate impact
analysis, the plaintiff's claim would fail.° The court concluded that the
defendant's salary policy constituted a "business necessity" and rea-
soned that the ADEA's "safe harbor" provision, allowing an employer
to "observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system," supported this
conclusion. 60 Thus, the court held that to prevail on an ADEA claim,
a plaintiff must show that an employment practice having a dispropor-
tionate effect on older workers serves as a pretext for applying a
conscious or unconscious stereotype about older employees. 8'
In dissent, Judge Cudahy characterized the majority decision as
holding that Hazen Paper precluded the use of disparate impact theory
in the ADEA context. 62
 He argued that the majority's analysis began with
a conclusion, i.e., that Parker did not base its decision to reject Johnson
on forbidden stereotypes about older workers. 63 The dissent stated that
courts should use disparate impact theory as an instrument to inquire
whether Parker refused to hire Johnson because of these stereotypes. 84
Judge Cudahy agreed with the majority that after Hazen Paper it
is no longer enough to show that an employer based a decision on a
factor obviously correlated with age. 65 Rather, Judge Cudahy agreed,
Hazen Paper requires a showing that an employer based a decision on
age qua age.66 Thus, Judge Cudahy framed the issue presented in Parker
as whether a plaintiff can attempt to prove that an employer discrimi-
nated on the basis of age qua age by showing that the employer used
a practice disproportionately affecting older workers.67 Judge Cudahy
argued that implicit in the majority's rejection of disparate impact
theory was the belief that an employer need not actually discriminate
in order to incur liability under disparate impact analysis.°
Judge Cudahy also disagreed with the majority's suggestion that
the "reasonable factors other than age" defense precludes the use of
disparate impact theory to establish an ADEA violation, 69 Rather than
58 Parker, 41 F.Sd at 1077-78, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 88.
59 Id.
55 Id. The "safe harbor" provision of the ADEA is found at 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1994).
61 Parker, 41 F.3d at 1077-78, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 88.
62 Id. at 1078, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 88-89 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
63 .M. at 1078, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 89 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
54 Id. (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 1078-79, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 89 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
66 Parker, 41 F.341 at 1078-79, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 89 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 1079, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 89-90 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 1079, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 90 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 1080, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 90 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
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precluding the use of disparate impact theory, Judge Cudahy argued,
the "reasonable factors other than age" defense to the ADEA merely
codifies the "business necessity" defense available under disparate im-
pact theory generally." He reasoned that an employment practice
having a disparate impact on older workers raises a presumption of
discrimination; the "business necessity" defense rebuts this presump-
tion and thus provides an already existing defense for "reasonable
factors other than age." 71
The Seventh Circuit, in Parker, has seriously limited, and perhaps
eliminated, the availability of disparate impact theory for establishing
age discrimination." Moreover, even if disparate impact theory sur-
vives, the Seventh Circuit has further held that linking wages to years
of experience constitutes "an economically defensible and reasonable
means of determining salaries." 7s This suggests that even if a plaintiff
may endeavor to prove age discrimination under disparate impact
theory, the court will be sympathetic to a defendant's argument that
its desire to cut costs falls within the "business necessity" defense."
The Seventh Circuit has dramatically expanded the holding in
Hazen Paper by applying that case's disparate treatment reasoning to
the plaintiff's disparate impact claim in Parker:15 Hazen Paper requires
that the defendant discriminate on the basis of age and not on the
basis of some factor closely correlated with age." As Judge Cudahy
frames the issue, the question thus becomes whether a plaintiff may
attempt to prove discriminatory intent by proving that an employment
practice falls more harshly on older employees." By granting sum-
mary judgment without inquiring whether the disparate impact analy-
sis allowed an inference of discriminatory intent, the Parker court
foreclosed the plaintiff's opportunity to prove that a forbidden stereo-
type about older workers lay behind the linking of wages to years of
service."
Instead, Parker suggests that to survive a summary judgment mo-
tion, a plaintiff will have to produce some "smoking gun" evidence of
discriminatory intent." Judge Cudahy correctly argued that this bur-
7° Id. (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
71
 See Parker, 41 F.3d at 1080, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 90 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 1077, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 87-88.
"Id. at 1078, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 88.
74 see
 id.
75 See id. at 1076, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 87.
76 See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1707, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 793,
796 (1993).
77
 Parker, 41 F.3d at 1079, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 89-90 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 1075, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 86.
" See id. at 1080, 66 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 90 (Cudahy, J., dissenting),
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den is too high.s° In essence, the Seventh Circuit will now hold plain-
tiffs to a burden of proof similar to that required in the equal protec-
tion context.'" Hazen Paper's holding that an employer may base a
decision on a factor correlated with age does not necessitate elimina-
tion of the disparate impact theory of relief." Even if a plaintiff must
show, as Hazen Paper holds, that an employer discriminated on the
basis of age qua age, disparate impact analysis should remain an ac-
ceptable method of detecting employment decisions that were really
based on age, that is, decisions in which the employer's reliance on a
factor correlated with age was merely pretextual. 83
In sum, EEOC v. Francis W Parker School establishes that a plaintiff
must show that an employer based its employment decision on a
stereotype about older workers in order to prevail on an age discrimi-
nation claim under the ADEA. 84 The Seventh Circuit expanded on the
holding in Hazen Paper by making this the rule regardless of whether
the plaintiff brings a disparate treatment claim or a disparate impact
claim." By granting the defendant summary judgment without consid-
ering whether the plaintiff's disparate impact analysis could establish
discriminatory intent, the Seventh Circuit implied that a plaintiff must
produce "smoking gun" evidence of discriminatory intent to make it to
trial." In the future, the Seventh Circuit's Parker rule may effectively
eliminate the availability of the disparate impact theory in the ADEA
contexts'
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT
*ERISA Preemption—When Does a State Law 'Relate to" an ERISA
Plan?: New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.'
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA") in 1974 in part to protect employee benefit plan partici-
pants by controlling the administration of plan benefits. 2 ERISA cover-
8° See id. (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
81 See id. (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
82 See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1707-08, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
793, 796-97 (1993).
83 See Parker, 41 F.3d at 1080-81, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 91 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
84 Id. at 1078, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 88.
85 See id.
86 See id. at 1080, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 90 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
87 See id. at 1078, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 89 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
* By Elizabeth Rover Bailey, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 115 S. Ct. 1671, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1137 (1995).
2 See id. at 1674, 19 Employee Benefits Cas, (BNA) at 1139.
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age extends to employee benefit plans that provide medical, surgical
or hospital care or benefits.' ERISA contains participation and vesting
requirements, funding standards, reporting and disclosure mandates
for covered plans and creates fiduciary responsibility for plan admin-
istrators. 4 ERISA also preempts state laws "insofar as they ... relate to
any employee benefit plan" that ERISA covers.' Congress intended this
preemption provision to subject employee benefit plans to a uniform
body of law and thus minimize the administrative and financial bur-
dens on plan administrators who would otherwise have to comply
with conflicting state, federal and local regulations. 6 In determining
whether ERISA preempts certain state laws, the United States Supreme
Court and other federal courts have repeatedly struggled to interpret
the term "relate to" as used in ERISA's preemption provision.?
In 1983, in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the United States Supreme
Court held that a law relates to an employee benefit plan, and thus
falls under ERISA's general preemption clause, if it has a connection
with, or reference to an ERISA plan.' In Shaw, the plaintiffs sought
declaratory judgments that ERISA preempted New York's Human Rights
Law, which forbade discrimination in employment, and New York's
Disability Benefits Law, which required employers to pay sick-leave
benefits to employees unable to work because of pregnancy or other
nonoccupational disabilities.' The Court reasoned that Congress in-
tended ERISA's preemption provision to be broad in order to elimi-
nate the threat of conflicting state and local regulation by reserving to
federal authority the sole power to regulate employee benefit plans.''
In light of such a broad interpretation of ERISA's preemption provi-
sion, the Court concluded that the Human Rights Law and the Disabil-
ity Benefits Law related to employee benefit plans by regulating their
structure and content." Thus, the Court held that New York's Human
3 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994),
4 Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1674, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1139; see 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001(b) (1994).
5 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
6 See Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1677, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1142; Ingersoll-Rand
Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142, 5 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1601, 1604 (1990).
7 See, e.g., Travelers, 115 S, Ct. at 1677, 19 Employee Benefits Gas, (BNA) at 1141; Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 121, 125-26 (1983);
United Wire, Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 995 F.2d
1179, 1192, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2182, 2186-87 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 382
(1993).
8 463 U.S. at 96-97, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 125.
9 Id. at 89, 92, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 122-23, 124.
to Id. at 99, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 126.
11 Id, at 100, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 127.
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Rights Law and Disability Benefits Law fell within the general scope of
ERISA's preemption provision.' 2
In contrast, in 1984, in Rebaldo v. Cuomo, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that to relate to an ERISA plan,
a state law must purport to regulate the terms and conditions of the
plan." In Rebaldo, a New York statute authorized specific inpatient
hospital charges for patients with self-insured plans and prohibited
hospitals from establishing other charges for those patients, but did
not restrict the discounts that hospitals could give to payers such as
Blue Cross. 14 Acknowledging that the United States Supreme Court
had interpreted the term "relate to" broadly, the Second Circuit nev-
ertheless reasoned that ERISA preemption does not create 1'a fully
insulated legal world" of ERISA plans where regulations of purely local
transactions do not apply." Therefore, the court reasoned, ERISA
cannot preempt a state statute that merely has some economic impact
on an ERISA plan." Consequently, the Second Circuit held that ERISA
did not preempt the New York statute, even though the statute had
some economic impact on ERISA plans. 17
The United States Supreme Court again addressed the issue of
whether a law related to an ERISA plan in 1990, in Ingersoll-Rand Co.
v. McClendon, where the Court held that a state law escapes ERISA
preemption if it is generally applicable, lacks reference to and func-
tions irrespective of the existence of an ERISA plan." In Ingersoll-Rand,
the plaintiff filed suit in a Texas state court alleging that Ingersoll-Rand
fired him to avoid making contributions to his pension fund.' 9 The
Texas Supreme Court held that under Texas law a plaintiff could
recover in a wrongful discharge action if he or she established that the
principal reason for his or her termination was the employer's desire
to avoid contributing to or paying benefits under the employee's pen-
12 Id. at 97, 100, 108, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 125-26, 127, 130. Although both of
New York's laws fell within ERISA's general preemption provision, the Court ultimately held that
exemptions to preemption applied and thus ERISA did not fully preempt either statute. Id. at
100, 108-09, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 127, 129, 130.
13 749 F.2d 133, 137, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1001, 1004 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1008 (1985).
14 Id. at 134, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1001-02.
15 Id. at 138, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1004-05. Because containment of hospital
costs is part of a state's police power, the Second Circuit reasoned, federal law should not
supersede the New York statute, absent clear congressional intent to the contrary. Id. at 138, 6
Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1005.
16 See id. at 139, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1005-06.
' 7 Id.
1 " See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139, 5 Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA)
1601, 1603 (1990).
19 M. at 135-36, 5 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1601.
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sion fund." In reviewing the wrongful discharge cause of action cre-
ated by the Texas court, the United States Supreme Court focused on
the necessity that the plaintiff plead, and that a Texas court find, that
an ERISA plan existed and the employer had a pension-defeating
motive in terminating the employment:2 ' Because the wrongful dis-
charge cause of action depended on the existence of an ERISA plan,
the Court held that it related to an ERISA plan and thus fell within
ERISA's preemption provision. 22
The United States Supreme Court further developed ERISA pre-
emption jurisprudence in 1992, in District of Columbia v. Greater Wash-
ington Board of Trade, where it held that a law that specifically referred
to ERISA plans related to ERISA plans." In Greater Washington, the
Court considered a District of Columbia statute that required employ-
ers providing health insurance to provide the same benefit level to
injured employees eligible for worker's compensation benefits as they
provided to all other employees. 24 A corporation that sponsored health
insurance for its employees alleged that ERISA preempted the statute
and sought to enjoin its enforcement. 25 Reasoning that Congress in-
tended a broad reading of ERISA's preemption provision, the Court
examined whether the district statute had a connection with or re-
ferred to ERISA plans." The Court concluded that the statute related
to ERISA because the statute specifically referred to ERISA plans. 27
Thus, the Court held that ERISA preempted the district statute requir-
ing health insurance for employees eligible for workers' compensation
to equal other employee health insurance coverage."
In 1993, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held, in United Wire, Metal & Machine Health & Welfare Fund v.
Morristown Memorial Hospital, that a state statute relates to an ERISA
plan if the statute is specifically intended to affect such plans, singles
out such plans for special treatment or creates rights or restrictions
predicated on the existence of such a plan." In United Wire several
self-insured employee benefit plans and individual participants sought
29 Id. at 136, 5 Indiv. Erupt. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1602.
21 Id. at 140, 5 Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 1603.
22 Id.
23 See 113 S. Ct. 580, 583, 16 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) 1001, 1003 (1992),
24 Id. at 583-84, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1003.
25 Id. at 582, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1002.
26 See id. at 583, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1003.
27 Id. The Court reasoned that a law's coverage of non-ERISA plans is irrelevant if the law
otherwise relates to ERISA plans and thereby falls within ERISA's preemption provision. Id. at
584, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1004.
26 Greater Wash., 113 S. Ct. at 582, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1001.
29 United Wire, Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund v, Morristown Memorial Hosp., 995
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to prevent application to them of a New Jersey statutory scheme that
set different hospital prices for patients covered by differing insurance
plans." The Third Circuit noted that although ERISA preempts a state
law that has a connection with or refers to ERISA plans, the effect on
ERISA plans may be too tenuous, remote or peripheral to trigger
ERISA's preemption." Reasoning that New Jersey's regulatory scheme
had no effect on the manner in which an ERISA plan conducted
business or its ability to function in interstate commerce, the court
found that the indirect effect of the regulatory scheme on the cost of
ERISA plans was not sufficient to trigger preemption." The Third
Circuit further reasoned that Congress did not intend to frustrate the
efforts of a state to regulate health care costs through the exercise of
its police power.33
 Thus, the Third Circuit held that ERISA did not
preempt New Jersey's hospital rate regulation scheme."
During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court again
considered the scope of ERISA's preemption provision in New York
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance
Co., in which it examined ERISA's practical objectives to determine the
scope of state law that Congress intended to preempt." The Court
acknowledged that its prior attempts to construe ERISA's preemption
clause did not simplify the determination of which state laws relate to
ERISA plans.56
 Thus, in Travelers, the Court focused on the tension
between the broad congressional intent to preempt the field of employee
benefits for federal regulation and the traditional presumption that
Congress does not intend to supersede the police powers of the states."
In Travelers, a New York statute required that hospitals charge
each patient for the average cost of treating the patient's medical
problem, as adjusted for each hospital's individual operating costs and
other overhead." The statute also imposed differing surcharges on
patients, depending on the type of insurance held." For example, a
F.2d 1179, 1192, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2182, 2186 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. CL
382 (1993).
" Id. at 1188, 1189, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2183, 2183-84.
Id. at 1191, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2185 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 121, 127 n.21 (1983)).
32 United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1193, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2187-88.
33 Id, at 1196, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2190-91.
34 Id. at 1195, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2190.
35 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1677, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1137, 1141 (1995).
36 Id.
37 See id. at 1676, 1677, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1141.
" Id. at 1674, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1138.
" See id, at 1674, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1138.
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patient who belonged to a Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan paid no sur-
charge, but a patient who belonged to a self-insured plan paid a
thirteen percent surcharge." Some patients with commercial insurance
paid as much as a ,twenty-four percent surcharge under the statute.'"
Several commercial insurers, acting as fiduciaries of ERISA plans
they administered, sought to invalidate the statute on the grounds that
it related to an ERISA plan and that ERISA therefore preempted the
surcharges. 42 The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York reasoned that the surcharges would lead, at least indi-
rectly, to an increase in plan costs." Thus, the district court enjoined
enforcement of the surcharges against any commercial insurer or health
maintenance organization ("HMO") in connection with its coverage
of ERISA plans."
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit abandoned its prior decision in Rebaldo v. Cuomo and held that
the surcharges related to ERISA because they place a significant eco-
nomic burden on commercial insurers and HMOs." The court relied
on the United States Supreme Court's assertions that ERISA's preemp-
tion clause is broad enough to reach any state law connected with or
referring to ERISA plans and thus may preempt laws not specifically
designed to affect ERISA plans or laws that have only an indirect effect
on ERISA plans." The court reasoned that New York's intentional
interference with ERISA plan administrators' choices, through price
setting, constituted a connection with ERISA plans. 47 Hence, the Sec-
ond Circuit held that ERISA preempted the New York hospital sur-
charges statute."
4° Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1674, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1138.
" See id.
42 Id. at 1675, 19 Employee Benefits Cas, (BNA) at 1139.
°Travelers Ins. Co, v. Cuomo, 813 F. Stipp. 996, 1003, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA)
1551, 1556 (S.D.N.Y 1993), aff'd, 14 F.3d 708, 723, 17 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1675, 1686
(2d Cir. 1994), rev'd sub nom, New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1676, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1137, 1140, 1141 (1995).
44 Id. at 999, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1552,
45 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 719, 17 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1675, 1682
(2d Cir. 1994), reu'd sub nom. New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1676, 19 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) 1137, 1140, 1141 (1995); see
Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 137, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1001, 1004 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985).
°Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d at 718, 17 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1681; see
District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 113 S. Ct. 580, 583, 16 Employee Benefits
Cas. (BNA) 1001, 1003 (1992); Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139, 5 Individual
Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 161)1, 1603 (1990).
47 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d at 719, 17 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at. 1682.
4° Id. at 723, 17 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1686. The Second Circuit acknowledged
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The United States Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's
decision, reasoning in part that unless Congress provides clear evi-
dence to the contrary, it does not intend a federal act to supersede the
police powers of a state. 49
 The Court began its analysis with the text of
the preemption provision.50
 Previously, the Court had applied the provi-
sion to those laws that had a connection with, or reference to, an ERISA
plan. 51
 Because the New York statute did not refer to ERISA plans, the
Court examined whether the statute had the requisite connection with
ERISA plans." Noting that determining whether a law has a "connec-
tion with" an ERISA plan is no easier than determining whether a law
relates to an ERISA plan, the Court looked beyond the text of the
preemption provision and examined ERISA's objectives to identify
which state laws Congress intended to preempt."
The Court noted that Congress intended ERISA to create a uni-
form body of benefits law to minimize the administrative and financial
burdens of complying with a multiplicity of state and local directives. 54
The Court contrasted the laws at issue in Shaw, which related to ERISA
plans by regulating the structure of plans and by requiring payment of
specific benefits, with the Travelers statute, which only indirectly af-
fected the costs of benefits and did not bind plan administrators to any
specific choice. 55
 The Court emphasized that the New York statute did
not conflict with the congressional goal of uniformity because the
statute did not preclude uniform administrative practices or the pro-
vision of a uniform interstate benefit package.56
 Reasoning that if
ERISA were to preempt rate regulation, it would also preempt all other
regulation indirectly affecting plan costs, the Court noted that ERISA
that this holding contradicted the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decision
on a similar statute in United Wire. Id. at 721 n.2, 17 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1683 n.2;
see United Wire, Metal & Mach. Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 995 F.2d
1179, 1196, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2183, 2191 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 382
(1993).
49
 New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct.
1671, 1676, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1137, 1140, 1141 (1995).
59 Id. at 1677, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1141.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id
54
 See Travelers, 115 S. CL at 1677-78, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1142.
55
 Id. at 1678, 1679, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1142, 1143; see Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 121, 125-26 (1983). New York's
Human Rights Law prohibited employers from structuring their employee benefit plans in a
manner that discriminated on the basis of pregnancy, and New York's Disability Benefits law
required employers to pay employees specific benefits. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97, 32 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 125-26.
56
 See Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1679, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1143.
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could then effectively preempt all state laws.'" The Court asserted that
this result would violate basic principles of statutory interpretation by
reading the limiting language out of ERISA's preemption provision
and would contradict the Court's earlier assertions that ERISA does
not preempt state laws that have only a tenuous connection with ERISA
plans." Furthermore, the Court reasoned, barring the New York hos-
pital rate regulations would allow the preemption of any state regula-
tion of hospital costs on the grounds that the regulation has an indirect
economic effect on ERISA plans."
The Court found no evidence that Congress intended ERISA to
preempt local general health care regulation or to create nationwide
cost uniformity and therefore indicated that ERISA does not preempt
state laws that indirectly affect the relative costs of health insurance
packages within a state." Additionally, the Court emphasized that states
regulated hospital prices when Congress passed ERISA, and yet Con-
gress did not indicate that ERISA should curtail these state efforts,t In
fact, the Court noted, the same Congress later enacted a statute to
encourage and fund state responses to growing health care costs."
Consequently, the Supreme Court reasoned, it would be illogical to
read ERISA as preempting such state action. 63 After reaching its deci-
sion, the Court clarified that its reasoning and holding in Travelers
were not inconsistent with its reasoning and holdings in past cases."
Hence, the United States Supreme Court held that New York's hospital
rate surcharge statute did not relate to ERISA plans and thus fell
outside the scope of the preemption provision."
The Court's decision will likely have a profound effect on state
regulation of health care. Already, a number of courts have applied
the reasoning in the Travelers decision to various state laws before
them." Although the Court did not address whether ERISA preemp-
57 See id, at 1677, 1679, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1191, 1144.
58 Id. at 1679-80, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1149; see District of Columbia v. Greater
Wash. Bd. of Trade, 113 S. Ct. 580, 583 n.1, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1001, 1003 n.1
(1992).
59 Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1681, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1146,
69 Id. at 1680, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1144,
61 Id. at 1681, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1146.
62 Id. at 1681-82, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1146.
63 Id. at 1682, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1147.
64 Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1680-81, 19 Employee Benefits Cas, (BNA) at 1144-46.
65 See id. at 1680, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1144.
66 E.g., New England Health Care Union, Dist 1199 v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 65 F.3d 1024, 1030,
19 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) 1809, 1817 (2d Cir. 1995); Safeco Life Ins. Co. v. Musser, 65
F.3d 647, 652-53, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1828, 1834 (7th. Cir. 1995); Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Pataki, 63 F.3d 89, 95, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1702, 1717 (2d Cir. 1995).
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ted application of New York's hospital rate regulations to self-insured
plans, on remand the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit found no reason to differentiate between self-insured and other
ERISA plans for purposes of preemption and held that the New York
statute applied equally to self-insured plans. 67
 Federal courts have also
relied on the Court's reasoning to uphold other state laws that imposed
surcharges, taxes or assessments on insurers. 68
 This trend of permitting
states to indirectly increase the cost of administering ERISA plans is
likely to continue and to result in increased charges to beneficiaries of
ERISA plans.°
On the other hand, the Court's ruling may allow states to be more
innovative in regulating health care to further individual state goals.
In light of recent federal failure to enact sweeping health care reform,
the Travelers decision may allow states greater opportunity to attempt
their own limited reforms. States might place surcharges on the treat-
ment of patients with insurance in order to subsidize treatment for the
un- and under-insured. Taken to its furthest extreme this could lead,
in effect, to direct or indirect health care coverage for all. Although
this result seems to be socially desirable, it would impose costs on
ERISA plans that the plans would then pass on to their subscribers.
This might cause more and more people to forgo insurance, thereby
further increasing the costs to those who have insurance.
Unfortunately, while the Court's decision takes a pragmatic ap-
proach to ERISA preemption, it does not create any bright-line stand-
ard by which to judge state regulations." This lack of a bright-line
standard may lead to increased litigation of this issue as more states
attempt limited reforms of health care. In the course of this litigation,
the courts are likely to develop a standard that will curtail or prevent
the perpetual cycle mentioned above.
67 See Travelers, 115 S. CL at 1675 n.4 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1140 n.4; Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Pataki, 63 F.3d at 95, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1707.
68
 See, e.g., New England Health Care Union, 65 F.3(1 at 1029-31, 19 Employee Benefits Cas.
(BNA) at 1814-17; Safeco, 65 F.3d at 651-53, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1831-34; New
York State Health Maintenance Org. Conf. v. Curiale, 64 F.3d 794, 802-04, 19 Employee Benefits
Cas. (BNA) 1777, 1785-86, (2d Cir. 1995).
69
 See Medical Savings Accounts Face Opposition in Finance Committee, Aide Says, 95 TAX NOTES
TODAY, May 12, 1995, Doc. No. 93-7, available in LEXIS, Taxria Library, TNT File (noting that
full implications of recent Supreme Court holding in Travelers are unclear, but costs certainly will
rise for affected plans).
79 See Travelers, 115 S. Cr at 1683, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1147-48; Safeco, 65
F.3d at 652, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1833 (noting the Court's pragmatic view of the
surcharges at issue in Travelers").
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In summary, Travelers elucidated the Court's past interpretations
of ERISA's preemption provision. The Court clarified that ERISA will
not preempt a law that has only an indirect economic effect on ERISA
plans as long as the law does not effectively restrict an ERISA plan's
choice of insurers or force the plan to adopt specific substantive cov-
erage. 7 ' The Court did not, however, provide a workable standard for
determining which regulations with indirect economic effects fall within
ERISA's preemption provision. This void will likely engender more
litigation as states attempt to reform health care within their borders
and insurers resist the resultant increased costs.
*Amendment Procedure for Employee Welfare Plans Under Section
402(b)(3) of ERISA: Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongeni
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")
sets forth a number of procedures that an employer must follow when
establishing and providing pension and welfare plans.' For the pur-
poses of ERISA, welfare plans are those designed or maintained to
provide employee benefits, such as health care, disability benefits,
vacation benefits or the like." Plans providing severance pay are also
considered welfare plans for the purposes of ERISA. 4 ERISA requires
that welfare plans be set out in writing and have certain requisite
features." Section 402(b) (3) of ERISA specifically requires that the plan
include a procedure for its amendment and for identifying the persons
who have authority to amend the plan,"
71 See Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1683, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1147.
* By John E. Nilsson, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REviEw.
1 115 S. Ct. 1223, 18 Employee Benefits Cas, (BNA) 2841 (1995).
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994). The full text of the statutory definition reads:
The terms "employee benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any plan, fund, or
program which was heretofore established or maintained by an employer or by an
employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program
was establiShed or maintained for the purpose of providing to its participants or
their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical,
surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident,
disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other
training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services,
or (B) any benefit described in section 186(c) of this title (other than pensions on
retirement or death, and insurance to provide such pensions).
Id.
4 See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 105, 10 Employee Benefits Cas.
(BNA) 1873, 1874 (1989).
'29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1), (b) (1994).
6 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b) (3).
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Two controversies have arisen in courts of appeals surrounding
section 402(b) (3). 7
 One area of controversy is the issue of what constitutes
a valid amendment procedure under section 402 (b) (3). 8 The second
involves the appropriate remedy for a violation of section 402(b) (3). 9
In 1990, in Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that ERISA prohibits an
employer from modifying its welfare benefits plan without a written
instrument. 1 ° In Hazier, the defendant, Midwest Fasteners, Inc. ("Mid-
west"), implemented a policy that decreased the severance benefits
provided in its original plan." Midwest then implemented the new
policy without reducing it to writing.' 2
 The plaintiffs in Hozier were
sales employees of Midwest who were discharged and found themselves
subject to the new policy.' 3
 They sued for the original plan's higher
benefits, claiming that the original plan had been improperly modified
under ERISA.' 4
Drawing on a line of cases holding that ERISA prohibits employees
from binding their employers to oral promises to increase benefits in
written plans, the Hozier court reasoned by analogy that Midwest could
not enforce its oral decree to decrease the written plan's benefits.' 5 In
reaching this conclusion, the court explicitly avoided ruling on whether
the amendment would be invalid, even if it were in writing, because
the original plan failed to set out an amendment procedure as re-
quired by section 402(b) (3) of ERISA.' 6
 In a footnote, however, the
court surmised that a court might remedy such a violation of ERISA
section 402(b) (3) by invalidating any subsequent amendment." None-
theless, the Third Circuit raised the issue only as dictum to its central
holding that ERISA prohibits an employer from modifying a welfare
benefits plan without a written instrument's
7 See Schoonejongen v. Curtiss-Wright, 18 F.3d 1034, 17 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2041
(3d Cir. 1994), rezi'd, 115 S. Ct. 1223, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2841 (1995); Biggers v.
Wittek Indus., 4 F.3d 291, 17 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1556 (4th Cir. 1993); Murphy v.
Keystone Steel & Wire Co., 850 F. Stipp. 1367 (C.D. III. 1994).
8 See Huher v. Casablanca Indus., 916 F.2d 85, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2393 (3d
Cir. 1990).
9 See Schoonejongen„ 18 F.3d 1034, 17 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2041; Biggers, 4 F.3d 291,
17 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1556; Murphy, 850 F. Supp. 1367.
10 908 F.2d 1155, 1163, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2449, 2456 (3d Cir. 1990).
II Hazier, 908 F.2d at 1158, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2451.
12 Id,
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 1163, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2457.
18 Hazier, 908 F.2d at 1 163  n,9, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2456 n.9.
17
 See id.
16 Id. at 1163, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2456.
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Also in 1990, in Frank v. Colt Industries, the Third Circuit held that
the minutes of a meeting of company officers did not meet the minimal
standards of formality required for a valid amendment of a welfare
benefits plan.''' The defendant in Frank, Colt Industries ("Colt"), had
set up a welfare plan that provided for severance pay, but lacked an
amendment procedure. 2° Subsequently, Colt implemented a system of
"continuance bonuses" (a sum payment upon termination of employ-
ment rather than a continuation in pay for a prescribed period). 21 In
two internal memoranda, Colt maintained that discharged employees
would not be eligible for both severance pay and the continuance
bonuses. 22 Upon being discharged, some of Colt's former employees
brought an action under ERISA's section 402(b) (3) claiming that, in
the absence of a more formal instrument of amendment stating oth-
erwise, the continuance bonuses could only supplement, not replace,
their severance benefits. 23
The Frank court likened Colt's memoranda to attempts at oral
amendment of a written plan insofar as they did not sufficiently mani-
fest intent to alter the written plan. 24 As in Hozier, the Third Circuit
again suggested in dicta that, even if the amendment were sufficiently
formal, it might still be invalid because the original plan lacked an
amendment procedure as required by ERISA section 402(b) (3). 25 Again,
however, this dicta was only ancillary to the Third Circuit's holding in
Frank that the minutes of a meeting of company officers did not meet
the minimal standards of formality necessary for a valid amendment
of a welfare benefits plan under ERISA. 26
Also in 1990, in Huber v. Casablanca Industries, the Third Circuit
held that informal written agreements may be effective amendments
to a welfare plan if made pursuant to the plan's amendment proce-
dure. 21 In Huber, the plaintiff, a subsidiary of Casablanca Industries,
challenged an amendment to its multi-employer pension plan. 2' The
amendment, which involved increased benefits, was made in writing
during a meeting of the pension fund's board of trustees, pursuant to
a procedure set forth in the plan that allowed modification by "the
16 9 I 0 E2d 90, 98, 12 Employee Benefits Cat. (BNA) 2249, 2256 (3rd Cir. 1990).
25 Id. at 93, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2251.
21 See id. at 93-94, 12 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2251-52.
22 Id. at 97, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2255.
23 Id. at 95, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2253.
24 See Frank, 910 F.2d at 97-98, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2256-57.
23 Frank, 910 F.2d at 98, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2256 (citing Hozier, 908 F.2d at
1 163 ri.9, 12 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2456 n.9).
26 Id.
27 9 1 6 F.2d 85, 88, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2393, 2395 (3d Cir. 1990).
28 Id. at 105, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2412.
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Trustees."29
 The Third Circuit distinguished the board's modification
of the multi-employer pension plan from the sort of oral modification
that it had previously invalidated in Hozier. 3° The court emphasized
that by allowing for modification "by the Trustees" the plan had pro-
vided a valid procedure for amendment, one which the board had
followed in making its amendment. 51
 Therefore, the Huber court con-
cluded that informal written agreements to a welfare plan may be
effective if made pursuant to an amendment procedure set forth in
the plan."
In 1993, in Biggers v. Wittek Industries, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that in the absence of an amend-
ment procedure, a written amendment is only effective if accompanied
by a clear manifestation of an intent to alter the plan." In Biggers, the
defendant, Wittek Industries, had established a severance policy with
no amendment procedure that provided severance benefits commen-
surate with an employee's term of service up to a maximum of twenty
weeks pay. 34
 Subsequently, the defendant instituted a new policy that
capped a terminated employee's severance pay at three weeks." The
new policy was put into effect without ever having been signed by the
company president." Eighteen terminated employees sued under ERISA
for the benefits provided in the original plan."
Drawing upon principles of trust law, the Biggers court likened an
employer who desires to amend but whose plan does not set forth
procedures for doing so, to a settlor who has reserved the power to
amend a trust but has not provided a method for exercising that
power.58
 Noting that Wittek Industries' new policy was drafted and
revised for its president's approval and signature, the Fourth Circuit
reasoned that the absence of her signature was fatal to any effort of
the defendant to show a clear manifestation of intent to alter the
policy." The Biggers court refused to adopt a remedy that would auto-
matically invalidate any amendment made subsequent to a violation of
ERISA section 402(b) (3). 40
 Instead, the Biggers court concluded that,
23 Id. at 105, 106, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2412, 2413.
" Id. at 106, Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2413.
31 Id.
52 Huber, 916 F.2d at 88, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2395.
33 4 F.3d 291, 296, 17 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) 1556, 1560 (4th Cir. 1993).
34 Id. at 293, 17 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1557.
33 Id.
Id. at 294, 17 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1558.
"Id. at 293, 17 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1557.
$8 Biggers, 4 F.3d at 295, 17 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1559-60.
39 Id. at 296, 17 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1560.
4° Id. at 295, 17 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1560.
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even in the absence of a valid amendment procedure, a subsequent
amendment may itself be valid if accompanied by a clear manifestation
of intent to alter the policy.'"
In 1994, in Murphy v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co., the United States
District Court for the Central District of Illinois held that an employer's
failure to set out a procedure for amending its welfare plan did not
automatically invalidate its purported amendment." In Murphy, the
defendant, Keystone Steel & Wire Co. ("Keystone"), established a health
care benefit plan for retirees that contained no amendment proce-
dure." Subsequently, Keystone instituted a new plan with a larger
annual deductible and a larger copayment percentage." Simultane-
ously, Keystone notified the affected retirees of the original plan's
termination and the adoption of the new plan.* Plaintiffs, a group of
affected retirees, sued Keystone for their former benefits."
The Murphy court declined to award the substantial remedy of
invalidating the amendments made subsequent to the violation of
ERISA section 402(b) (3). 47 Instead, the court explicitly agreed with the
comparatively lenient remedy to section 402 (b) (3) violations set forth
by the Fourth Circuit in Biggers, allowing for the written amendment
of a welfare plan, even without an amendment procedure, as long as
the defendant can show a clear manifestation of an intent to alter the
policy or plan." In adopting this approach, the Murphy court rejected
the Third Circuit's suggestion that the appropriate remedy for a viola-
tion of ERISA section 402 (b) (3) (i.e., a lack of an amendment proce-
dure) is to render invalid any subsequent amendment." The Murphy
court therefore concluded that an employer's failure to set out a
procedure for amending its welfare plan does not automatically invali-
date its subsequent amendment. 5°
During the Survey year, in Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen,
the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that a welfare plan
provision reserving the company's right to amend the plan at any time
satisfies the requirement of ERISA section 402(b) (3) that welfare plans
provide a procedure for amendment. 5 ' The Court's decision in Curtiss-
41 See id. at 296, 17 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1560.
42 See 850 F. Supp. 1367, 1382 (C.D. Ill. 1994).
4!S
	 at 1370, 1378.
44 Id. at 1370.
45 Id. at 1370 n.4.
46 Id, at 1370.
47
 Murphy, 850 F. Supp. at 1381.
48 1d. at 1381-82.
49 See id. at 1379, 1381.
50 Id, at 1382.
51 115 S. CL 1223, 1232, 18 Employee Benefits Cas, (BNA) 2841, 2846.
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Wright set a de minimis standard for what qualifies as a valid provision
for amendment under ERISA section 402(b) (3).52 The Court left un-
resolved, however, the question of the appropriate remedy for a section
402(b) (3) violation."
In Curtiss-Wright, the Curtiss-Wright Corp. ("Curtiss-Wright") main-
tained a post-retirement health plan with a reservation clause stating:
"The Company reserves the right at any time and from time to time
to modify or amend, in whole or in part, any or all of the provisions
of the Plan."54
 In early 1983, Curtiss-Wright issued a revised provision
to the plan that terminated a recipient's health benefits upon the
closing or sale of the facility from which the recipient retired. 55 Later
that year, Curtiss-Wright announced that its Woodbridge, New Jersey,
facility would close." In accordance with the revised plan, Curtiss-
Wright then terminated the health benefits of the retirees from the
Woodbridge facility. 57
A group of the Woodbridge retirees brought suit in United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey to recover their terminated
benefits." The district court agreed with the plaintiffs' contention that
Curtiss-Wright amended its original post-retirement health plan with-
out ever having set forth in the plan any procedure for amendment as
required by ERISA section 402(b) (3)." On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Curtiss-Wright argued that the
reservation clause constituted a valid procedure for amendment of its
post-retirement health plan, likening the clause to the provision up-
held in Huber that provided for amendment by "the Trustees." 6° The
Third Circuit, however, rejected this argument. 6' The court pointed
out that, unlike the Curtiss-Wright plan, the plan in Huber clearly
identified which persons had the authority to amend the plan (the
Trustees)." Consequently, the Third Circuit concluded that mere res-
ervation of Curtiss-Wright's right to amend did not amount to an
52 See id. at 1229, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2844.
53 1d. at 1231, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2847.
" Id. at 1227, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2842.
55 Id.
56 Curtiss-Wright, 115 S. Ct. at 1227, 18 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2842.
" Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Schoonejongen v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 18 F.3d 1034, 1039, 17 Employee Benefits Cas.
(BNA) 2041, 2045 (3d Cir. 1994), reu'd, 115 S. Ct. 1223, 18 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) 2841
(1995),
61 Id. at 1039, 17 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2046.
62 Id. at 1039, 17 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2045.
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amendment procedure under section 402(b) (3). 63 The Third Circuit
also affirmed its dicta in Hozier and in Frank by holding that the penalty
for a violation of ERISA section 402(b) (3) is the invalidation of the
purported amendment."
In a footnote, the court described the concurring views of Judge
Roth.65 Judge Roth suggested that action taken "by the Company"
might be interpreted under traditional principles of corporate law to
mean action taken by the board of directors. 66
 According to Judge
Roth, the subsequent amendment was invalid not because Curtiss-
Wright failed to include a valid amendment procedure in its welfare
plan, but because Curtiss-Wright's board of directors never ratified the
amendment as the procedure required.67 Subsequently, Curtiss-Wright
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari to consider
two questions: first, whether a plan provision stating that he com-
pany reserves" the right to amend the plan sets forth a valid amend-
ment procedure under section 402(b) (3); and second, if the provision
is deemed insufficient, whether the proper remedy is to declare any
subsequent amendment invalid.° The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to address both questions.°
In Curtiss-Wright, the United States Supreme Court bifurcated its
section 402(b) (3) analysis into two distinct inquiries: first, whether
there was a procedure in place for amending the plan; and second,
whether there was also a procedure for identifying the persons with
the authority to amend the plan." Starting with the second inquiry,
the Court looked to the "Definitions" section of ERISA, which defines
"person" as including companies and corporate actors. 11 Accordingly,
the Court concluded that Curtiss-Wright's reservation clause did, in
fact, identify the person ("the company") who possessed the authority
to amend its plan with sufficient specificity for the purposes of ERISA
section 402(b) (3). 12
65
 See id. at 1039, 17 Employee Benefits Cas, (BNA) at 2046.
" Id. at 1039-40, 17 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2046-47.
65
 Schoonejangen, 18 F.3d at 1039 n.3, 17 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2045-46 n.5.
66 Id.
67 Id.
6B Curtiss-Wright v. Schoonejongen, 115 S. Ct. 1223, 1226, 1228, 18 Employee Benefits Cas.
(BNA) 2841, 2841, 2843 (1995).
69 Id. at 1228, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2843.
7° See id.
71
 Id. ("The term 'person' means an individual, partnership, joint venture, corporation,
mutual company, joint-stock company, trust, estate, unincorporated organization, association, or
employee organization." (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(9) (1988)).
72 Id.
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The Court next turned to the more difficult question of whether
the reservation clause contained a procedure for amending the plan."
Examining the reservation clause, the Court found more substance in
the clause than its terseness might have suggested, insofar as it sug-
gested that only a unilateral decision by the company, as opposed to a
decision by a third-party trustee or the approval of the union, could
amend the plan. 74
 The Court further reasoned that Curtiss-Wright's
amendment procedure was as elaborate as it needed to be to provide
for the amendment of what amounted to "the simplest of plans." The
Court denied that ERISA may require more detail from more compli-
cated plans; rather, the Court concluded that section 402(b) (3) merely
requires that there be a procedure, not that it contain a certain level
of detail."
The Court then rejected the Woodbridge retirees' assertion that
the purpose of ERISA section 402(b) (3) is to notify employees of their
rights and obligations; the Court concluded that section 402(a) (1) of
ERISA governs notification." The Court emphasized that the purpose
of ERISA's requirement that each plan provide an amendment proce-
dure is merely "to insure that every plan has a workable amendment
procedure." Although the Court suggested that a plan's failure to
contain an amendment procedure might render the plan unamend-
able under principles of trust law, it declined to reach the second
portion of the Third Circuit's holding regarding the proper remedy
for a section 402(b) (3) violation." The Curtiss-Wright Court therefore
restricted its holding to the conclusion that Curtiss-Wright's reserva-
tion clause established a valid amendment procedure.g°
By affirming Curtiss-Wright's boilerplate reservation clause, the
Court in Curtiss-Wright instituted a de minimis standard for what qualifies
as a valid amendment procedure under section 402(b) (3) of ERISA. 8 '
As long as a plan mentions, however ambiguously, amendment and an
amending authority, it would appear to meet this standard. 82 Moreover,
73 Curtiss-Wright, 115 S. Ct. at 1228, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2844.
74 Id. at 1228-29, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2844.
75 Id. at 1229, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2844.
75 Id.
77 Id. at 1229-50, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2845. Section 402(a)(1) provides, in
relevant part: "Every employee benefit plan shall be established and maintained pursuant to a
written instrument." 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1994).
78 Curtiss-Wright, 115 S. Ct. at 1230, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2845.
75 Id. at 1230-31, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2845, 2847.
8° Id. at 1231, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2847.
81 Id. at 1229, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2844.
82 See id.
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by concluding that the purpose of ERISA's requirement that welfare
plans have an amendment procedure is merely "to insure that every
plan has a workable amendment procedure[,] " 8s the Court reduced
section 402(b) (3) to a tautology. Both of these developments seem to
represent an assertion that section 402(b) (3) is for the benefit of
employers, not employees.
By setting this de minimis standard for ERISA section 402(b) (3),
the Court may also have made the question of the appropriate remedy
for a violation of section 402(b) (3) largely academic. The question
remains, however, whether the utter absence of an amendment proce-
dure in a welfare plan will render subsequent amendments invalid. 84
The Court in Curtiss-Wright seemed to approve the Fourth Circuit's
suggestion in Biggers that the answer lies not in ERISA itself, but in
principles of trust law.85
 If so, the Court might also approve the Biggers
court's holding that, even in the absence of amendment procedure
provisions in a plan, an amendment may still be valid when accompa-
nied by a clear manifestation of intent to alter the plan. 86
 Without an
explicit holding by the Supreme Court, however, the question of the
appropriate remedy for a violation of section 402(b) (3) remains un-
certain.
To conclude, the United States Supreme Court in Curtiss-Wright
held that a welfare plan provision that simply reserves a company's
right to amend the plan at any time satisfies the requirement of ERISA
section 402(b) (3) that welfare plans provide a procedure for amend-
ment.87
 The Court's holding set a de minimis standard for what qualifies
as a valid amendment procedure under ERISA section 402 (b) (3), a
standard that has the practical effect of protecting employers rather
than employees. The Curtiss- Wright Court left unresolved, however, the
question of whether the utter absence of an amendment procedure in
a welfare plan will render subsequent amendments invalid.88 The Court
implied that the answer would depend on principles of trust law,
perhaps hinging on whether the amendment is accompanied by a clear
manifestation of an intent to alter the plan. 89
es Curtiss-Wright, 115 S. Ct. at 1230, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2845.
sa See id. at 1231, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2847,
85 See id. at 1230, IB Employee Benefits Gas. (RNA) at 2845.
"Biggers v. Wittek Indus., 4 F.3d 291, 296, 17 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) 1556, 1560 (4th
Cir. 1993).
CUriiSS-Wright, 115 S. Ct. at 1231, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2846.
88 Id. at 1231, 18 Employee Benefits Cas, (BNA) at 2847,
89 See id. at 1230, 18 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2845.
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AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
*Direct Employment Relationship Not Necessary for ADA Liability:
Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive
Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, Inc.'
On July 26, 1992, Title I of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA") went into effect, prohibiting "covered entities" from dis-
criminating on the basis of disability in an employment context.' Sec-
tion 101(2) of the ADA defines a "covered entity" as "an employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee."3 The ADA definition of "employer," which is a vital com-
ponent of the ADA definition of "covered entity," has recently become
the subject of litigation. 4 One issue arising from the ADA definition of
"employer" is whether it includes entities that are not the complain-
ant's direct employer. 5 Courts have also struggled with the interpreta-
tion of the identical definition of "employer" under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII").6 As a result, the reasoning that
courts have developed in considering the meaning of "employer" un-
der Title VII has proven to be a source of guidance for courts inter-
preting the same term under the ADA.'
* By Jason E. Dunn, Staff Member, Bos-rom COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 37 F.3d 12, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) 1237 (1st Cir. 1994).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-17 (Stipp. V 1993). Specifically, Section 102(a) of the ADA provides,
"No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of
the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement,
or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.G. § 12112(a).
9 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (emphasis added).
4 See Carparts Distrib. Cir., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, Inc., 37
F.3d 12, 16, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) 1237, 1240 (1st Cir. 1994). Section 101(5) (A) defines -employer"
as, "[a] person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for
each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year, and any agent of such person." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (A).
5 See Carparts, 37 F.3d at 16, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1240. A direct employer generally refers
to the entity that employs the employee in the conventional sense of the word. See Peters v. Wayne
State Univ., 691 F.2d 235, 238, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 1753, 1754 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 359 (1983). For
example, a direct employer is often the entity that issues pay checks to the employee. See Barone
v. Hackett, 602 F. Supp. 481, 483, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 961, 962 (D.R.I. 1984).
6 See Peters, 691 F.2d at 238, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1754-55; see also 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994). Section 701(b) of Title VII defines "employer" as, "[a] person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in
each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent
of such a person . ..." 42 U.S.G. § 2000e(b).
7 See Carparts, 37 F.3d at 16, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1240; Pappas v. Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n,
861 F. Supp. 616, 619, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) 590, 592 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
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In 1973, in Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that employers have
a duty under Title VII not to discriminate against individuals whose
employment opportunities could be affected by the employer, even if
those individuals are not directly employed by the employer.8 In Sibley,
the plaintiff was a private duty nurse who worked at a hospital but was
paid directly by the patients in his care.' The plaintiff alleged gender
discrimination when hospital supervisors prevented him from working
for female patients.'"
The District of Columbia Circuit rejected the hospital's argument
that the plaintiff's complaint did not fall under Title VII because there
was no direct employment relationship between the hospital and the
plaintiff." The court reasoned that Congress could not have intended
Title VII liability to extend only to direct employment relationships
because an objective of Title VII is to provide for equal employment
opportunities, and control over employment opportunities often is
held by an entity that is not the complainant's direct employer. 12 The
court further noted that Title VII's remedial provisions use the term
"person aggrieved" rather than "employee." Construing "person ag-
grieved" to include people other than direct employees, the court
reasoned that Congress would not have granted standing to a category
of individuals unless they had rights under Title VII.'" Consequently,
the court concluded that an entity meeting the statutory definition of
"employer" could be liable under Title VII for discriminatory conduct
against individuals who, while not direct employees, nevertheless might
have employment opportunities affected by the employer. 15
In 1982, in Spirt v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass'n, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that entities pro-
viding employee benefits could be liable under Title VII for discrimi-
8 See 488 F.2d 1338, 1341, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1029, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Section
703(a) (1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in relevant part, "bit shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1).
488 F.2d at 1339, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1029-30,
10 Id. at 1339-40, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1030.
Id. at 1340-41, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1030-31.
12 Id. at 1341, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1031. The court cited labor organizations
and employment agencies as entities that might not have a direct employment relationship with
an employee, yet still possess significant control over the employee's employment opportunities.
Id.
is Id.
la Sibley, 488 F.2d at 1341, 6 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1031,
15 See id.
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natory conduct against benefit recipients. 16
 In so holding, the Second
Circuit expanded the Sibley reasoning regarding entities that have
control over employment opportunities to cover entities that control
only part of an individual's existing employment.'? The plaintiff in Spirt
was a female university professor who alleged that the university's
pension plan, offered by defendant Teachers Annuity, violated Title
VII because it provided smaller monthly benefits to female annuitants
than were provided to "similarly situated" male annuitants."'
In holding Teachers Annuity liable under Title VII, the court
reasoned that for Title VII to be effective, it had to cover entities that
functioned as the employer for specific aspects of an employee's em-
ployment. 19
 The court noted that the defendant's pension plan was
mandatory for university employees and that the administrative re-
sponsibilities resulting from employee participation were shared by the
defendant and the university. 2° As a result, the court concluded that
the university and the defendant were "closely intertwined" such that
the defendant acted as the "employer" with respect to one aspect of
every university employee's employment package. 2 ' Therefore, to pre-
vent employers from circumventing their Title VII obligations through
delegation to third parties, the court concluded that entities "closely
intertwined" with the direct employer could be liable for Title VII
violations. 22
Conversely, less than a month later in 1982, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in Peters v. Wayne State
University that the defendant Teachers Annuity, also the defendant in
Spirt, was not liable as an "employer" under Title VII for merely pro-
viding retirement benefits to employee recipients. 23
 As in Spirt, the
plaintiffs in Peters were employees at a university who challenged the
16 See 691 F.2d 1054, 1063, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1599, 1605-06 (2d Cir. 1982),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223, 32 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) 359 (1983),
and reinstated and modified on other grounds, 735 F.2d 23, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 1469
(2d Cir,), and cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cat 1688 (1984).
17 See id. at 1063, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1606.
18 Id. at 1056-.57, 29 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1600-01. "'Similarly situated' individuals
are those who are the same age, retire on the same date, and have identical amounts of accumulated
contributions in their individual retirement accounts on the date of retirement." Id. at 1058 n.3,
29 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1602 n.3.
ig See id. at 1063, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1606.
20 1d.
23 spirt, 691 F.2d at 1063, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1606.
22 See id.
23
 Peters v. Wayne State Univ., 691 F.2d 235, 238, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1753, 1755
(6th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223, 32 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 359 (1983),
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Teachers Annuity pension plan as violative of Title VII because female
annuitants received smaller periodic benefits under the plan. 24 The
Sixth Circuit refused to hold Teachers Annuity liable under Title VII
as the plaintiffs' employer under either of two theories. 2' First, the
Sixth Circuit held that Teachers Annuity was not an agent of the
university because the university did not exercise control over Teachers
Annuity's actions, and such control is a necessary element of an agency
relationship.26 Second, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the university
had not delegated any of its employer responsibilities to Teachers
Annuity because the university retained the power to set contribution
levels and make decisions regarding employee eligibility for the pen-
sion plan. 27 Thus, unlike the Second Circuit in spirt, the Sixth Circuit
did not find that Teachers Annuity acted as the "employer" for any
aspect of the plaintiffs' employment. 28 The Sixth Circuit instead char-
acterized Teachers Annuity as an insurance company that only pro-
vided a service to the university. 29 In the absence of a direct employ-
ment relationship, the court refused to deem an entity an "employer"
under Title VII for merely providing benefits to employee recipients
and thus held that Teachers Annuity was not an employer for the
purposes of Tide VII. 30
In 1994, in Pappas v. Bethesda Hospital Ass- in, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio first considered whether
the ADA requires a direct employment relationship and held that an
administrator of employee benefits was not a "covered entity" under
Title I of the ADA.3 ' The plaintiff in Pappas was an employee of a
hospital association who was denied family health coverage because her
husband and son suffered from severe medical problems,s 2 The plain-
tiff thus alleged that the association and its administrator of health insur-
ance benefits were liable for discrimination under the ADA.""
In interpreting Title I of the ADA, the Pappas court looked to cases
interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for guidance."
Consonant with the reasoning of the Peters decision from the same
24 Id. at 237, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1753-54.
25 See id. at 238, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1754-55.
2fi Id.
27 Id. at 238, 29 Fair Empl, Prac, Gas. (BNA) at 1754.
28 See Peters, 691 F.2d at 238, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1755.
29 Id.
" Id.
31 861 E Supp. 616, 619, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) 590, 592 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
32 Id. at 617, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 591.
" Id. at 617, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 590.
34 1d. at 619, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 592.
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circuit, the court concluded that the health insurance administrator
was not liable under the ADA." The Pappas court reasoned that be-
cause the employer had identified the health insurance plan as its own,
the employer intended to retain responsibility for providing employee
benefits and thus had not delegated to the administrator any duties re-
garding employee compensation. 36
 In addition, because the employer
lacked control over the health insurance administrator, the court de-
termined that the administrator was not an agent of the employer."
Consequently, the Pappas court concluded that the health insurance
administrator was not liable as a "covered entity" under the ADA."
During the Survey year, in Carparts Distribution Centel; Inc. v. Auto-
motive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, Inc., the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a direct employment relation-
ship was not necessary to sustain a claim under the ADA." In so
holding, the First Circuit became the leading circuit court to apply the
reasoning of the Title VII cases Sibley and spirt to the definition of
"employer" under the ADA. 4°
The plaintiffs in Carparts, Ronald J. Senter and Carparts Distribu-
tion Center, Inc. ("Carparts"), participated in a medical insurance plan
(the "Plan") offered by the defendants, Automotive Wholesalers Asso-
ciation of New England, Inc. ("AWANE") and its administering trust,
Automotive Wholesalers Association of New England, Inc. Insurance
Plan ("AWANE Trust"). 41
 Carparts was a member of AWANE, and its
employees, including Senter, received medical insurance under the
Plan.42
 In May of 1986, Senter was diagnosed as infected with the
human immunodeficiency virus. 43
 Beginning in 1989, Senter's condi-
tion caused him to contract several serious illnesses that required
medical treatment." In October of 1990, AWANE Trust announced
that as of January 1, 1991, each eligible member's lifetime benefits
55 Id.
36 See Pappas, 861 F. Supp. at 619, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 592.
37 Id.
'4' Id.
39 37 F.3d 12, 16, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) 1237, 1240 (1st Cir. 1994).
4° See id. at 17-18, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1241; Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 691
F.2d 1054, 1063, 29 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1599, 1605-06 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 359 (1983), and
reinstated and modified on other grounds, 735 F.2d 23, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1469 (2d
Cir.), and cert. denied 469 U.S. 881, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1688 (1984); Sibley Memorial Hosp.
v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1029, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Carparts, 37 F.3d at 14, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1238.
42 1d. Senter had been enrolled in the Plan since 1977. Id.
45 1d.
44 Id.
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under the Plan for expenses resulting from acquired immune deficiency
syndrome ("AIDS") related illnesses would be capped at $25,000. 45 For
all other non-AIDS-related medical expenses, the Plan covered each
eligible member up to $1 million. 46
 In March of 1991, Senter was
diagnosed with AIDS. 41 Shortly thereafter, Carparts began submitting
claims on behalf of Senter because his medical costs had reached the
$25,000 limit and Carparts had assumed the responsibility for paying
Senter's medical expenses.48 Ten days before the ADA became effec-
tive, Senter and Carparts filed suit against AWANE and AWANE Trust,
alleging claims under the New Hampshire antidiscrimination law. 49 On
January 17, 1993, Senter died." The coexecutors of Senter's estate were
substituted for Senter as plaintiffs in the suit on April 1, 1993. 5 ' Shortly
thereafter, the plaintiffs were granted the opportunity to amend their
complaint to include claims under Title I and Title III of the ADA."
In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that AWANE Trust
knew of Senter's illness when it capped AIDS-related medical coverage
and that the cap consequently violated the antidiscrimination provi-
sions of the ADA."
The defendants objected to the plaintiffs' amendment, and the
United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire treated
the objection as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b) (6).54 The District Court dismissed the plaintiff's com-
plaint, holding that neither AWANE nor AWANE Trust qualified as
"covered entities" under the ADA because neither entity was Senter's
"employer."55
 The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, claiming that the District Court's inter-
pretation of "covered entity" under Title I of the ADA was in error."
45 Id.
96 Carparts, 37 F.3d at 14, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1238.
47 Id.
4° See id. at 14-15, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1238-39.
49 Id. at 15, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1239. The New Hampshire Law Against Discrimination
provides in relevant part, "It shalt be an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . for an employer,
because of the . . physical . disability ... of any individual ... to discriminate against such
individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment, unless based
upon a bona fide occupational qualification." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354—A:7 (1995).
5° Carports, 37 F.3d at 14, 3 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 1238.
51 Id. at 14 n.1, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1238 n.l.
52 Id. at 15, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1239.
"Id. at 14-15, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1238-39.
54 Id. at 15, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1239.
55 Carparts, 37 F.3d at 15, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1239.
" Id.
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In accordance with the Interpretative Guidance on Title I of the
ADA, published by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
and Title I itself, the First Circuit looked to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 for guidance in interpreting the term "employer" under
Title 1.57 Thus, the First Circuit confronted conflicting interpretations
of the Title VII term "employer" by other circuits. 58 Citing several Title
VII cases, the court enunciated three theories under which AWANE
and AWANE Trust could be liable as "employers" under the ADA. 59
One theory would impute liability if AWANE or AWANE Trust func-
tioned as Senter's employer with respect to Senter's health insurance
benefits.6° A second theory would impute liability if AWANE or AWANE
Trust acted as Carpart's agent. 61 The last theory would impute liability
if AWANE or AWANE Trust met the statutory definition of "employer"
and Senter met the statutory definition of a "qualified individual with
a disability."62
The court first determined that if AWANE or AWANE Trust func-
tioned as Senter's employer with respect to his health insurance benefits,
they should be treated as "employers" under Title 1. 65 The court thus
recognized, as did the Second Circuit in spin, that parties other than
the direct employer may control important aspects of employment,
and consequently, the statutory definition of "employer" must be broad
enough to include parties other than the direct employer. 64 The court
cited certain factors for the lower court to consider on remand in
determining whether AWANE or AWANE Trust functioned as Senter's
employer with respect to health insurance benefits. 65 The court stated
that the amount of control AWANE and AWANE Trust had over Sen.-
67 Id. at 16, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1240. Section 107(a) of the ADA states that where
applicable, the 'powers, remedies and procedure? of Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
shall apply to discrimination claims brought under Tide I of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)
(Supp. V 1993).
58 See Carparts, 37 F.3d at 16, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1240; Peters v. Wayne State Univ., 691
F.2d 235, 238, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 1753, 1755 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 359 (1983); Spirt v. Teachers Ins.
and Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1063, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1599, 1605-06 (2d Cir.
1982), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 359
(1983), and reinstated and modified on other grounds, 735 F.2d 23, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1469 (2d Cir.), and cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1688 (1984).
59 Carparts, 37 F.3d at 17-18, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1240-42.
6° Id. at 17, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1240-41.
61 Id. at 17-18, 5 A.D. Cases (DNA) at 1241.
62 See id. at 18, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1241-42.
69 1d. at 17, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1240.
64 Carparts, 37 F.3d at 17, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1240.
65 Id. at 17, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1241.
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ter's health insurance benefits was one factor to be considered in
determining whether they functioned as Senter's employer with re-
spect to health insurance benefits.
The court reasoned that for ADA purposes, an "employer" is any
entity that can exercise significant control over an important aspect of
an employment situation.66
 Relevant to the determination of whether
AWANE or AWANE Trust exercised significant control over an aspect
of Senter's employment, the court stated, was whether AWANE or
AWANE Trust set the level of benefits each employee received and
whether alternative insurance plans were available to employees.° The
court concluded that if there were no alternative insurance options,
employees would be forced to accept the terms of the Plan. 68 Conse-
quently, if those terms were set by AWANE or AWANE Trust, then those
entities did exercise significant control over an aspect of the plaintiffs'
employment. 69
The court also stated that the extent to which Carparts shared the
administrative duties arising from its employees' participation in the
Plan was another factor for the lower court to consider in determining
whether AWANE or AWANE Trust functioned as Senter's employer."
The court reasoned that when the administrative obligations of a plan
are shared by the direct employer and the provider of benefits, the two
entities are "closely intertwined." 7 ' Consequently, for at least one aspect
of the employment, the direct employer and the provider of benefits
operate jointly as the "employer." 72
Under the court's second theory, even if AWANE or AWANE Trust
did not exercise significant control over an aspect of Senter's employ-
ment, they could still be liable under Title I if they were the "agents"
of a "covered entity."73
 The court noted that the language of Section
101(5) of the ADA imputes liability to any entity that serves as an agent
of an entity that meets the statutory definition of "employer."74
 The
court implicitly recognized that imputing liability to agents of covered
entities was consonant with the ADA's purpose. 75
 Citing Spirt, the court
further noted that the force of the statute would be lost if employers
66 Id. at 17, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1240-41.
67 /d. at 17, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1241.
68 See id.
69 See Carparts, 37 F.3d at 17, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1241.
7° Id.
71 id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Carports, 37 F.3d at 17 n.7, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1241 n.7.
75 See id. at 17-1s, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1241.
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were able to avoid ADA liability by delegating responsibility to an
agent. 76
The First Circuit based its third theory by which AWANE and
AWANE Trust could be liable under the ADA on Section 102(a) of the
ADA, which states, "No covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability."" The court held, with some res-
ervation, that if an entity met the ADA's definition of "employer," it
might be liable for discriminatory conduct against any qualified indi-
vidual with a disability, regardless of whether the disabled individual
was a direct employee." The court qualified its conclusion by stating
that such liability would not be automatic and would greatly depend
on the circumstances of each case." Nevertheless, the court stated its
willingness to uphold a claim akin to the action in Sibley, where the
claimant had no direct employment relationship with the employer
being sued."
Under any one of three theories, the First Circuit held that AWANE
and AWANE Trust could be liable as Senter's "employer" under Title
of the ADA. 81 Neither AWANE nor AWANE Trust was Sen ter's direct
employer." Thus, in Carparts, the First Circuit held that a direct employ-
ment relationship is not necessary to sustain a claim under the ADA."
The First Circuit's three theories for indirect liability under the
ADA make it difficult for a third party to escape liability if the employ-
ment benefits it provides to a direct employer's employees discriminate
based on a disability. If a third party exercises too much control over
the employees' employment benefits, a court may find that the third
party is "closely intertwined" with the direct employer and hold it liable
under the First Circuit's first theory." If a third party does not exercise
sufficient control, a court may deem it an agent of the direct employer
and thus incur liability under the First Circuit's second theory." Should
a third-party provider of employment benefits manage to escape liabil-
ity under the first two theories, it is not at all clear whether it can escape
liability under the First Circuit's third theory. The uncertainty sur-
78 Id. at 18, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1241.
77 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added); see also Carparts, 37 F.3d at 18, 3
A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1241.
78 See Carparts, 37 F.3d at 18, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1241.
79 Id.
s° Id.
ill Id. at 17-18, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1240-42.
82 1d. at 14, 3 A.D. Cases (DNA) at 1238.
88 CarPartS, 37 F.3d at 16, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1240.
84 See id. at 17, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1241.
85 See id.
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rounding the court's third theory follows from the broad and vague
terms the court employed that may provide future courts a great deal
of freedom to apply the Carports ADA analysis to many factual circum-
stances." Clearly, third parties who are risk-averse now must consider
the ADA implications when providing employment benefits to the
employees of their customers.
By forcing parties who provide employment benefits to consider
ADA compliance, the First Circuit endeavored to fulfill the ADA ob-
jective of equal employment opportunities for the country's forty-three
million handicapped citizens B 7 Focusing on the allegedly discrimina-
tory conduct, and not on the employment relationship between the
complainant and the allegedly discriminating party, the court cast a
wide ADA liability net." Consequently, after Carparts, because third
parties cannot limit the benefits they provide to their customers' em-
ployees without risking ADA liability, it is likely that disabled persons
will not receive disparate employment benefits on account of their
disabilities."
In the long run, however, the Carports decision may hurt the very
people it seeks to protect by limiting the number of jobs and reducing
wages for all employable people, whether handicapped or not. Under
the First Circuit's analysis, risk-averse third parties who provide employ-
ment benefits will face one of two options. Both options promise to
encumber third-party providers with additional costs to ensure that the
benefits they provide comply with the ADA.
A third-party provider of employment benefits may decide that it
is economically efficient to offer generic services that will comply with
the ADA under any factual circumstances. Generic benefit packages
will be necessarily comprehensive and therefore, more expensive. For
many small employers, the additional costs will be unwarranted be-
cause, given their employee demographics, exhaustive benefit pack-
ages are unnecessary for ADA compliance.
To avoid costs incurred by offering generic services, a third party
may offer benefit packages tailored to the customer's specific needs.
After Carparts, however, a third-party provider of employment benefits
is now likely to incur additional costs to ensure that the services are
tailored to comply with the ADA." Because these costs will raise the
86 See id. at 18, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1241.
87 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1) (Stipp. V 1993).
88 See Carports, 37 F.3d at 18, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1241.
89 Selected Recent Court Decisions, 20 Am. J.L. & MED. 341, 341, 342 (1994).
9° For instance, a third-party provider of employment benefits may have to examine the
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overall price of employment benefits, customers will likewise incur
additional costs in purchasing the benefits packages. Employers will
eventually pass these costs to existing and potential employees by
lowering wages and decreasing the number of jobs.
In summary, in Carparts, the First Circuit held that third parties
may be liable for providing discriminatory employment benefits to
their customers' employees because the court concluded that a direct
employment relationship is not necessary to sustain an ADA claim. 91
The court drew on the reasoning of Title VII cases to provide three
theories by which third parties can be liable as "employers" under the
ADA.92 First, if the entity exercises significant control over an aspect of
the employees' employment, the entity may be deemed an "employer"
for ADA purposes." Second, even if the entity does not exercise sig-
nificant control over an aspect of the employees' employment, it may
still be liable as an "agent" of the direct employer." Third, if an entity
meets the statutory definition of "employer" and the complainant
meets the statutory definition of "qualified individual," the entity may
incur liability for its discriminatory conduct regardless of the entity's
employment relationship with the complainant. 95 Although these three
theories are designed to ensure that disabled persons do not receive
disparate employment benefits because of their handicap, they may fail
the court's objectives by raising the cost of employment benefits, which,
in the long run, may reduce wages and eliminate jobs.
REHABILITATION ACT
*Employee Misconduct Grounds for Discharge Despite Disability:
Maddox v. University of Tennessee )
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation
Act") makes it unlawful for an employer that receives federal funds to
terminate handicapped employees based solely on their disability.' The
employee medical records of each customer to ensure that any limits on benefits do not conflict
with a specific employee's needs.
91 Carparts, 37 F.3d at 16, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1240.
92 Id. at 17-18, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1240-42.
" Id. at 17, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1240.
94 Id. at 17, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1241.
95 Id. at 18, 3 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1291.
* By Laurence P. Naughton, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 62 F.2d 843, 4 AD Cases (BNA) 1253, (6th Cir. 1995).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1994). The Rehabilitation Act provides: "No otherwise qualified
individual with a disability in the United States ... shall solely by reason of her or his disability,
be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 794. The
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drafters of the Rehabilitation Act intended to provide for the integra-
tion of handicapped employees into the workplace and for the devel-
opment of these employees' economic independence.' The law must
delicately balance the rights of all individuals to equal opportunity with
the legitimate concerns of employers who receive federal aid to pre-
serve the effectiveness of their programs. 4
 Courts have recently strug-
gled to maintain this balance when employers have discharged employ-
ees for misconduct related to their disability.'
In 1991, in Teahan v. Metro
-North Commuter Railroad, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Rehabili-
tation Act prohibits an employer's termination of an employee due to
an outward manifestation of a protected handicap.6 In Teahan, an
employee discharged for excessive absenteeism challenged his termi-
nation under the Rehabilitation Act by alleging that the absences
constituted a symptom of his alcoholistn. 7
 The Second Circuit deter-
mined that, due to the causal connection between the alcoholism and
the excessive absenteeism, the employer did in fact rely on the handi-
cap in discharging the employee.' Deciding otherwise, the court rea-
soned, would permit employers to circumvent the provisions of the
Rehabilitation Act by simply drawing a distinction between a handicap
and its causal manifestations.' Thus, the Second Circuit held that an
employer terminates an employee "solely by reason of a handicap
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101-13 (Stipp. IV 1992), extends
this protection to employees in the private sector in the same fashion.
3 See 29 U.S.C. § 701(b).
4 Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 951 F.2d 511, 513, 57 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1138, 1140 (2d Cir. 1991).
5 See Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 832, 4 AD Cases (BNA) 1278, 1280 (9th
Cir. 1995) (ADA permits employer to terminate drug-addicted employees for drug-related mis-
conduct); Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635, 637, 4 AD Cases (BNA) 1313, 1315 (7th
Cir. 1995) (Rehabilitation Act permits employer to demote alcoholic employee to nondriving
position following arrest for driving under the influence); Maddox v. University of Tenn., 62 F.3d
843, 847, 4 AD Cases (BNA) 1253, 1257 (6th Cir. 1995) (employer may terminate alcoholic
employee for driving while intoxicated); Little v. FBI, 1 F.3c1 255, 257-58, 2 AD Cases (BNA) 1109,
1112 (4th Cir. 1993) (FBI may terminate alcoholic agent for drunkenness while on duty); Taub
v. Frank, 957 F.2d 8, 10-11, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 159, 162 (1st Cir. 1992) (permitted
discharge of postal employee following arrest for possession of heroin); Butler v. Thornburgh,
900 F.2d 871, 876, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1526, 1529 (5th Cir. 1990) (Rehabilitation Act
does not prohibit termination of alcoholic FBI agent for on- and off-duty alcohol-related inci-
dents). But see Teahan, 951 F.2d at 518, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1144 (termination of
alcoholic employee for excessive absenteeism may violate Rehabilitation Act). It is notable that
four of these cases were decided during the Survey year, all with the same ruling.
6 Mahan, 951 F.2d at 517, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1143.
7 See id. at 513-14, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cam. (BNA) at 1140.
8
 See id. at 517, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1143.
Id.
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when the reason for the termination is causally connected to the
handicap. '°
In 1992, in Taub v. Frank, the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit held that an employer could permissibly discharge an
employee for some types of misconduct causally related to a protected
disability." In Taub, the employer discharged an employee shortly after
his arrest for possession of heroin with intent to distribute. 12 The
employee, claiming that he suffered from a heroin addiction, brought
suit alleging discriminatory discharge, contending that his addiction
entitled him to the protection of the Rehabilitation Act." The court,
in rejecting the employee's argument, found the connection between
the protected handicap and the criminal conduct simply too attenu-
ated for such protection to be proper. 14 Consequently, the First Circuit
reasoned that the employee's discharge occurred because of his pos-
session of heroin rather than "solely by reason of his handicap."" Thus,
the First Circuit held that an employer, when discharging an employee,
can permissibly draw a distinction between a protected handicap and
the conduct it causes."
In 1993, in Little v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that an employer
may discharge an employee for egregious conduct in the workplace
irrespective of the employee's handicap.'? In Little, an alcoholic FBI
agent, terminated for drunkenness on duty, brought suit against the
agency under the Rehabilitation Act." Little alleged that the FBI ter-
minated him due to his status as an alcoholic, thus constituting a
violation of the Rehabilitation Act." The court rejected Little's argu-
ment, noting that regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare, related judicial opinions, and common sense
all properly permit an employer to terminate an employee for wrong-
ful conduct without regard for the underlying cause of the miscon-
duct. 20 Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that employers may prop-
1 ° Id.
"Taub v. Frank, 957 F.2d 8, 10, 11, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 159, 160, ]61 (1st Cir.
1992).
12 Id. at 9, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 160.
"
14 Id. at 11, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 161.
15 /d.
'h See Taub, 957 F.2d at 11, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 161.
17 Little v. FBI, 1 F.3d 255, 259, 2 AD Cases (BNA) 1109, 1113 (4th Cir. 1993).
18 Id. at 255, 256-57, 2 AD Cases (BNA) at 1110-11.
19 Id. at 257, 2 AD Cases (BNA) at 1111.
14 Id. at 258-59, 2 AD Cases (BNA) at 1112-13.
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erly distinguish a handicap from related misconduct when deciding to
terminate an employee. 21
During the Survey year, in Maddox v. University of Tennessee, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that an
employer may discharge an employee for egregious conduct even if
the protected disability caused the misconduct. 22 In so holding, the
Sixth Circuit embraced the Little approach by permitting employers to
terminate employees for misconduct without regard for those employ-
ees' handicapped status.° As a result, in the Sixth Circuit, terminations
for misconduct caused by a protected handicap are not prohibited by
the Rehabilitation Act. 24
The plaintiff in Maddox, Robert Maddox, served in a terminable-
at-will position as an assistant football coach at the University of Ten-
nessee.25 The University did not know, however, that Maddox was an
alcoholic with three arrests, two of which involved alcohol, prior to his
employment by the University. 26 On May 26, 1992, Maddox, while
intoxicated, backed his car across a major public highway at a high rate
of speed. 27 When stopped by a police officer, he was highly combative
and refused a Breathalyzer test. 28 The officer subsequently arrested
Maddox and charged him with driving under the influence and public
intoxication.° This incident received considerable attention from the
regional press."
Following this incident, the University investigated the charges
and placed Maddox on paid administrative leaves' Shortly after sub-
stantiating the allegations, the University's head football coach and the
athletic director informed Maddox in writing of his termination. 32 This
notice of termination provided three reasons for the University's deci-
sion—Maddox's criminal acts, the bad publicity and the University's
determination that Maddox no longer possessed the qualifications
necessary to serve as an assistant football coach."
21 Id. at 259, 2 AI) Cases (BNA) at 1113.
22 See Maddox v. University of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 847, 4 AD Cases (BNA) 1253, 1256 (6th
Cir. 1995).
23 See id.
24 See id. at 848, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1257.
25 Id. at 844, 4 AD Cases (RNA) at 1254.
26 Id. at 844-45, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1254-55.
27 Maddox, 62 F.3d at 845, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1255.
28 Id.
29 Id.
st' Id.
31 Id.
52 Maddox, 62 F.3d at 845, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1255.
35 Id.
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After receiving this letter, Maddox brought an action against the
University alleging that his termination was discriminatory because of
his alcoholism and thus violated his rights under both the Rehabilita-
tion Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").34 In support
of this action, Maddox alleged that the drunk driving incident consti-
tuted a causally connected manifestation of his alcoholism. 33 In re-
sponse, the University filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging
that it had terminated Maddox for his misconduct rather than his
disability. 38 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee granted the University's motion, determining that Maddox
could not demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact with respect to
whether the termination was due to his status as an alcoholic rather
than his criminal conduct."
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit upheld the ruling of the district court
and held that an employer may discharge an employee for egregious
conduct even if a protected disability caused the misconduct. 38 In so
doing, the Sixth Circuit began its analysis by noting the substantial
similarities between the relevant provisions of the ADA and the Reha-
bilitation Act. 3° Accordingly, the court determined that it would review
the claims under the two Acts in the same fashion. 4° Therefore, to
establish that his termination was discriminatory, the Sixth Circuit
required Maddox to show: (I) that he qualified as a "handicapped per-
son" under the Rehabilitation Act; (2) that he was "otherwise qualified"
for employment as an assistant coach; (3) that the University termi-
nated him "solely by reason of his handicap"; and (4) that the Univer-
sity received federal financial assistance. 41
After setting out these requirements, the court examined Mad-
dox's claim. 42 First, the court noted that neither party disputed that the
University constituted a program that receives federal financial assis-
tance. 43 Next, the Sixth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that alco-
holics are "handicapped persons" as set out in the Rehabilitation Act."
34 Id.
35 See id. at 846, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1256.
36 Id.
37 Maddox, 62 F.3d at 844, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1254.
"Id.
" Id. at 846 n.2, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1255 n.2.
4° Id.
41 Id. at 846, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1255-56.
42 Maddox, 62 F.3d at 846, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1256.
45 1d.
44 Id.
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Therefore, for the purposes of its decision, the court determined that
Maddox satisfied the first and fourth requirements.°
The Sixth Circuit then reviewed the district court's finding that
the University did not terminate Maddox "solely by reason of his
handicap."46 Relying heavily on Teahan, Maddox alleged that the dis-
trict court incorrectly distinguished between discharge for misconduct
and discharge solely by reason of his disability of alcoholism. 47 With-
out such a distinction, Maddox argued that termination for conduct
caused by a protected handicap would violate both Acts.°
The Sixth Circuit, however, rejected this argument and held that
the district court properly distinguished between misconduct and its
underlying causal disability. 49 The court, in permitting this distinction,
first noted that the holding in Teahan would require employers to
tolerate all types of behavior by an alcoholic employee, no matter how
improper, if they in any way related to the employee's use of alcoholic
beverages.50 This broad category of protected behavior would even
include behavior that the employer would not tolerate if done by a
sober employee or even an intoxicated, but nonalcoholic employee. 51
The Sixth Circuit relied on 'Taub and Little to support its determination
that imposing such a burden on an employer would run contrary to
common sense.52 The Sixth Circuit agreed with the reasoning em-
ployed by both the First and Fourth Circuits that neither logic nor the
Rehabilitation Act prohibits an employer from discharging an em-
ployee for misconduct solely because alcoholism caused such conduct.."
For additional support, the Sixth Circuit examined the language
of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.54 The court determined that
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA permitted employers to distinguish
between the misconduct and its root cause!' Finally, using an example
45 Id.
16 id,
47 Maddox, 62 F.3d at 846-47, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1256.
48 Id.
48 Id. at 848, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1257.
5° See id.
51 Id. at 847, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1256.
52 See Maddox, 62 F.3d at 847, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1256-57.
53 See id.
54 Id. at 847, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1257.
55 Id. at 847-48, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1257. The Rehabilitation Act states:
"Individuals with a disability" does not include any individual who is an alcoholic
whose current use of alcohol prevents such individual from performing the duties
of the job in question or whose employment, by reason of such current alcohol
abuse, would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others.
29 U.S.C. 4 706(8)(C) (v) (1994).
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of sexual assault, the court opined that an employer must have the
ability to discharge an employee for egregious conduct without regard
for whether a protected disability caused that conduct."
The Sixth Circuit did not determine whether Maddox was "other-
wise qualified."57 The court, however, did note that, under the Reha-
bilitation Act, a plaintiff may demonstrate that the employer's stated
reasons for discharge served merely as a pretext for discrimination."
On this point, the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's determina-
tion that the reasons for dismissal articulated by the University did not
constitute merely a pretext for discrimination." The court made the
determination, after examining the record compiled at trial, that Maddox
could not substantiate his claim that the reasons stated by the Univer-
sity served as a pretext for terminating him due to his alcoholism.°
The court in Maddox, although ultimately displaying proper judg-
ment, travels a curious, and perhaps unnecessary, route in reaching its
decision.61 The court's reasoning begins, and seems rooted in, an
examination of the possible impact on employers if Maddox's argu-
ments were to prevail. 62 After rejecting such implications as unaccept-
able, the court bolstered this determination by noting that other cir-
cuits have employed analogous reasoning. 65 The court, finally and
briefly, mentioned the relevant language of the ADA and the Rehabili-
tation Act.° By examining this text last, the court violates the tradi-
tional approach to statutory interpretation and improperly relegates
congressional legislation to a supporting role.
Despite this improper approach, the Sixth Circuit in Maddox be-
comes the third circuit within the past year to properly determine that
Section 104(c) (4) of the ADA provides:
A covered entity may hold an employee who engages in the illegal use of drugs or
who is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or job
performance and behavior that such entity holds other employees, even if any
unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the drug use or alcoholism of
such employee . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 12114(c) (4) (Supp. IV 1992).
56 Maddox, 62 F.3d at 848, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1257. The court concluded that, under the
Rehabilitation Act, an employer could permissibly terminate an employee who, while intoxicated,
sexually assaulted a coworker. Id. Therefore, by analogy, the court reasoned that the University
could discharge Maddox. See id.
57 See id.
55 Id.
" See id. at 848, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1257-58.
60 Id.
61 See Maddox, 62 F.3d at 846-848, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1256-1258.
62 See id. at 847, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1256.
65 See id.
" Id. at 847, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1257.
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the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA protect handicapped individuals
from discrimination but do not discriminate in their favor with regard
to termination decisions." As provided for by the clear language of the
Rehabilitation Act, individuals shall not become the object of discrimi-
nation based solely on their handicapped conditions.° Thus, an em-
ployer must not assume that a handicapped person could not function
in a given context, but rather must make employment decisions based
on the individual's actual attributes.° This language of the Act should
not be read to exempt protected individuals from work requirements
that the employer applies fairly to all.° Doing otherwise would go
beyond bringing disabled individuals to the level playing field of equal
protection and would elevate them to a status well beyond that of their
coworkers.°
Providing such extra protection to handicapped employees is not
only contrary to the purpose of the Act but would also, in practice,
harm those individuals Congress attempted to protect. 7° As one of its
stated purposes, the Rehabilitation Act intends to maximize the inclu-
sion and integration of disabled individuals into the work force."
Going beyond this worthwhile goal would not serve this end because
this added protection may serve to deter employers from hiring handi-
capped applicants. In addition, forcing employers to accept egregious
misconduct by handicapped employees ultimately would hinder the
development of these individuals' independence, also contrary to the
Act's goals. 72
Although the court's reasoning is not sufficiently grounded in the
statute, the Sixth Circuit did properly distinguish between termination
for misconduct and termination solely by reason of a protected disabil-
ity. 73
 The University terminated Maddox for his unwise decision to
drive while intoxicated rather than for his status as an alcoholic. 14 If
65 See Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.34:1 828, 835, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1278, 1282 (9th
Cir. 1995); Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635, 637, 4 AD Cases (BNA) 1313, 1315 (7th
Cir. 1995); Maddox, 62 F.3d at 848, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1257.
66 See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a),
67 See Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 951 F.2d 511, 513, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1138, 1140 (2d Cir. 1991).
m See Raison v. Gwitinett. County, 865 F. Supp. 1564, 1572, 10 A.D.D. 478 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
6° See id.
70 See Despeats, 63 F,3d at 637, 4 AD Cases (DNA) at 1315.
71 29 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1) (1994).
72
 See Despears, 63 F,3d at 637, 4 AD Cases (DNA) at 1315.
73 See Maddox, 62 F.3d at 847, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1256.
74 See id. at 848, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1257; see also Despears, 63 F.3d at 636, 4 AD Cases
(BNA) at 1314,
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drunk driving inevitably resulted from Maddox's protected handicap,
then the termination would have been improper. 7' Presumably, how-
ever, Maddox, like most other alcoholics, did not drive each time he
drank; therefore his action was voluntary. 76 Thus, although the Univer-
sity may have terminated Maddox in part due to his alcoholism, at least
one additional reason for the termination was Maddox's faulty judg-
ment." Because of these multiple reasons, Maddox did not satisfy the
Act's requirement that the wrongful termination be "solely by reason
of .. his handicap."78 Although his alcoholism may have affected his
judgment that evening, such conduct does not inevitably follow, as seen
by the numerous alcoholics who refuse to drive while drunk. 79 In
addition, criminal law also recognizes that drunk driving is not wholly
involuntary and thus refuses to accept alcoholism as a defense to the
charge of driving while intoxicated."
Because driving while intoxicated amounts to a voluntary deci-
sion, Teahan, even if properly reasoned, can be distinguished from this
case. 8 ' The Teahan court, in ruling that the discharge of an alcoholic
employee for excessive absenteeism violated the Rehabilitation Act,
employed an example of the "thumping limper: 1'42 The court con-
cluded that the Act would prevent an employer from discharging a
handicapped employee for the "thump" sound that results from a
limp." By analogy to the facts of Teahan, the court determined that an
employer could not terminate an alcoholic employee who averaged
approximately fifty-three unexcused absences if the absences resulted
from his drinking." This reasoning does not apply to Maddox because
driving while intoxicated, unlike the "thump" sound that inevitably
results from a limp, results from a voluntary, albeit unwise, decision."
Furthermore, because some unexcused absences inevitably result from
alcoholism, labeling them "voluntary" would be inappropriate." In
sum, due to the physical effects of excessive drinking caused by alco-
holism, missed work-related obligations are an inevitable result of the
75 See Despears, 63 F.3d at 636-37, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1314.
76 See id. at 636, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1314.
77 See id.
78 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
79 See Despears, 63 F.3d at 636, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1319.
8° Id.
a' See Teahan, 951 F.2d at 513-14, 516, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1140, 1143.
82 Id. at 516, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1143.
93 Id. at 516-17, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1143.
84 Id. at 517, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1143.
85 See Despears, 63 F.3d at 636, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1314.
86 See id. at 637, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1314.
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protected handicap whereas driving while intoxicated constitutes a
voluntary decision. 87 Therefore, Teahan, even if decided properly, is
factually distinct from Maddox. 88
In conclusion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in Maddox v. University of Tennessee held that an employer can
permissibly distinguish between a discharge for misconduct and a
discharge solely by reason of disability." By embracing the Little ap-
proach, the Sixth. Circuit now permits employers to terminate employ-
ees for misconduct regardless of the employee's handicapped status."
Such an approach either rejects or sharply curtails Teahan's causal
connection analysis.9 ' Therefore, in the Sixth Circuit, the Rehabilita-
tion Act provides little protection for handicapped employees who
engage in egregious misconduct. 92
 It remains undecided by the Sixth
Circuit whether employees who demonstrate that this misconduct in-
evitably results from their protected disability will receive the protec-
tion of the Rehabilitation Act in the Sixth Circuit." There is no lan-
guage in Maddox, however, to suggest that the Sixth Circuit is currently
prepared to extend the protection of the Rehabilitation Act to such
employees."
FIRST AMENDMENT
*Balancing the Efficiency Needs of the Government as Employer Against
an Employee's First Amendment Rights: Jeffries v. Harlestonl
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
the rights of citizens to speak freely on social, political and economic
subjects without risking acts of retribution by the government. 2 A civil
remedy exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for any person who, under color
87 See id.
88 See Maddox, 62 F.3d at 844-45, 4 AD Cases (BNA) at 1254-55; Mahan, 951 E2d at 513-14,
57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 1140.
89 See Maddox, 62 F.3d at 847, 4 Al) Cases (BNA) at 1256.
9° See id. at 848, 4 AI) Cases (BNA) at 1257.
91 See Teahan, 951 F.2d at 517, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1143,
92 See Maddox, 62 F.3d at 848, 4 Al) Cases (BNA) at 1256.
99 See id.
94 See id. at 848, 4 Al) Cases (RNA) at 1257.
* By Megan M. Rose, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 52 F.3d 9, 10 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 806 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 116 S. CL 173 (1995).
2
 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
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of state law, is deprived of any right, privilege or immunity secured by
the United States Constitution. 3 Under § 1983, an employee termi-
nated by a government-employer is entitled to challenge the termina-
tion on grounds that it violated free speech rights protected by the
First Arnendment. 4
 In light of the government-employer's competing
mission to provide public services effectively and efficiently, however,
the government as employer has a greater interest in regulating em-
ployees' speech than the government as sovereign has in regulating
the speech of the general population. 5
 Balancing the government
employee's right to free speech with the government-employer's right
to regulate that speech has raised problems in the context of § 1983
wrongful termination suits. 6
In 1983, in Connick v. Myers, the United States Supreme Court
held that a government-employer's termination of an employee did
not violate her right to free speech because the employer's belief that
the employee's actions would disrupt the efficient functioning of the
office was reasonable and outweighed the employee's limited First
Amendment interest.? In Connick, an assistant district attorney sued
her employer under § 1983, claiming that he had fired her for distrib-
uting in the workplace a questionnaire concerning office policies. 8 The
Supreme Court noted that the threshold condition for a wrongful
termination suit on First Amendment grounds is that the speech at
issue be on a matter of public concern. 9 Whether speech touches
matters of public concern must be determined on a case by case basis,
considering the content, form and context of the speech." The Court
3 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 states, in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ... of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
4 See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 178, 180
(1983).
3 Id. at 140, 150-51, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 179, 183-84.
6 See, e.g., id. at 149-50, 152, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (RNA) at 183-84.
7 Id. at 154, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (RNA) at 185.
8 Id. at 141, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 180.
9 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 145, 146, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 181, , 182. The Court
reaffirmed its position that speech on public issues occupies the "highest rung of the hierarchy
of First Amendment values." Id. at 145, 1 1ndiv, Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 181 (quoting NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982)). The Court also stated that when the speech
cannot be fairly characterized as touching on a matter of public concern, the government-em-
ployer should have broad discretion in managing its offices, "without intrusive oversight by the
judiciary." See id. at 146, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 182.
30
 Id. at 147-48, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 182.
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observed that although most of the questionnaire involved an em-
ployee grievance relating to internal office policies, one question about
pressure to work in political campaigns did touch on a matter of public
concern." The Court next balanced the employee's right to distribute
that question against the employer's right to regulate employees' speech
and concluded that the employer's belief that the completion of ques-
tionnaires would disrupt the workplace, interfere with close working
relationships and undermine the authority of the supervisors out-
weighed the employee's limited First Amendment interest." Thus, the
Connick Court called for a fact-specific balancing inquiry to determine
whether a government-employer's decision to terminate an employee
violates the employee's right to speak on matters of public concern."
In 1987, in Rankin v. McPherson, the United States Supreme Court
held that a county constable's discharge of a clerical employee was
improper where the constable's interest in the dismissal did not outweigh
the employee's First Amendment freedom of speech." In Rankin, the
plaintiff alleged that the constable violated her First Amendment rights
by firing her for a remark she made to a coworker." After hearing of
an attempt to assassinate the President of the United States, the plain-
tiff had said to a coworker, "If they go for him again, I hope they get
him."" The Court first determined that the statements at issue consti-
tuted speech on a matter of public concern because they were com-
ments on presidential policies following an assassination attempt." In
order to determine whether the public employer acted properly in
discharging the employee for speech, the Court next balanced the
interests of the employee in commenting upon matters of public con-
cern against the interests of the government, as an employer, in per-
forming its public services effectively." The Court held that the employer
failed to demonstrate a state interest that outweighed the employee's
First Amendment rights, where there was no evidence that the em-
ployee's statements interfered with the function of the constable's
office, discredited the office or indicated that the employee was unfit
to perform her duties."
"Id. at 149, 154, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (RNA) at 183, 185.
12
 See id. at 151-53, 154, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 184, 185.
18 See id. at 154, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 185.
14
 483 U.S 378, 392, 2 Indiv, Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 257, 262 (1987).
15 See id. at 382, 2 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 258.
16 /d. at 381, 2 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 258.
17
 Id. at 386, 2 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 260.
18 Id. at 384, 2 Indiv. Empl, Rights Cas. (BNA) at 259 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). The Court noted that the state bears the burden of proving the
legitimacy of the discharge. Id. at 388, 2 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 260.
19 Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388-89, 2 Indiv. Ennpl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 261.
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The Court further explained that the potential for disruption
would increase with the level of authority and public accountability
inherent in the employee's position. 2° Because this employee's position
was purely clerical the Court concluded that her speech posed only a
minimal threat of disruption to the employer's law enforcement func-
tion.21 Thus, the Rankin Court held that a public employer may not
discharge an employee for engaging in speech on a matter of public
concern where the speech had no disruptive effect on the functioning
of the employer's enterprise. 22
In 1991, in Piesco v. City of New York, Department of Personnel, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a
public employer's discharge of an appointed city official for engaging
in speech violated her First Amendment rights, where the employer
failed to demonstrate that the employee's statements on matters of
public concern interfered with the efficient functioning of the work-
place. 25
 In Piesco, the plaintiff had held a provisional appointment as
Deputy Personnel Director for Examinations in the New York City
Department of Personnel ("DOP") and in that capacity oversaw the
administration of the Bureau of Examinations and the city's civil serv-
ice tests. 24
 Following a disagreement over the setting of a passing grade
for a police examination, the plaintiff replied affirmatively at a com-
mittee meeting when asked whether a "moron" could pass a police
examination with the passing grade set as it was. 25 The plaintiff filed
suit alleging that the DOP violated her First Amendment rights by
retaliating against her for her testimony before the committee. 26 Eight
days later, DOP fired the plaintiff. 27
The Second Circuit first determined that the plaintiff's statements
concerning the competency of police officers touched on matters of
public concern because law enforcement is a fundamental governmen-
tal function. 25
 The court stated that a primary purpose of the First
Amendment is to protect open discussion of political and governmen-
tal issues and that criticism of the government is the kind of speech
for which the First Amendment protection was designed. 29 The court
20 Id. at 390-91, 2 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (DNA) at 261-62.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 389, 392, 2 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (DNA) at 261, 262.
23 933 F.2d 1149, 1160 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 921 (1991).
2'1 1d. at 1151.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1153.
27 Id. Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint that added a count for wrongful
discharge under § 1983. Id. at 1154.
28 See Piesco, 933 E2d at 1157.
29 Id. at 1156-57.
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next applied the Connick balancing test and concluded that the plain-
tiff's interest in testifying truthfully before a city legislative committee
significantly outweighed the city's interest in efficiently performing its
public services." The Piesco court did acknowledge that the plaintiff
had held a relatively senior position and that the speech of such an
employee has a greater potential for disruption. 31
 The court explained,
however, that the need for honest and candid testimony from those
uniquely qualified to speak before a legislative investigative committee,
as well as their legal obligation to so testify, mitigates the burden
normally borne by high ranking officials to monitor their speech on
public matters.s 2
 The court also noted that when the speech at issue
substantially touches upon matters of public concern, the government
must make a stronger showing of disruption of the functioning of the
government-employer's enterprise." Because the plaintiffs statements
clearly touched on matters of public concern and the government-em-
ployer failed to demonstrate any interference with the effective func-
tioning of the workplace, the court determined that the DOP had
violated the plaintiff's First Amendment rights."
In 1994, in Waters v. Churchill, the United States Supreme Court
added to the Connick balancing test an inquiry into the evidentiary
bases of the employer's decision by stating that a government-employer
could properly terminate an employee for speech that might disrupt
the functioning of the employer's workplace, as long as the employer
used a reasonably reliable procedure for determining what was actually
said by the employee." The Supreme Court held that a public hospi-
tal's discharge of a nurse did not violate her First Amendment rights
because the hospital's belief that her speech had the potential to
interfere with its efficient functioning outweighed the nurse's interest
in expressing herself on a matter of public concern. 36 Waters involved
an obstetrics nurse at a public hospital who allegedly made remarks
critical of her department to another nurse considering transferring
to obstetrics. 37
 When the hospital fired her from her nursing job, she
filed suit claiming that her discharge violated her First Amendment
rights."
30
 Id. at 1157, 1158.
31
 Id. at 1157.
32 /d. at 1157, 1158.
33 See Piesco, 933 F.2d at 1159.
31 Id. at 1161.
35 See 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1889, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 801, 807 (1994).
36 See id. at 1891, 9 Indiv, Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 808-09.
37 Id. at 1882-83, 9 Indiv. Empt. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 801-02. The substance of the remarks
was disputed. Id. at 1882, 9 Indiv, Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 801.
68 Id. at 1883, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 802.
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The Court first noted that the government has a greater ability to
regulate speech when acting as employer, than when acting as sover-
eign.39 The government must be able to restrict employee speech in
some situations that would violate an employee's First Amendment
rights in a private employment setting, and courts must give greater
deference to government-employers' reasonable predictions of disrup-
tion when these predictions motivate restrictions on employee speech.4°
The Court further explained that the extra power the government has
in dismissing employees for engaging in speech arises from the nature
of the government's mission as employer. 41 The government hires an
employee to contribute to the government's mission, and when that
employee says things that hinder effective operations, the government-
employer must have power to restrain that employee. 42 Applying this
reasoning to the case at hand, the Court determined that the hospital's
discharge did not violate the nurse's First Amendment rights.* The
Court reasoned that whether or not the nurse's statements touched on
matters of public concern, they had the potential to disrupt operations
by discouraging people from coming to work in the obstetrics depart-
ment, undermining management authority and raising doubts as to
the nurse's future effectiveness."
The Waters Court also discussed the procedure or evidence upon
which a government-employer may reasonably rely in making a termi-
nation decision.* The Court stated that it would sustain the termina-
tion of an employee if the employer used reasonably reliable proce-
dures to determine what was actually said by the employee, even though
a trier of fact might later find that those procedures yielded incorrect
information.* Because the hospital interviewed the employee herself,
the nurse to whom the employee spoke, the person who overheard the
conversation and three managers who confirmed the informants' reli-
ability, the Court concluded that the hospital's investigation was rea-
sonable.47 Thus, the Waters Court held that the government-employer's
interests in maintaining effective operations outweighs an employee's
First Amendment rights when the employer bases its belief that the
" Id. at 1886-87, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 804.
4° Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1886-87, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 804-05.
41 Id. at 1887, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 806.
42 Id. at 1887-88, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 806.
43 See id. at 1890-91, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 808.
44 Id.
45 Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1888, 1890-91, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 806, 808.
4°/d. at 1888, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 806.
47 Id. at 1890, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 808.
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speech at issue is potentially disruptive on reasonably reliable informa-
tion. 48
During the Survey year, in Jeffries v. Harleston, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a public college
could remove a professor from his position as department chairperson
where it made a substantial showing that the removal was motivated by
a reasonable prediction that the professor's speech would disrupt the
efficient functioning of the college. 49 In Jeffries, a public college re-
moved a professor from his department chairmanship after he made
several anti-Semitic remarks at an off-campus conference." The Sec-
ond Circuit applied the Connick balancing test and showed substantial
deference to the government-employer's reasonable prediction of dis-
ruption.51
 The court held that an adverse employment action will be
sustained where the speech at issue is on a matter of public concern,
the potential for disruption outweighs the employee's First Amend-
ment rights and the employer's decision to take action is a reaction to
this potential disruption and not to the substance of the speech. 52
In Jeffries, the plaintiff, Leonard Jeffries, was chairman of the Black
Studies Department at City College of New York ("City College"), part
of the City University of New York ("CUNY") system, and was the
featured speaker at a July 1991 conference on black culture in Albany. 53
While commenting on what he considered to be racial and ethnic
biases in New York's public school curriculum, Jeffries made several
remarks disparaging Jews. i 4 Several days later, Bernard Harleston, the
President of City College, released a statement condemning Jeffries's
Albany speech as contrary to CUNY's policy of ethnic, racial and
religious tolerance. 55
At a meeting of the CUNY Board of Trustees in late October 1991,
Harleston recommended that the trustees reappoint Jeffries to only a
one-year term as chairman of the Black Studies Department, instead
of to the normal three-year term.5° Four of the trustees voted against
Jeffries's reappointment for any term in response to the content of his
48 Id. at 1890-91, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 808.
°Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 10, 10 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 806, 807 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 173 (1995) [hereinafter Jeffries II],
5° See Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238, 1238, 1241-42, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA)
686, 686, 688-89 (2d Cir.) [hereinafter Jeffries 1], vacated, 115 S. CL 502, 503 (1994).
51
 Jeffries H, 52 F.3d at 13, 10 litchi/. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 809.
52 Id.
53 See Jeffiies1, 21 F.3d at 1241, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 688.
54 Id. at 1241-42, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 689.
55 Id. at 1242, 9 Indiv, Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 689.
56 Id. at 1242, 9 Indiv, Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 689-90.
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speech. 57 Nine other trustees voted for the one-year reappointment,
and that term was approved by the Board. 58
 In a letter to Jeffries,
Harleston claimed that the Albany speech threatened "recruitment,
fund-raising, and CUNY's relationship with the community." 59
 In De-
cember 1991, Harleston proposed to replace Jeffries as chairman, and
the trustees voted unanimously for his replacement."
Jeffries filed suit in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York, naming as defendants Harleston, the CUNY
Chancellor and the fourteen individual trustees. 6 ' He claimed that the
defendants had removed him as department chair in violation of his
First Amendment right to free speech. 62 The district court served the
jury with three sets of interrogatories." The first set of jury responses
indicated that the defendants had limited Jeffries's term in reaction to
the content of the Albany speech." The jury also indicated that al-
though the speech did not actually disrupt the efficient and effective
operation of the Black Studies Department, the fifteen defendants
were motivated by a reasonable expectation that it would." The district
court judge determined from these responses that the fifteen defen-
dants had violated Jeffries's First Amendment rights because the Al-
bany speech was substantially on matters of public concern and did
not cause actual disruption to CUNY. 66
In response to a second set of interrogatories designed to deter-
mine the individual liability of the fifteen defendants, the jury found
that six of the defendants, the four trustees, Harleston and the CUNY
Chancellor, voted against Jeffries solely because of the Albany speech,
and the other nine, who voted only to limit Jeffries's term, did not base
their decision on the speech. 67 The district court judge enforced the
jury's third interrogatory response, awarding punitive damages against
" Id. at 1242, 9 Indiv, Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 690.
58 jeffries 1, 21 F.3d at 1242, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 690. One trustee abstained
from voting because she had previously criticized Jeffries's controversial views. Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1243, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 690.
61 Id. at 1241, 1245, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 688, 690. One of the trustees died
during the trial and Jeffries discontinued his claim against her. felfries II, 52 F.3d at 11, 10 lndiv.
Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 808.
62 Jeffries I
, 21 F.Sd at 1243, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 690.
63 See id, at 1243-44, 9 [Tlly, Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 690-91.
64 See id.
SeeJeffries II, 52 F.3d at 11, 10 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 808; Jeffries I, 21 F.Sd at
1243-44, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 690-91.
66 See Jeffries II, 52 F.3d at 11, 10 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 808.
67 Jeffries I, 21 F.3d at 1244, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 691.
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six of the defendants, and ordered Jeffries's reinstatement as chair-
man.68
 The defendants appealed.®
In Jeffries v. Harleston ("Jeffries I"), the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the reinstatement order, but recognized an
inconsistency in the two sets of interrogatories." The Jeffries I court
affirmed the district court's findings that Jeffries's speech touched
upon matters of public concern, that the decision to terminate Jeffries
was motivated by that speech and that the defendants had failed to
show "substantial interference" with CUNY's functioning." The court
could not reconcile the jury's finding that the fifteen defendants voted
to dismiss Jeffries based on a reasonable belief that the Albany speech
would disrupt the effective operation of CUNY with the further finding
that six of the defendants acted with "malicious intent" to violate
Jeffries's First Amendment rights." The court therefore vacated the
punitive damages against the six defendants and remanded for a new
trial on the punitive issues." After the decision in Waters v. Churchill,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Jeffries I decision
and remanded the case to the Second Circuit with instructions to
reconsider the case in light of Waters. 74
On remand from the Supreme Court, in Jeffries v. Harleston ("Jef-
fries II"), the Second Circuit reversed the Jeffries I decision and held
that Jeffries's removal as department chair was justified because the
defendants had a reasonable prediction of disruption that was sufficient
to overcome Jeffries's First Amendment interests." Following Waters,
the Second Circuit stated that in applying the Connick balancing test
a court should give substantial deference to a government-employer's
reasonable prediction of disruption and that the government-employer
need not show actual disruption or injury caused by the employee's
speech." The court noted that Waters had thus altered a crucial aspect
of the earlier Jeffries opinion." The Jeffries II court also acknowledged
the Waters conclusion that where the employee's interest in comment-
ing on public matters is stronger, the government-employer's bur-
den of showing that the speech would likely result in disruption in-
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1241, 9 Indiv. Einpl, Rights Cas. (BNA) at 688.
"Jeffries II, 52 F.3d at 11, 10 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 808.
"Jeffries I, 2:1 F,3d at 1245-46, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 692-93.
72
 Jeffries II, 52 F.3d at 11-12, 10 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 808.
75 Id. at 12, 10 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 808.
74 /d.
75
 See id. at 15, 10 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cat. (BNA) at 810.
76
 Id. at 13, 10 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 809.
"Jeffiies II, 52 F.3d at 13, 10 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cat. (BNA) at 809.
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creases." The Jeffries II court restated the Connick balancing test in
light of the Waters holding and concluded that a government-employer
may discharge an employee for engaging in speech that touches on a
matter of public concern if (1) the employer's determination of po-
tential disruption is reasonable; (2) the potential for disruption out-
weighs the value of the speech; and (3) the employer took action
against the employee because of this potential disruption and not in
retaliation for the content of the speech."
The Jeffries II court next reviewed the jury's responses to the inter-
rogatories in the district court case and determined that the jury's
"central finding" was that the fifteen defendants had voted to limit
Jeffries's term based on a reasonable prediction of disruption and not
based on a retaliatory motivation. 8° Relying on that jury finding, the
Jeffries II court held that as a matter of law the potential for disruption
created by the Albany speech outweighed Jeffries's First Amendment
rights." The court then disposed of the inconsistency in the jury
responses by stating that "elementary principles of causation" demanded
the conclusion that the defendants had not violated Jeffries's rights."
The court explained that because a majority of the defendants voted
to limit Jeffries's term based on a legitimate motive, their reasonable
expectation of disruption, the decision of the Board of Trustees did
not violate Jeffries's constitutional rights." The court also rejected the
argument that Jeffries's speech deserved greater protection because of
Jeffries's role as an educator by holding that Jeffries's position as
department chair was not academic, but purely "ministerial," in na-
ture." Thus, the Jeffries II court concluded that the government-em-
ployer's reasonable prediction of disruption caused by an employee's
speech on a matter of public concern outweighed the employee's First
Amendment right of free speech. 85
By accepting the broader "reasonable prediction of disruption"
standard and deferring to employers' conclusions that are based on
reasonable investigative procedures, the Jeffries II court's interpreta-
tion of Waters signals that courts will show significantly greater defer-
ence to government-employers' determinations in wrongful discharge
78 Id.
79 Id.
88 Id. at 13, 10 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 810.
Hi Id.
82 Jeffries II, 52 F.3d at 14, 10 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 810.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 14, 10 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 810-11.
83 Id. at 13, 15, 10 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 810, 811.
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suits. 88
 In practice, it appears the government-employer will bear a light
burden in showing that it considered disruption likely under the cir-
cumstances of the case. For example, in Waters, the Supreme Court
deferred to the hospital's determination that the plaintiffs alleged
criticism of the obstetrics department might discourage people from
transferring to the department, undermine the authority of the hospi-
tal management or hinder the plaintiffs continued effectiveness. 87 The
Court stated that if the hospital "really did believe" the two employees
who witnessed the plaintiffs comments, and if the hospital fired the
plaintiff because of those comments, then the termination was lawful. 88
In other words, the requirements for investigation seem minimal. Not
only are government-employers able to establish and follow investiga-
tive procedures free from the strictures of the evidentiary rules of
court, but they also are encouraged to rely on hearsay, personal judg-
ments of credibility and character, and unfounded complaints. 89 As
long as a reasonable manager would approve of the procedure used
to determine what was actually said and the government-employer
found a potential for disruption, the employer will escape liability. 90
The Jeffries //court's additional requirement that the government-
employer prove that it acted in response to the potential disruption
and not in response to the substance of the speech itself will probably
not restrict the government-employer's broadened freedom under Jef-
fries II.'' A government-employer could satisfy this requirement so eas-
ily in most cases that it affords almost no additional protection to the
employee. If the managers disagree with the content of the speech,
they might also reasonably believe, or at least claim in a believable
manner, that others will find it disagreeable. On that basis they may
justify their decision by citing potential harm to working relationships
or doubt as to the employee's future effectiveness, when the decision
was primarily, though perhaps secretly, a reaction to the substance of
the speech. 92
 Once a government-employer is on notice of the Jeffries II
standard, it may simply pay closer attention to the phrasing of its
determinations and word public statements and termination notices
accordingly. Although four of the CUNY trustees admitted basing their
86 Id. at 13, 10 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 809.
97 Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1890-91, 9 Indiv, Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 801, 808
(1994).
88 Id. at 1890, 9 Indio. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 808.
89 See id, at 1888-89, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 806.
9° See id, at 1889, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 807,
'Jeffries II, 52 F.3d at 13-14, 10 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 809, 810.
92
 See Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1890-91, 9 lndiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 808.
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decision to reject Jeffries's reappointment on the substance of his
Albany speech, it is probable that avoiding such public confessions and
instead citing concerns about potential effects on the workplace will
allow the employer to avoid liability."
In Jeffries II, the Second Circuit did not fully develop its interpre-
tation of the Waters requirement that the employer's investigative pro-
cedures be reasonably reliable.94 In Waters, the Supreme Court held
that a government-employer can properly terminate an employee for
speech only if the employer uses reasonably reliable procedures to
determine the nature of the speech at issue." The Jeffries II court
correctly interpreted Waters as holding that the government can ter-
minate an employee for potentially disruptive speech based on a rea-
sonable belief of what was said, regardless of what was actually said.96
The Jeffries II interpretation of Waters subsumes the inquiry into the
reasonableness of the investigative procedures through which the em-
ployer's belief is formed.97 Yet because the Jeffries II court determined
that there was no dispute as to what Jeffries actually said, it did not
review the reasonableness of the investigative procedures used by CUNY. 98
The Jeffries II decision therefore does not indicate how the Second
Circuit will conduct such an inquiry when there is a dispute as to what
was actually said by the employee.
In summary, the feffries //court held that where a government-em-
ployer terminates an employee for engaging in speech on a matter of
public concern, the employer need only show that it fired the em-
ployee because of a reasonable prediction of disruption of the effective
functioning of the employer's workplace." The courts will grant con-
siderable deference to the government-employer's conclusions as to
what was actually said and its potential for disruption.'" While both
Waters and Jeffries II emphasize the special mission of the government
as employer and the justifications for the broader powers accorded it
in that capacity, the fact-specific balancing test they establish will always
be tipped in the State's favor by the courts' consistent grants of deference
to the government-employer's investigations and determinations.' 91
93 See Jeffries I, 21 F.3d at 1242, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 690.
94 See Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1889, 9 Indiv. Empi. Rights Cas, (BNA) at 807; Jeffries II, 52 F.3d
at 12, 10 Indiv. Empl. Rights Gas. (BNA) at 809.
95 See Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1890, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 807, 808.
94iJeffries II, 52 F.3d at 12, 10 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 809.
97 Id.
98 Id. The court instead focused its opinion on the issue of disruptiveness. Id.
" Id. at 13, 10 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (RNA) at 809, 810.
IN Id. at 13, 10 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 809.
See Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1887, 9 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 806; Jeffries II, 52 F.3d
at 13, 10 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 809.
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FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
*Employees Not Bound 11 Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment
Claims Unless They Knowingly Contract to Fargo Their Statutory
Remedies: Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Lail
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")
both to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agree-
ments and to place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with
other contracts.2
 The FAA allows federal district courts to stay proceed-
ings when a claim can be referred to arbitration and to compel arbi-
tration when one party has not complied with an arbitration agreement.'
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted these provisions as
manifesting Congress's intent to favor arbitration agreements.'
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title
VII") to ensure equality of employment opportunities.' Title VII pro-
vides for consideration of employment-discrimination claims in sev-
eral forums, and in general, submission to one forum does not pre-
clude subsequent submission to another.' The Court has interpreted
these provisions as manifesting Congress's intent to make the policy
against discrimination of the highest priority. 7
 Consequently, courts
must determine whether compelling arbitration of a particular Title
VII claim is consistent with Congress's policy against employment dis-
crimination.'
* By Cameron S. Matheson, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1
 42 F.3d 1299, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 933 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S, Ct.
61, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1536 (1995).
2
 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24, 55 Fair Empl. Prat. Cas. (BNA)
1116, 1119 (1991). The FAA provides in pertinent part:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a trans-
action involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
out of such contract or transaction shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
s 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1994).
4 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25, 55 Fair Erupt. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1119.
'Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44, 7 Fair Empl. ['MC. Cas. (BNA) 81, 84
(1974). Title VII provides in pertinent part: "It shall he an unlawful employment practice for an
employer ... to discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex or national origin , ..." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1988).
6
 Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47-48, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 85 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(b), (c),	 (1988)).
7 Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 85.
8
 See, e.g., Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59-60, 7 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 90; Prudential, 42
F.3d at 1305, 66 Fair Empl, Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 936.
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In 1974, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the United States
Supreme Court held that an arbitrator's resolution of a contractual
claim did not dispose of a statutory claim under Title VII. 9 The em-
ployee filed a claim in federal court alleging that the employer fired
him because of his race in violation of Title VII.'° The district court
dismissed the case because an arbitrator had previously adjudicated
the discrimination claim in the employer's favor, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed per curiam." On
appeal, the Supreme Court interpreted the legislative history and pro-
cedures of Title VII as indicative of Congress's intent that the act
supplement, not replace, other laws and institutions relating to em-
ployment discrimination.' 2 The Supreme Court rejected the reasoning
of the two lower courts and determined that the doctrine of election
of remedies was inapplicable to the case, stating that an employee
asserts contractual rights in arbitration and statutory rights in a law-
suit.' 3 The Court also dismissed the argument that the employee waived
his cause of action under Title VII, opining that because Title VII
concerns individual rights it cannot be waived prospectively.' 4 Submis-
sion of a grievance to arbitration did not constitute a waiver, accord-
ing to the Court, because such a submission is an existing contractual
right and no additional concession may be exacted as the price for
its enforcement.' 5 The Court held, accordingly, that the arbitrator's
resolution of the employee's employment discrimination claim did
not dispose of the employee's statutory right to pursue the claim in
court.'6
In 1991, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the United
States Supreme Court held that an arbitration agreement could subject
claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
("ADEA") to compulsory arbitration." The employee filed a claim in
federal court alleging that the employer fired him because of his age
in violation of the ADEA.' 8 In response, the employer filed a motion
to compel arbitration of the ADEA claim.' 9 The Court interpreted the
9 See 415 U.S. at 59-60, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 90.
1 ° Id. at 43, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 83.
11 /d.
12 Id. at 48-49, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 85-86.
13 1d. at 49-50, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 86.
34 Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 86-87.
15 1d. at 52, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 87.
36 See id, at 59-60, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 90.
17 500 U.S. 20, 23, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1116, 1118 (1991).
18 Id. at 23-24, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1119.
19 /d. at 24, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1119.
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FAA as allowing compulsory arbitration of statutory claims unless Con-
gress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statu-
tory rights in question. 2° The Court reasoned that parties are afforded
the same substantive rights by agreeing to arbitrate statutory claims as
they are through a judicial remedy." The Court distinguished Alexan-
der on the grounds that the employee in that case had only agreed to
arbitrate contractual rights under a collective-bargaining agreement
whereas the employee in Gilmer agreed to arbitrate statutory rights. 22
The Court held, therefore, that because the employee had failed to
show that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of ADEA claims,
his ADEA claim was subject to compulsory arbitration in accordance
with the arbitration agreement he had signed."
In 1992, in Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the Gilmer decision to
Title VII claims and held that the employee failed to show that Con-
gress intended to preclude arbitration of Title VII clairns. 24 The em-
ployee claimed sexual harassment and gender discrimination in viola-
tion of Title VII.2s The employer moved to stay the proceeding and
compel arbitration under the terms of the employee's employment
agreement. 29 Following Gilmer, the Ninth Circuit opined that Title VII
and the ADEA had similar aims and provisions." The court concluded
therefore that Title VII claims may be subject to arbitration pursuant
to a prior arbitration agreement's
During the Survey year, in Prudential Insurance Co. of America v.
Lai, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
Title VII plaintiffs may be forced to waive their statutory remedies and
arbitrate their claims only if they knowingly agreed to submit those
disputes to arbitration." In Prudential, two employees sued Prudential
Insurance Co. ("Prudential") and their supervisor on various state law
claims, alleging rape, harassment and sexual abuse." Prudential filed
an action in federal district court to compel arbitration based on the
20 Id. at 26, 55 Fair Empl, Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1120.
21 Id.
22 Gilmer, 500 U,S. at 35, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1123.
23 See id.
24
 956 F.2d 932, 935, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 178, 180 (9th Cir. 1992).
25 Id. at 934, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 179.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 935, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 180.
28 Id.
29 42 F.3d 1299, 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 933, 937 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 61, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1536 (1995).
30 Id. at 1301, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 934. The FAA applies identically to state
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Standard Applications for Securities Industry Registration ("the U-4
forms"), which the employees had been required to sign when applying
for their positions." The court determined that the evidence showed the
employees could not have known that by signing the U-4 forms they
were agreeing to arbitrate sexual discrimination claims." The court
further concluded that Congress intended to encourage arbitration
only where the parties have knowingly and voluntarily agreed to arbi-
trate certain disputes." The court thus held that the appellants were
not bound to arbitrate their sexual discrimination claims because they
did not knowingly waive their statutory remedies."
In Prudential, the appellants worked for Prudential as sales repre-
sentatives,35 When they applied for their positions, Prudential required
the employees to sign U-4 forms that contained an agreement to
arbitrate any dispute required to be arbitrated by the rules, constitu-
tions or bylaws of the organizations with which appellants subsequently
registered." The employees subsequently registered with the National
Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") which required arbitration
of disputes arising in connection with its members' business." The
employees alleged that they were directed to sign the U-4 forms with-
out being given an opportunity to read the arbitration clause contained
within, arbitration was never mentioned and they were never given a copy
of the NASD Manual that contained the terms of the agreement requir-
ing arbitration that the company later sought to enforce."
The employees sued Prudential and their supervisor in state court
on various state law claims, alleging rape, harassment and sexual abuse."
claims and Title VII claims because state anti-discrimination laws are part of Title VIPs enforce-
ment scheme. Id. at 1303 n.1, 66 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 935 n.l.
51 Id. at 1301, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 933-34.
"Id. at 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 937.
38 See id. at 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 936.
34
 Prudential, 42 F.3d at 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (13NA) at 937.
35 Id. at 1301, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 934.
36 Id. The U-4 forms provided in pertinent part: "I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or
controversy that may arise between me or my firm, or a customer, or any other person, that is
required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or bylaws of the organizations with which
I register." Id. at 1302, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 935.
37 Id. at 1301, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 934. The NASD Manual provided in pertinent
part: "Any dispute, claim or controversy eligible for submission under part I of this Code between
or among members and/or associated persons ... arising in connection with the business of such
member(s) or in connection with the activities of such associated person(s), shall be arbitrated
under this Code." Id. at 1302, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 935.
38 Id. at 1301, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 934.
"Prudential, 42 F.3d at 1301, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 934.
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Prudential filed an action in federal district court to stay the state court
proceedings and compel arbitration." The district court granted Pru-
dential's motions.'"
In overturning the district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit first
decided that a court was the proper forum for deciding the issue of
arbitrability.42 Unlike the district court, the Ninth Circuit found Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing —in which the United
States Supreme Court held that under the FAA an arbitrator, and not
a court, must decide whether an entire contract containing an arbitra-
tion clause had been induced by fraud—inapplicable to the case." The
Ninth Circuit framed the issue before it as whether and under what
circumstances individuals may waive their Title VII statutory remedies,
which differed from the issue in Prima Paint." The court concluded,
therefore, that because courts routinely decide whether Congress in-
tended to prevent or limit the arbitrability of statutory claims, the issue
of arbitrability was within the court's province."
Next, the court probed congressional intent by examining the
legislative histories of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Civil Rights
Act of 1991." It found that prior to 1991, courts interpreted Title VII
as prohibiting any waiver of its statutory remedies in favor of arbitra-
tion.47
 The Ninth Circuit also noted that in passing the Civil Rights Act
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1304, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 936. In a procedural aspect of the case, the
court held that it had jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the FAA. See id. at 1302, 66 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 935. The FAA provides in pertinent part:
An appeal may be taken from ... a final decision with respect to an arbitration
that is subject to this title.... Except as otherwise provided in section 1292(b) of
title 28, an appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory order—
(1) granting a stay of any action under section 3 of this title;
(2) directing arbitration to proceed under section 4 of this tide;
(3) compelling arbitration under section '206 of this title ....
9 U.S.C. § 16 (1994). Persuaded by every other court that had considered the issue, the Ninth
Circuit interpreted 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3) as allowing appeals of decisions to compel arbitration in
cases in which the motion to compel arbitration is the only claim before the district court.
Prudential, 42 F.3d at 1302, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 934.
43 See Prudential, 42 F.3d at 1303-04, 66 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 935-36 (citing Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)). Relying on Prima Paint, the district
court did not decide whether the arbitration clause was enforceable, concluding that the question
was for the arbitrator to decide, Prudential, 42 F.3d at 1303, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
935.
44
 Prudential, 42 E3d at 1303-04, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 935-36.
95 1d.
46 Id. at 1304-05, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 936.
47 Id, at 1304, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 936.
436	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 37:303
of 1964, Congress indicated that the policy supporting anti-discrimina-
tion was of the highest priority. 48
 Looking at Congress's intent regard-
ing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the court reasoned that the purpose
of section 118, which allows for the use of arbitration to settle claims,
was to increase the remedies available to civil rights plaintiffs and to
allow compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims only "where appropri-
ate," that is, only where the parties knowingly choose that method.°
One House report explained the purpose of the section as consistent
with the Alexander Court's interpretation of Title VII.50 The Ninth
Circuit determined that the public policy of protecting victims of
sexual discrimination is at least as strong as the public policy favoring
arbitration.5 ' The court then noted that the remedies and procedures
of an arbitral forum can differ significantly from those contemplated
by Congress, thus affecting a plaintiff's substantive rights." The court
held, therefore, that Title VII plaintiffs may be forced to arbitrate
claims only after knowingly agreeing to submit such claims to arbitra-
tion."
Applying its test to the case before it, the Ninth Circuit held that
the appellants did not knowingly agree to submit sexual discrimination
claims to arbitration. 54
 The court stated that the U-4 forms the appel-
lants signed did not describe any of the types of suits subject to arbi-
tration.55
 The court further determined that the NASD arbitration
clause did not put the appellants on notice that arbitration of Title VII
claims would be compelled because it did not even refer to employ-
411 Id,
49 See Prudential, 42 F.3d at 1304, 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 936. Section 118
states in pertinent part: "Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of
alternative means of dispute resolutions including, . . . arbitration, is encouraged to resolve
disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by this title." Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991) (set forth in the notes following 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(Supp. IV 1992)).
Senator Dole, speaking of § 118, said the arbitration provision encourages arbitration only
"where the parties knowingly and voluntarily elect to use these methods." 137 Conic. Rtc. 515,472,
S15,478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole).
5° Prudential, 42 F.3d at 1304, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 936. The House Report
stated: "[T]he committee believes that any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration ...
does not preclude the affected person from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of
Title VII. This view is consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII in Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co." H.R. REP. No. 40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 635.
51 Prudential, 42 F.3d at 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 936.
52 See id. at 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 936-37.
53 Id. at 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 937.
54 Id.
55 Id.
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ment disputes.'" The court noted that the Seventh Circuit in Farrand
v. Lutheran Brotherhood had held as a matter of law that the relevant
NASD provision did not cover employment disputes." The Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that the appellants could not have understood that by
signing the U-4 forms they were agreeing to arbitrate sexual discrimi-
nation claims." The court, therefore, held that the appellants were not
bound by the arbitration agreements they had signed because they did
not knowingly agree to them."
In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Judge Norris agreed
that the appellants were not bound by the arbitration agreement they
had signed because of the language of the relevant NASD provision,
but disagreed with the majority's unnecessary interpretation of Title
VII's arbitration provision.'" He agreed with the Seventh Circuit's de-
cision in Fan-and that the relevant NASD provision did not apply to
employment disputes."' judge Norris argued that the inapplicability of
the provision was dispositive of the issue facing the court."' He argued,
therefore, that the majority should not have gone on to hold that
Congress intended to allow only knowing waivers of the right to adju-
dicate employment discrimination claims and that the employees in
this case did not knowingly waive that right because there was no need
to reach those issues.'"
Critics of the Prudential decision may agree with judge Norris, that
the Ninth Circuit went too far. On the other hand, the court may not
have gone far enough. Because of its resolution of the case, the court
found it unnecessary to decide whether the Civil Rights Act of 1991
("CRA") overruled Gilmer.64 Instead, the court used the legislative history
of the CRA to determine that Congress intended to preclude unknow-
ing waivers of the right to adjudicate employment discrimination claims."'
Six months after the United States Supreme Court decided Gilmer,
Congress enacted the CRA, in part to overrule several Supreme Court
decisions restricting the rights of plaintiffs alleging discrimination." In
56 Prudential, 42 F.3d at 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 937.
57 Id. (citing Farrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 993 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1993)).
58 Prudential, 42 F.3d at 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 937.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1305-06, 66 Fair Ernpl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 937 (Norris, J., concurring).
61 Id. (Norris, J., concurring).
62 Id. at 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 937 (Norris, J., concurring).
63 Prudentia4 42 F.3d at 1306, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 937 (Norris, J., concurring).
64 Id. at 1303 n.2, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 935 n.2.
65 Id. at 1504-05, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 936.
66 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991) (set
forth in the notes following 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. IV 1992)). Section 3 provides in pertinent
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enacting the CRA, Congress may have intended to preclude any waiver
of the statutory remedies created by Title VII. Section 118 of the CRA
dealt with arbitration of civil rights disputes. 67 A House report stated
that section 118 encouraged alternative dispute resolution; 68 however,
an agreement to arbitrate, in the context of a collective bargaining
agreement or in an employment contract, does not preclude relief
under the enforcement provisions of Tide VII. 69 The Supreme Court
in Gilmer had distinguished its prior decision in Alexander, in which it
held that prior arbitration of a claim did not preclude the later asser-
tion of a Title VII claim in court, on the grounds that Alexander dealt
with a collective bargaining agreement, whereas Gilmer dealt with a
private employment agreement. 7° The reasoning behind section 118 of
the CRA, therefore, indicates that Congress intended to overturn the
Gilmer decision!'
Although the Ninth Circuit declined to decide whether the CRA
overruled Gilmer, the court did carve out an exception to Gilmer. 72 It
left unresolved the question of how courts will determine whether a
waiver was knowing. The Ninth Circuit relied on both the language of
the NASD provision and on the fact that the appellants were not given
the opportunity to read it." Though the court did not provide any
explicit standards, it implied that arbitration clauses may need to
describe all disputes the parties agreed to arbitrate. 74 Regardless of the
test for a knowing waiver, employers in the Ninth Circuit will find it
more difficult, after Prudential, to compel employees to arbitrate Title
VII claims."
In summary, the Ninth Circuit in Prudential held that Title VII
plaintiffs may be compelled to arbitrate their claims only if they know-
ingly waived their statutory remedies by agreeing to submit those
disputes to arbitration.76 This ruling represents an exception to the
part: "The purposes of this Act are . , . to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by
expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to
victims of discrimination." Id.
67 Set forth in the notes following 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. IV 1992); see Prudential, 42 F.3d
at 1304, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 936.
66 14.8. REP. No. 40(1), supra note 50, at 97, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. at 635.
419 Prudential, 42 F.3d at 1304, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 936.
76 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas.
(BNA) 1116, 1123 (1991).
71 See Prudential, 42 E3d at 1304, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas, (BNA) at 936.
72 See id. at 1303 n.2, 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 935 n.2, 937.
71 See id. at 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 937.
71 See id.
75 See id.
76 See Prudential, 42 F.3d at 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 937.
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holding in Gilmer that employment discrimination claims can be sub-
jected to compulsory arbitration.77 The decision may prevent many
employers from enforcing arbitration clauses against employees claiming
employment discrimination. 78
 Nevertheless, employers are not com-
pletely foreclosed from compelling arbitration of Title VII claims."
They may compel arbitration where they can prove that the employee
made a knowing waiver of statutory remedies, 8°
77 See id.
78 See id.
7!Y
	 id. at 1303, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 935.
89 See id. at 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 937.
